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Abstract. Information flow security is classically formulated in terms of the absence of
illegal information flows, with respect to a security setting consisting of a single flow policy
that specifies what information flows should be permitted in the system. However, this
security model does not suit scenarios of distributed and mobile computing where security
policies are decentralized and distinct policies might simultaneously apply to different
parts of a program depending on their dynamically changing location. The challenge of
managing compliance to heterogeneous security policies is further fledged when migrating
programs conform to varying policies at different points of their executions, as in when
declassification must be performed.
We investigate the security issues that emerge in distributed security settings, where
each computation domain establishes its own local security policy, and where programs
may exhibit location-dependent behavior. In particular, we study the interplay between
two distinct flow policy layers: the declared flow policy, established by the program itself,
and the allowed flow policy, established externally to the program by each computation
domain. We refine two security properties that articulate how the behaviors of programs
comply to the respective flow policies: Distributed Non-disclosure, for enabling programs
to declare locally scoped flow policies; and Flow Policy Confinement, for controlling the
flow policies that are declared by programs.
We present enforcement mechanisms that are based on type and effect systems, ranging
from purely static mechanisms to hybrid combinations with dynamic migration control, for
enforcing the above properties on an expressive ML-like language with concurrent threads
and code migration, and which includes an allowed flow policy construct that dynamically
tests the allowed flow policy of the current context.
Finally, we show that the combination of the above two properties guarantees that
actual information flows do not violate the relevant allowed flow policies. To this end
we propose and use the Distributed Non-Interference property, a natural generalization of
Non-Interference to a distributed security setting that ensures that information flows in a
program respect the allowed flow policy of the domains where they originate.
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21. Introduction
Crucial services of today’s societies, such as health care, energy, communication, trans-
portation, finance, security and defense are increasingly supported by and dependent of
the well-functioning of interconnected networks of computing devices that can be seen as
a cyber ecosystem [US 11]. At the same time, the impact of cyber attacks is continuously
escalating, having become increasingly frequent and widespread, now holding an unprece-
dented potential for damage. Indeed, the new possibilities offered by existing distributed
computing technologies are exploited by parties with hazardous intentions, by means of pro-
grams that are able to automatically propagate throughout computation sites, persistently
occupy those sites, and set up communication pathways for conducting cyber attacks in a
concerted manner. In other words, they utilize the global computing paradigm, and must
be tackled using mechanisms that act with at least the same level of sophistication [US 11].
The present paper proposes to contribute to this goal by setting the distributed security
problem in terms of global computing concepts, by means of mechanisms drawn from lan-
guage based security.
Access control serves a crucial role in cyber-security, by ensuring that access to computer
resources is only granted to subjects that hold the required clearances. However, it does
not offer the necessary refinement for controlling how programs manipulate the information
that is held by a resource once access to it is granted. Information flow security regards
the control of illegal flows of information across resources of different security levels during
program execution, such as the prevention of confidentiality violations that are entailed
by flows from private to publicly available resources. This kind of program behavior is
established by means of dependencies that are encoded in programs, and can be detected by
employing information flow analyses. The language-based approach to security has placed a
lot of attention on the study of information flow properties and enforcement mechanisms in
a variety of programming paradigms [SM03]. Information flow properties range in strictness
from pure absence of information leaks, known as Non-interference [GM82], to more flexible
properties that allow for declassification to take place in a controlled manner [SS05].
Distributed security setting. The specification of information flow policies, or what informa-
tion flows should be permitted during program execution [BvDS15], is classically formulated
in terms of a single security setting consisting of a security labeling, that assigns security
levels to programming language information resources, and a security lattice, that orders
security levels according to their degree of confidentiality and/or integrity [Den76]. How-
ever, in the context of distributed and mobile computing, security policies are decentralized,
and distinct policies might simultaneously apply to different parts of a program depend-
ing on their location. Enforcement of confidentiality in networks must therefore deal with
distributed security policies, since different computation domains (or sites) follow different
security orientations. This issue is particularly challenging when migrating programs are
given the flexibility to perform declassifying operations, as these might be acceptable or not
depending on the policy of the thread’s current computation domain. For example, migrat-
ing programs that were conceived to comply to certain security policies do not necessarily
respect those of the computational locations they might end up executing at. Furthermore,
when programs consist of more than one thread running concurrently, the same program
might need to comply to more than one security policy simultaneously. This problem seems
to be beyond the grasp of single program constructs that can restrict by whom, when, what,
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or where in the program declassification can be performed [SS05], since here the question
is: in which context?
So far, most studies of declassification have been directed towards local computation
scenarios, thus overlooking security issues that result from heterogeneous security require-
ments. In order to study this problem, we consider as a starting point a distributed security
setting where each computation domain establishes its own local flow policy in the form
of a security lattice. More precisely, we consider a refinement of the notion of flow pol-
icy, and study the compliance of programs, consisting of one or more migrating threads,
to two distinct information flow policy layers: the declared flow policy, established by the
program itself, representing a specification mechanism for enabling declassification; the al-
lowed flow policy, established externally to the program by each computation domain, as
an actual boundary on information leaks that are performed by programs. During compu-
tation, both of these flow policies can change dynamically. While the former is changed via
declassification declarations, the latter is changed via program migrations.
Flow policy awareness. At the programming language level, we assume that intention to per-
form declassification is expressed by means of a purely declarative declassification-enabling
construct, while inspection of the relevant allowed flow policies is facilitated by means of a
flow policy context testing construct that provides the programmer with flow policy aware-
ness. Let us take a closer look at the concrete programming constructs that are considered
in this paper for these roles.
In order to enable local dynamic changes to the valid flow policy, the programming
language may be enriched with a flow declaration construct (flow F in M) that simply
declares the flow policy F as valid in its scope M . It is then easy to declare more flexible
flow policy environments for delimited blocks of code, as for instance the part of a program
that is executed by authenticated users:
(if authenticated then (flow Fpermissive in M) else N) (1.1)
This program declares that flows in M conform to a policy that is extended by Fpermissive.
In other words, M may contain declassifications that comply to Fpermissive.
At the moment that a program is written, it might be hard to anticipate which flow
policies will be imposed at execution time by the domains where the program will run.
In a distributed context with code mobility, the problem becomes more acute, since the
computation site might change during execution, along with the allowed flow policy with
which the program must comply. In order to provide programs with some awareness re-
garding the flow policy that is ruling in the current computation domain, we introduce the
allowed-condition, written (allowed F then M else N), that tests whether the flow policy
F is allowed by the current domain and executes branches M or N accordingly. Programs
can then offer alternative behaviors to be taken in case the domains they end up at do not
allow declassifications of the kind they intended to perform:
(allowed Fdisclose secret then M else plan B) (1.2)
The allowed-condition brings no guarantees that the plan B of the above program does not
disclose just as much as the M branch. However, misbehaving programs can be rejected
by the domains where they would migrate, so its chances of being allowed to execute are
increased by covering portions of code containing declassifications with appropriate allowed-
conditions.
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When moving within a distributed security setting, the allowed-condition makes pro-
gram behavior depend on location. As a consequence, new information flows can be encoded
using this language construct, and give rise to a form of illegal flow known as migration
leak, where a program’s location is leaked [AC11].
Modular security properties and enforcement mechanisms. Separating the problems of declar-
ing and of controlling declassification enables the decomposition of security requirements
into specialized properties that can be defined and enforced independently. Here we treat
the former as an information flow control problem, in the frame of the non-disclosure prop-
erty [AB09], while the latter is isolated as the problem of ensuring that declassifications that
are performed by mobile code respect the flow policy that is allowed at the computation
domain where they are performed.
The non-disclosure property can be seen as a generalization of Non-interference. It uses
information provided by the program semantics describing which flow policies are valid at
different points of the computation, to ensure that, at each step, all information flows comply
with the declared flow policy. The property serves to guarantee consistency between the
declared flow policies and the actual flows that programs perform. It does not impose any
limit on the usage of declarations. The imposition of one or more levels of control can be
treated as an independent problem.
Enforcing compliance of declassifications with allowed flow policies of computation do-
mains raises new challenges when code moves in a distributed security setting. For instance,
a computation domain d might want to impose a limit to the flexibility of the flow declara-
tions that it executes, and prevent incoming code from containing:
(flow Fall is allowed in M) (1.3)
In the above example, the flow declaration validates any declassifications that might occur
in M , regardless of what is considered acceptable by d. However, in order to reason about
whether this declaration is acceptable, it is necessary to take into consideration what are
the security policies of the domains where this code might run. We formulate the problem
of ensuring that programs’ threads can only declare declassifications that comply with the
allowed flow policy of the domain where they are performed in terms of confinement with
respect to an allowed flow policy. This property is not concerned with the actual leaks that
are taking place, but only with the declared intentions of enabling a declassification.
To sum up, two security properties that articulate the compliance of program behavior
to the respective flow policies are studied in this paper:
(1) Distributed Non-disclosure, which requires information leaks that are encoded by
programs to respect the declared flow policies of the context in which they are
executing, in a language that includes a notion of locality, migration capabilities
and location-dependent behavior. This property is intended as a tool for enabling
the programmer to introduce declassification in the program.
(2) Flow Policy Confinement requires that declassifications that are used by programs
respect the allowed flow policy of the context in which they execute. This property
formalizes a simple form of declassification control.
Both properties can be enforced statically by means of a type and effect system. However,
the latter depends on the allowed flow policies of each domain that the program might
migrate to. This motivates the proposal to shift part of the burden of the declassification
control to runtime, in order to improve efficiency and precision of the mechanism. We
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argue for this shift by presenting mechanisms, centered on migration control, that range
from purely static to hybrid combinations with dynamic features.
Declassification control as migration control. The problem of controlling the use of declassi-
fication across a distributed security setting can be reduced to a migration control problem,
by preventing programs from migrating to sites if they would potentially violate that site’s
allowed flow policy. To achieve this, domains must be able to check incoming code against
their own allowed flow policies, ideally assisted by certificates that are carried by the pro-
gram, and then decide upon whether those programs should be let in. We thus address
the technical problem of inferring what are the flexible flow policies that a program might
set up for its own executions. A certificate could consist of information about all the flow
policies that are declared in the program and are not validated by the allowed-branch of an
allowed-condition. We call this flow policy the declassification effect of the program. Then,
while the program
(allowed F1 then M else (flow F2 in N)) (1.4)
would have a declassification effect that includes F2 – meaning that it should only be allowed
to run in domains where F2 is allowed –, the program
(allowed F then (flow F in M) else N) (1.5)
(assuming that M and N have no flow declarations) would have an empty declassification
effect – meaning that it could be safely allowed to run in any domain.
We propose an efficient hybrid mechanism based on statically annotating programs with
the declassification effect of migrating code. This is done by means of an informative type
and effect pre-processing of the program, and is used for supporting runtime decisions.
Semantic Validation. The coherence of the above properties should be supported by showing
that combining Distributed Non-disclosure and Flow Policy Confinement has the intended
meaning. Ultimately, it is desirable to establish the absence of illegal information flows
for programs that satisfy both properties. In the presence of a single global allowed flow
policy, this amounts to classic Non-interference. However, in a distributed security setting,
it is necessary to accommodate the reality of that distributed and mobile programs must
obey different security settings at different points of their computation, depending on their
location. This raises the question of what are the relevant allowed flow policies that the
actual information flows should comply to, in order to be legal. More concretely, which
site or sites should have a say on the legality of flows performed by a thread that, during
computation, reads and writes to resources as it migrates between different sites? We
argue that confidentiality of information that is read at a certain site should be preserved
according to that site’s allowed flow policy. This idea leads to what we propose as the
natural generalization of Non-interference to a distributed security setting, which we call
Distributed Non-interference property, that ensures that propagation of information respects
the allowed flow policy of the domains where the information originates.
This paper proposes a generalized definition of Non-interference that accommodates
the reality of that distributed and mobile programs must obey different security settings
at different points of their computation, depending on their location. It is formalized for a
simple and general network model where computation domains are units of abstract allowed
information flow policies.
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Contributions. This paper presents a simple language-based framework for studying infor-
mation flow security in distributed security settings in the presence of code mobility. In this
model, computation domains are units of allowed flow policies, which have a scope that is
local to each domain. While the formulation of the security properties is largely language-
independent, a concrete language is defined and considered for the purpose of examples and
as a target to the proposed enforcement mechanisms. It consists of an expressive distributed
higher-order imperative lambda-calculus with remote thread creation. The latter language
feature implies in particular that programs might need to comply to more than one dy-
namically changing allowed flow policy simultaneously. The main technical contributions
are:
(1) A new programming construct (allowed F then M else N) that tests the flexibility
of the allowed flow policy imposed by the domain where it is currently located and
can act accordingly.
(2) A refinement of the Non-disclosure for Networks property [AC11] that is more suit-
able for settings where migration is subjective (i.e., cannot be induced by external
threads), called Distributed Non-disclosure1.
(3) A new security property, named Flow Policy Confinement, that regards the com-
pliance of declassification operations that are performed by programs to the valid
allowed flow policies where they take place.
(4) A comparative study of three enforcement mechanisms for flow policy confinement
in the form of migration control mechanisms for deciding whether or not certain
programs should be allowed to execute at each site. These are based on a type and
effect system, and differ on the emphasis that is placed on static and runtime effort:
(a) A purely static type and effect system for enforcing flow policy confinement.
(b) A type and effect system for checking migrating threads at runtime, that is
more precise than the one in point 4a.
(c) A static-time informative pre-processing type and effect system for annotating
programs with a declassification effect, for a more efficient and precise mecha-
nism than the one in point 4b.
(5) A new information flow property, named Distributed Non-interference, that natu-
rally generalizes classical Non-interference to Distributed security settings.
(6) A study of the semantic coherence between the proposed definition of distributed
Non-interference and other relevant information flow properties, namely (local) Non-
interference, Distributed Non-disclosure and Flow Policy Confinement.
This paper revises, unifies and expands work that is presented in the conference arti-
cles [Alm09], [AC13], and part of [AC14]. Proofs that make use of techniques that are
not novel to this paper are omitted for space reasons, but are available in the Appendix for
convenience of the reviewer.
Outline of the paper. We start by defining the formal security and language setting of the pa-
per (Section 2). Two main sections follow, dedicated to the security analyses of Distributed
Non-disclosure (Section 3) and Flow Policy Confinement (Section 4). In each, the formal
properties are proposed (Subsections 3.1 and 4.1), enforcement mechanisms are presented
(Subsections 3.2 and 4.2 to 4.4), and their soundness is proved. In the latter, we study the
1The new designation for the property highlights the fact that it is intended for distributed security
settings, independently of whether the underlying memory and communication model is closer to that of a
full-fledged network, or is reduced to simply logically distributed computation domains.
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efficiency and precision of three type and effect-based mechanisms for enforcing confine-
ment by means of migration control, that place different weight over static and run time.
We then propose a definition of Distributed Non-interference against which we verify the
semantic coherence between the proposed and other relevant information flow properties,
namely (local) Non-interference, Distributed Non-disclosure and Flow Policy Confinement
(Section 5). Finally we discuss related work (Section 6) and conclude (Section 7).
2. Distributed Security Setting
2.1. Security Setting. We adopt the classic representation of a security policy as a security
lattice of security levels [Den76], corresponding to security clearances, such as read-access
rights. The lattice defines a flow relation between security levels which determines their
relative degree of confidentiality. Security levels can then be associated to observable infor-
mation holders in the programming language by means of a security labeling, which maps
resources to security levels. Hence, a security lattice represents a baseline information flow
policy, establishing that information pertaining to resources labeled with l1 can be legally
transferred to resources labeled with l2 only if l2 is at least as confidential as l1 according
to the lattice. Other flow policies, which enable additional legal flow directions between
security levels, can be seen as relaxations of the baseline policy. Such flow policies can
be formalized as downward closure operators that collapse security levels of the baseline
security lattice into lower ones [AF12].
2.1.1. Abstract requirements.
Baseline lattice of security levels. Security levels l, j, k ∈ Lev are assumed to be structured
according to their confidentiality by means of an abstract lattice L = 〈Lev ,⊑,⊓,⊔,⊤,⊥〉,
where: the partial-order ⊑, when relating two security levels l1, l2 as l1 ⊑ l2, means that l2
is at least as confidential as l1; the meet operation ⊓ gives, for any two security levels l1, l2,
the most confidential security level that is at least as permissive as both l1 and l2; the join
operation ⊔ gives, for any two security levels l1, l2, the least confidential security level that
is at least as restrictive as both l1 and l2; the highest confidential security level ⊤ is the
most restrictive one; and the lowest confidential level ⊥ is the most permissive one.
The information flow policy that is represented by the baseline security lattice L asserts
as legal those flows that respect the baseline flow relation ⊑, since when information flows
from l1 to l2, its original confidentiality requirements are preserved.
Relaxed lattice of security levels. A downward closure operator on a baseline lattice L =
〈Lev ,⊑,⊓,⊔,⊤,⊥〉, is an operator F : Lev → Lev that is monotone, idempotent and
restrictive (for every level l ∈ Lev , F (l) ⊑ l). The image of a downward closure operator
F , equipped with the same order relation as L, is a sub-lattice of L, denoted by F (L) =
〈F (Lev ),⊑F ,⊓F ,⊔F ,⊤F ,⊥F 〉, where, for every two security levels l1, l2 ∈ F (Lev ), and set
of security levels I ⊆ F (Lev ), we have that (i) l1 ⊑
F l2 if l1 ⊑ l2; (ii) ⊓
F I = F (⊓I);
(iii) ⊔F I = ⊔I; (iv) ⊤F = F (⊤); and (v) ⊥F = ⊥.
The new more general flow relation ⊑F that is determined by the flow policy F now
enables the information flows that are allowed by F .
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Lattice of flow policies. Flow policies A,F ∈ Flo can be ordered according to their per-
missiveness by means of a permissiveness relation 4, where F1 4 F2 means that F1 is at
least as permissive as F2. We assume an abstract lattice of flow policies that supports a
pseudo-subtraction operation 〈Flo,4,uprise,g,℧,Ω,⌣〉, where: the meet operation uprise gives,
for any two flow policies F1, F2, the strictest policy that allows for both F1 and F2; the
join operation g gives, for any two flow policies F1, F2, the most permissive policy that
only allows what both F1 and F2 allow; the most restrictive flow policy ℧ does not allow
any information flows; and the most permissive flow policy Ω that allows all information
flows. Finally, the pseudo-subtraction operation ⌣ between two flow policies F1 and F2
2 represents the most permissive policy that allows everything that is allowed by the first
(F1), while excluding all that is allowed by the second (F2); it is defined as the relative
pseudo-complement of F2 with respect to F1, i.e. the greatest F such that F uprise F2 4 F1.
The lattice of flow policies can be achieved using downward closure operators. Given
the lattice L, the set of all downward closure operators on Lev form a lattice 〈Flo,4
,uprise,g,℧,Ω,⌣〉, where: (i) F1 4 F2 ⇔ ∀l ∈ Lev .F1(l) ⊑ F2(l); (ii) (upriseK)(l) = l if ∀F ∈
K.F (l) = l; (iii) (gK)(l) = ⊔{F (l)‖F ∈ K}; (iv) ℧(l) = ⊥; and (v) Ω(l) = l,
This lattice can be interpreted as a lattice of relaxations of the original security setting.
2.1.2. Concrete example. The following concrete security setting meets the abstract require-
ments defined above and provides helpful intuitions.
Baseline lattice of security levels. The security levels are the subsets of the principals, l ⊆
Pri , similar to read-access lists. In this setting, security levels are ordered by means of the
flow relation ⊇.
Lattice of flow policies. Flow policies then consist of binary relations on Pri , which can
be understood as representing additional directions in which information is allowed to flow
between principals: a pair (p, q) ∈ F , most often written p ≺ q, is to be understood as
“information may flow from p to q”. New more permissive security lattices are obtained by
collapsing security levels into possibly lower ones, by closing them with respect to the valid
flow policy. Writing F1 4 F2 means that F1 allows flows between at least as many pairs
of principals as F2. The relation is here defined as F1 4 F2 iff F2 ⊆ F
∗
1 (where F
∗ denotes
the reflexive and transitive closure of F ): The meet operation is then defined as uprise = ∪,
the join operation is defined as F1 g F2 = F
∗
1 ∩ F
∗
2 , the top flow policy is given by ℧ = ∅,
the bottom flow policy is given by Ω = Pri × Pri , and the pseudo-subtraction operation
is given by ⌣ = − (set subtraction).
Relaxed lattice of security levels. In order to define ⊑F we use the notion of F -upward
closure of a security level l, defined as l ↑F= {q | ∃p ∈ l. p F
∗ q}. The F -upward closure of
l contains all the principals that are allowed by the policy F to read information labeled l.
A more permissive flow relation can now be derived as follows [ML98, AB09]:
l1 ⊑
F l2
def
⇔ ∀q ∈ l2 . ∃p ∈ l1 : p F
∗ q ⇔ (l1 ↑F ) ⊇ (l2 ↑F )
Furthermore, l1 ⊓
F l2 = l1 ∪ l2 and l1 ⊔
F l2 = (l1 ↑F ) ∩ (l2 ↑F ), ⊤
F = ∅ and ⊥F = Pri .
2This operation is used for refining the static analysis of the policy-testing construct, and is not a re-
quirement of the security properties that are studied here.
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Security Levels l, j ∈ Lev Reference Names a, b ∈ Ref
Flow Policies A,F ∈ Flo Thread Names m,n ∈ Nam
Types τ, σ, θ ∈ Typ Domain Names d ∈ Dom
Values V ∈ Val
Expressions M,N ∈ Exp
Figure 1: Syntax of basic elements of the language
Notice that ⊑F extends ⊇ in the sense that ⊑F is larger than ⊇ and that ⊑∅ = ⊇. In
other words, for the base security lattice (where the flow policy parameter is ℧), the flow
relation coincides with reverse inclusion of security levels, while the join operator is simply
given by ⊔∅ = ∩.
2.2. Language Setting. We now present the basic language requirements to which the
technical developments of this paper apply. We then define a concrete instance of the
language that suits these requirements. It will be used for providing illustrative examples,
and as a target for the enforcement mechanisms.
2.2.1. Abstract requirements. Networks3 are flat juxtapositions of domains, each hosting
the execution of a pool of threads under the governance of a local allowed flow policy.
Information is associated to globally accessible references, which are information holders
for values of a designated type. As threads can move between computation domains during
their execution, their location, or current domain, also carries information.
The basic elements of the language are summarized in Figure 1. The names of references,
threads and domains are drawn from disjoint countable sets a, b ∈ Ref , m,n ∈ Nam , and
d ∈ Dom 6= ∅, respectively. As mentioned in Subsection 2.1, security levels are associated
to information holders by means of security labelings. We define two labelings:
• A reference labeling Σ : Ref → Lev ×Typ , whose left projection Σ1 : Ref → Lev
corresponds to the usual reference security labeling that assigns security levels to
references, and whose right projection Σ2 : Ref → Typ corresponds to the type
labeling that determines the type of values that can be assigned to each reference.
• A thread security labeling Υ : Nam → Lev , that assigns security levels to thread
names. This mapping represents the security level of the knowledge of the position
of a thread in the network.
The security labelings are used in the security analysis that is performed in Section 3.
In the context of examples, the mapping between reference or thread names and their
corresponding security annotations and types may be informally denoted as subscript of
names.
Threads consist of named expressions (drawn from Exp) and run concurrently in pools
P : Nam → Exp, which are mappings from thread names to expressions. Threads are
denoted byMm ∈ Exp×Nam , and pools are denoted as sets of threads. Stores S : Ref →
Val , or memories map reference names to values. Position-trackers T : Nam → Dom ,
3We adopt, from the global computing community, the term networks to designate an interconnected
structure of computation domains, which consist of hosts where a number of processes compute over resources.
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map thread names to domain names, and are used to keep track of the locations of threads in
the network. The pool P containing all the threads in the network, the position tracker T
that keeps track of their positions, and the store S containing all the references in the
network, form configurations 〈P, T, S〉, over which the evaluation relation is defined in
the next subsection. We refer to the pairs 〈S, T 〉 as states, and pairs 〈P, T 〉 as thread
configurations. The flow policies that are allowed by each domain are kept by the allowed-
policy mapping W : Dom → Flo from domain names to flow policies.
The following basic notations are useful for defining properties and modifications to
the elements of configurations. For a mapping Z, we define dom(Z) as the domain of a
given mapping Z. We say a name is fresh in Z if it does not occur in dom(Z). Given
an expression M , we denote by rn(M) and dn(M) the set of reference and domain names,
respectively, that occur in M . This notation is extended in the obvious way to pools of
threads. We let fv(M) be the set of variables occurring free in M . We restrict our attention
to well formed configurations 〈P, T, S〉 satisfying the conditions that rn(P ) ⊆ dom(S), that
dn(P ) ⊆ dom(W ), that dom(P ) ⊆ dom(T ), and that, for every a ∈ dom(S), rn(S(a)) ⊆
dom(S) and dn(S(a)) ⊆ dom(W ). We denote by {x 7→ X}M the capture-avoiding substi-
tution of the pseudo-value X for the free occurrences of x in M . The operation of adding
or updating the image of an object z to z′ in a mapping Z is denoted [z := z′]Z.
The ‘W ⊢Σ,Υ’ turnstile gives a security context to the definition of the semantics,
making explicit the allowed flow policy of each domain in the network, and the valid reference
and thread labelings. These parameters are fixed, and are not central do this study, so they
are omitted in the rest of the paper, written simply ‘W ⊢’. The reduction relation is a
transition relation between (well-formed) configurations
d
−→
F
, which are decorated with the
name of the domain d where each step is taking place and the flow policy F declared by
the evaluation context where they are performed. The semantics needs not depend on this
information, which is made available for the security analysis. The relation ։ denotes the
reflexive closure of the transition relation
d
−→
F
.
2.2.2. Concrete object language. The distributed language that we use is an imperative
higher-order λ-calculus with reference creation, where we include a flow policy declaration
construct (for directly manipulating flow policies [AB09]) and the new flow policy tester
construct that branches according to whether a certain flow policy is allowed in the pro-
gram’s computing context, obtained by adding a notion of computing domain, to which we
associate an allowed flow policy, and a code migration primitive. Threads are also named
in order to keep track of their position in the network. Programs executing in different
domains are subjected to different allowed flow policies – this is what distinguishes local
computations from global computations, and is the main novelty in this language. We
opt for the simplest memory model, assuming memory to be shared by all programs and
every computation domain, in a transparent form. As we will see in Section 3, this al-
lows us to focus on the effects of considering a distributed security setting, while avoiding
synchronization issues that are not central to this work.
Syntax. The syntax of expressions, ranged over by M,N ∈ Exp, is defined in Figure 2. It
is based on an imperative higher order λ-calculus that includes declassification, a context-
policy testing construct and remote thread creation. The values of the language are the nil
command (), variables ranged over by x, y ∈ Var , function abstraction (λx.M), boolean
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Values V ::= () | x | (λx.M) | tt | ff | a
Pseudo-values X ::= V | (̺x.X)
Expressions M,N ::= X | (M N) | (M ;N) | (! N) | (M := N) | (ref l,θ M) |
(if M then Nt else Nf ) | (flow F in M) |
(allowed F then Nt else Nf ) | (threadl M at d)
Figure 2: Syntax of expressions
values tt and ff , and reference names. Pseudo-values ranged over by X, extend values to
include recursion, provided by the (̺x.X) construct. Other standard expressions are formed
by function application (M N), sequential composition (M ;N), the dereferencing opera-
tion (! M), assignment (M := N), reference creation (ref l,θ M) and conditional branching
(if M then Nt else Nf ).
Reference names are not associated to any security levels or types at the language level
(in this aspect we depart from [Alm09]), and make use of the reference labeling Σ that is
defined in Subsection 2.2.1 only during the security analysis. Nevertheless, reference names
can be created at runtime, by a construct that is annotated with a type and security level
that should be associated with the new reference.
The new features of the language are the flow declaration and the allowed-condition.
The flow declaration construct is written (flow F inM), whereM is executed in the context
of the current flow policy extended with F ; after termination the current flow policy is
restored, that is, the scope of F is M . The allowed-condition is similar to a standard
boolean condition, with the difference that in (allowed F then Nt else Nf ) the branches Nt
or Nf are executed according to whether or not F is allowed by the site’s allowed flow
policy.
The remote thread creator (threadl M at d) spawns a new thread with security level
l and expression M in domain d, to be executed concurrently with other threads at that
domain. It functions as a migration construct when the new domain of the created thread
is different from that of the parent thread. The security level l is the confidentiality level
that is associated to the position of the thread in the network.
The following example illustrates the usage of the non-standard constructs of the lan-
guage:
((threadH (allowed FH≺L then (flow FH≺L in (xL := (! yH))) else plan B) at d)) (2.1)
The program creates a remote thread at domain d, tests whether its allowed flow policy al-
lows for the flows in FH≺L, which informally represents a flow policy that allows information
to flow from level H to level L, and executes the first or second branch accordingly
Operational semantics. In order to define the operational semantics, expressions are repre-
sented using evaluation contexts, which specify a call-by-value evaluation order:
E ::= [] | (E N) | (V E) | (E;N) | (ref l,θ E) | (! E) | (E := N) | (V := E) |
(if E then Nt else Nf ) | (flow F in E)
We write E[M ] to denote an expression where the sub-expression M is placed in the evalu-
ation context E, obtained by replacing the occurrence of [] in E by M . The flow policy that
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W ⊢ 〈{E[((λx.M) V )]m}, T, S〉
T (m)
−−−→
⌈E⌉
〈{E[{x 7→ V }M ]m}, T, S〉
W ⊢ 〈{E[(if tt then Nt else Nf )]
m}, T, S〉
T (m)
−−−→
⌈E⌉
〈{E[Nt]
m}, T, S〉
W ⊢ 〈E[(if ff then Nt else Nf )]
m}, T, S〉
T (m)
−−−→
⌈E⌉
〈{E[Nf ]
m}, T, S〉
W ⊢ 〈{E[(V ;N)]m}, T, S〉
T (m)
−−−→
⌈E⌉
〈{E[N ]m}, T, S〉
W ⊢ 〈{E[(̺x.X)]m}, T, S〉
T (m)
−−−→
⌈E⌉
〈{E[({x 7→ (̺x.X)} X)]m}, T, S〉
W ⊢ 〈{E[(flow F in V )]m}, T, S〉
T (m)
−−−→
⌈E⌉
〈{E[V ]m}, T, S〉
W ⊢ 〈{E[(! a)]m}, T, S〉
T (m)
−−−→
⌈E⌉
〈{E[S(a)]m}, T, S〉
W ⊢ 〈{E[(a := V )]m}, T, S〉
T (m)
−−−→
⌈E⌉
〈{E[()]m}, T, [a := V ]S〉
W ⊢ 〈{E[(ref l,θ V )]
m}, T, S〉
T (m)
−−−→
⌈E⌉
〈{E[a]m}, T, [a := V ]S〉, where
a fresh in S and Σ(a) = (l, θ)
W (T (m))4F
W ⊢ 〈{E[(allowed F then Nt else Nf )]
m}, T, S〉
T (m)
−−−→
⌈E⌉
〈{E[Nt]
m}, T, S〉
W (T (m)) 64F
W ⊢ 〈{E[(allowed F then Nt else Nf )]
m}, T, S〉
T (m)
−−−→
⌈E⌉
〈{E[Nf ]
m}, T, S〉
W ⊢ 〈{E[(threadl N at d)]
m}, T, S〉
T (m)
−−−→
⌈E⌉
〈{E[()]m, Nn}, [n := d]T, S〉, where
n fresh in T and Υ(n) = l
W ⊢ 〈P, T, S〉
d
−→
F
〈P ′, T ′, S′〉 〈P ∪Q,T, S〉 is well formed
W ⊢ 〈P ∪Q,T, S〉
d
−→
F
〈P ′ ∪Q,T ′, S′〉
Figure 3: Operational semantics
is permitted by the evaluation context E is denoted by ⌈E⌉. It is a lower bound to all the
flow policies that are declared by the context:
⌈[]⌉ = ℧ ⌈(flow F in E)⌉ = F uprise ⌈E⌉ ⌈E′[E]⌉ = ⌈E⌉ when E′ has no flow declarations
The small step operational semantics of the language is defined in Figure 3. Most of the
rules are standard, except for the allowed-policy mapping W , that parameterizes all rules,
and the domain name and flow policy that decorate the transitions. The W parameter is
used only by the allowed-condition, to retrieve the allowed flow policy of the domain where
the condition is executed. Notice that W is never changed. Furthermore, the semantics
does not depend on the flow policy that decorates the arrows. Thread names are used in
two situations: When a new thread is created, its new fresh name is added to the position-
tracker, associated to the parameter domain. As with reference creation, the security level
that is associated to the new thread does not influence the semantics, but is used later by the
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security analysis. Thread names are also used when an allowed-condition is performed: the
tested flow policy is compared to the allowed flow policy of the site where that particular
thread is executing. The last rule establishes that the execution of a pool of threads is
compositional (up to the choice of new names).
According to the chosen semantics, dereferencing and assigning to remote references can
be done transparently. In spite of this, since the allowed flow policies are distributed, the
behavior of a program fragment may differ on different machines. As an example, consider
the thread
(allowed F then (yL := 1) else (yL := 2))
m (2.2)
running in a network with domains d1 and d2, where W (d1) 4 F but W (d2) 64 F . The
thread will perform different assignments depending on whether T (m) = d1 or T (m) = d2.
In Section 3 we show that these possible behaviors are distinguishable by an information
flow bisimulation relation. This distributed behavior occurs regardless of the chosen memory
model.
One can prove that the semantics preserves well-formedness of configurations, and that
a configuration with a single thread has at most one transition, up to the choice of new
names.
3. Controlling Information Flow
As we have seen, the inclusion of the new allowed-condition construct in our programming
language has introduced subtle security issues. Indeed, even though the memory model that
we consider is non-distributed, the allowed construct projects the distributed nature of the
security policies into location-dependent program behavior. In other words, the location of
a thread in the network becomes an information flow channel. It is then necessary to clarify
what information flow dependencies are introduced by the construct, and to sort out what
information flows should be allowed or not.
In this section we consider the problem of controlling information flow in a language that
includes the new allowed-condition construct, in the context of a distributed security setting
with concurrent threads and code mobility. Information flows that violate the baseline
security policy should conform to declared intentions to perform declassification. To this
end, we define the Distributed Non-disclosure property, and analyze the security behavior
of the new allowed-condition construct in light of the proposed property. We show that the
new formalization is more permissive and precise than Non-disclosure for Networks [AC11],
and argue for the suitability of the proposed formalization for settings where migration
is subjective (i.e., auto-induced), such as the present one. We present a type and effect
system for enforcing the property over the concrete language of Subsection 2.2 and establish
soundness of the enforcement mechanism.
3.1. Distributed Non-disclosure. Non-disclosure states that, at each computation step
performed by a program, information flows respect the flow policy that is declared by the
evaluation context where the step is performed. The property is naturally defined in terms
of an information flow bisimulation [SS00, Smi01, BC02, FG95] on concurrent threads.
At each execution point, the bisimulation relates the outcomes of each possible step that
is performed over states (stores) that are indistinguishable at a certain observation level,
where the notion of indistinguishability is locally tuned to the flow policy that is currently
valid for that particular step [AB09]. Low-equality, the formalization of indistinguishability,
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is thus a crucial aspect of the definition of information flow bisimulations, and should reflect
what are the observable resources at a given security level.
As we will see towards the end of this section, in our setting the position of a thread in
the network can reveal information about the values in the memory. In other words, states
include other information holders which are also observable (besides the store), namely the
position of threads in the network. Low-equality must then be generalized accordingly in
order to relate states that include position trackers.
Low equality. We define a notion of indistinguishability between states that are composed
of a store S and a position tracker T , and is parameterized by the corresponding security
labelings – a reference security labeling Σ1 and a thread security labeling Υ (for retrieving
the security levels of references and threads). Low-equality is defined relative to a given flow
policy F and observation label l. Recall, from Sub-subsection 2.2.1, that the flow policy F
can be used to determine the permissiveness of the flow relation. Intuitively, two stores are
said to be low-equal at level l, with respect to a flow policy F , if they coincide in the values
of all references whose security levels are lower or equal than l (according to F ). Similarly,
two position trackers are said to be low-equal at level l, with respect to a flow policy F , if
they coincide in the location of all thread names whose security levels are lower or equal
than l (according to F ). Low-equality between states is then defined point-wise on stores
and position trackers:
Definition 3.1 (Low-Equality). Given a reference security labeling Σ1 and a thread security
labeling Υ, low-equality with respect to a flow policy F and a security level l is defined
between well-labelled stores, position-trackers and states as follows:
• S1 =
Σ1,Υ
F,l S2, if {(a, V ) | (a, V )∈S1 &Σ1(a) ⊑
F l} = {(a, V ) | (a, V )∈S2 &Σ1(a) ⊑
F
l}
• T1 =
Σ1,Υ
F,l T2, if {(n, d) | (n, d)∈T1 & Υ(n) ⊑
F l} = {(n, d) | (n, d)∈T2 & Υ(n) ⊑
F l}
• 〈T1, S1〉 =
Σ1,Υ
F,l 〈T2, S2〉, if S1 =
Σ1,Υ
F,l S2 and T1 =
Σ1,Υ
F,l T2.
This relation is transitive, reflexive and symmetric. In order to lighten the notation, the
parameters Σ and Υ are omitted in the rest of the paper, written simply ‘=F,l’.
Store compatibility. The language defined in Section 2.2 is a higher-order language, where
programs can build and execute expressions using values stored in memory. For example,
the expression
((! a) ()) (3.1)
can evolve into an insecure program when running on a memory that maps a reference a
to a lambda-abstraction whose body consists of an insecure expression. In order to avoid
considering all such programs insecure, it is necessary to make assumptions concerning the
contents of the memory. Here, memories are assumed to be compatible to the given security
setting and typing environment, requiring typability of their contents with respect to the
type system that is defined in the next subsection (see Definition 3.6). The assumption
is used in the definition of bisimulation that follows (as well as in subsequent security
definitions).
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Information flow Bisimulation. Intuitively, if a program is shown to be related to itself by
means of an information flow bisimulation, one can conclude that it has the same behavior
regardless of changes in the high part of the state. In other words, the high part of the state
has not interfered with the low part, i.e., no security leak has occurred. A secure program
can then be defined as one that is related to itself by an information flow bisimulation.
Resetting the state arbitrarily at each step of the bisimulation game accounts for changes
that might be induced by threads that are external to the pools under consideration, thus
enabling compositionality of the property.
Given that we are considering a setting with subjective migration (i.e. only the thread
itself can trigger its own migration), changes in the position of threads in a given pool
cannot be induced externally to that pool. We can then focus on the behavior of threads
when coupled with their possible locations in the network, and look at how the behavior of
thread configurations is affected by changes in the high part of the stores. Accordingly, the
following information flow bisimulation fixes the position tracker across the bisimulation
steps:
Definition 3.2 (≈W,Σ,Υ,Γl ). Given a security level l, a (W,Σ,Υ,Γ, l)-bisimulation is a sym-
metric relation R on thread configurations that satisfies, for all P1, T1, P2, T2, and (Σ,Γ)-
compatible stores S1, S2
〈P1, T1〉 R 〈P2, T2〉 and W ⊢ 〈P1, T1, S1〉
d
−→
F
〈P ′1, T
′
1, S
′
1〉 and 〈T1, S1〉 =F,l 〈T2, S2〉,
with (dom(S1
′)−dom(S1))∩dom(S2) = ∅ and (dom(T1
′)− dom(T1))∩dom(T2) = ∅ implies
that there exist P ′2, T
′
2, S
′
2 such that:
W ⊢ 〈P2, T2, S2〉։ 〈P
′
2, T
′
2, S
′
2〉 and 〈T
′
1, S
′
1〉 =℧,l 〈T
′
2, S
′
2〉 and 〈P
′
1, T
′
1〉 R 〈P
′
2, T
′
2〉
Furthermore, S′1, S
′
2 are still (Σ,Γ)-compatible. The largest (W,Σ,Υ,Γ, l)-bisimulation, the
union of all such bisimulations, is denoted ≈W,Σ,Υ,Γl .
In order to lighten the notation, the parameters Σ and Υ are omitted in the rest of
the paper, written simply ‘≈W,Γl ’. For any Γ and l, the set of pairs of thread configurations
where threads are values is an (W,Γ, l)-bisimulation. Furthermore, the union of a family of
(W,Γ, l)-bisimulations is a (W,Γ, l)-bisimulation. Consequently, ≈W,Γl exists.
We briefly recall intuitions that explain the above definition here, and refer the reader
to [AC11] for more explanations. The reason why the above bisimulation potentially relates
more programs than one for Non-interference is the stronger premise 〈T1, S1〉 =F,l 〈T2, S2〉,
which assumes pairs of states that coincide to a greater extent, thus facilitating the repro-
duction of the behavior by the opposite thread configuration. The absence of a condition on
the flow policy of the matching move for P2 enables all expressions without side-effects (such
as) to be bisimilar, independently of the flow policy that is declared by their evaluation con-
texts. Clearly, the relation ≈W,Γl is not reflexive since, as only “secure” programs, as defined
next, are bisimilar to themselves. For instance, the insecure expression (bB := (! aA)) is not
bisimilar to itself if A 6⊑F B.
We now present a new formalization of the non-disclosure property, defined over thread
configurations, that is suitable for distributed settings.
Definition 3.3 (Distributed Non-disclosure). A pool of threads P satisfies the Distributed
Non-disclosure property with respect to an allowed-policy mapping W , reference labeling
Σ, thread labeling Υ and typing environment Γ, if it satisfies 〈P, T1〉 ≈
W,Γ
l 〈P, T2〉 for all
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security levels l and position trackers T1, T2 such that dom(P ) = dom(T1) = dom(T2) and
T1 =℧,l T2. We then write P ∈ DND(W,Σ,Υ,Γ).
Distributed Non-disclosure is compositional with respect to set union of pools of threads,
up to disjoint naming of threads, and a subjective migration primitive.
We are considering a simplistic memory model where all of the network’s memory is
accessible at all times by every process in the network. With this assumption we avoid
migration leaks that derive from synchronization behaviors [AC11], but migration leaks can
be encoded nonetheless. The idea is that now a program can reveal information about the
position of a thread in a network by performing tests on the flow policy that is allowed by
that site.
Example 3.4 (Migration Leak). In the following program, the new thread will be created
at (migrate to) domains d1 or d2 depending on the tested high value.
if (! aH) then (threadl (allowed F then (bL := 1) else (bL := 2)) at d1)
else (threadl (allowed F then (bL := 1) else (bL := 2)) at d2)
(3.2)
If the allowed flow policies of these domains differ on whether they allow F , different low-
assignments are performed, thus revealing high level information. Therefore, the program
is insecure with respect to Distributed Non-disclosure.
It should be clear that this property concerns only the matching between flow declara-
tions and the leaks that are encoded in the program. It does not restrict the usage of flow
declarations. For example,
(threadl (flow F in (b := (! a))) at d) (3.3)
always satisfies Distributed Non-disclosure when F = Ω, even though it violates the allowed
flow policy of domain d if Σ1(a) 6⊑
W (d) Σ1(b).
Comparison with Non-Disclosure for Networks. The definition of Distributed Non-disclosure
consists of a technical refinement of the Non-Disclosure for Networks property [AC11].
The main difference is that, while Non-Disclosure for Networks was defined over pools of
threads, we now define Distributed Non-disclosure over thread configurations. This means
that, when imposing restrictions on the behaviors of bisimilar pools of threads, the former
definition resets the state arbitrarily at each step of the bisimulation game. However, as we
have pointed out, in a context where migration is subjective, resetting the position tracker
arbitrarily is unnecessary. In fact, it leads to a property that is overly restrictive. In the
following example, program Minsec can be a direct leak that is not placed within a flow
declaration:
(threadl (allowed F then () else Minsec) at d) (3.4)
The above program is intuitively secure if W (d) 4 F and insecure otherwise, as the body
of the thread is known to be executed at domain d. This is reflected by Distributed Non-
disclosure as proposed in Definition 3.3. However, it is considered insecure by the former
definition, as if the allowed-condition is executed over “fresh” thread configurations such
that the thread is located at a domain where F is not allowed, then the branch with the
illegal expression Minsec would be executed. Another example of a secure program that is
considered insecure according to the former definition, but not by Definition 3.3, is a variant
of the one in Equation (3.2), where d1=d2, i.e. where the two branches are syntactically
equal.
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[Nil] Γ ⊢Σj,F () : s, unit [BT] Γ ⊢
Σ
j,F tt : s, bool [BF] Γ ⊢
Σ
j,F ff : s, bool
[Loc] Γ ⊢Σj,F a : s,Σ2(a) refΣ1(a) [Var] Γ, x : τ ⊢
Σ
j,F x : s, τ
[Abs]
Γ, x : τ ⊢Σj,F M : s, σ
Γ ⊢Σj′,F ′ (λx.M) : s
′, τ
s
−−→
j,F
σ
[Rec]
Γ, x : τ ⊢Σj,F X : s, τ
Γ ⊢Σj,F (̺x.X) : s, τ
[App]
Γ ⊢Σj,F M : s, τ
s′
−−→
j,F
σ
Γ ⊢Σj,F N : s
′′, τ
s.t ⊑F s′′.w
s.r, s′′.r ⊑F s′.w
Γ ⊢Σj,F (M N) : s ⊔ s
′ ⊔ s′′ ⊔ 〈⊥,⊤, s.r ⊔ s′′.r〉, σ
[Seq]
Γ ⊢Σj,F M : s, τ
Γ ⊢Σj,F N : s
′, σ
s.t ⊑F s′.w
Γ ⊢Σj,F (M ;N) : s ⊔ s
′, σ
[Ref]
Γ ⊢Σj,F M : s, θ s.r, s.t ⊑
F l
Γ ⊢Σj,F (ref l,θ M) : s ⊔ 〈⊥, l,⊥〉, θ ref l
[Assign]
Γ ⊢Σj,F M : s, θ ref l
Γ ⊢Σj,F N : s
′, θ
s.t ⊑F s′.w
s.r, s′.r ⊑F l
Γ ⊢Σj,F (M := N) : s ⊔ s
′ ⊔ 〈⊥, l,⊥〉, unit
[Der]
Γ ⊢Σj,F M : s, θ ref l
Γ ⊢Σj,F (! M) : s ⊔ 〈l,⊤,⊥〉, θ
[Cond]
Γ ⊢Σj,F M : s, bool
Γ ⊢Σj,F Nt : st, τ
Γ ⊢Σj,F Nf : sf , τ
s.r ⊑F st.w, sf .w
Γ ⊢Σj,F (if M then Nt else Nf ) : s ⊔ st ⊔ sf ⊔ 〈⊥,⊤, s.r〉, τ
[Allow]
Γ ⊢Σj,F Nt : st, τ
Γ ⊢Σj,F Nf : sf , τ
j ⊑F st.w, sf .w
Γ ⊢Σj,F (allowed F
′ then Nt else Nf ) : st ⊔ sf ⊔ 〈j,⊤, j〉, τ
[Flow]
Γ ⊢Σj,FupriseF ′ N : s, τ
Γ ⊢Σj,F (flow F
′ in N) : s, τ
[Mig]
Γ ⊢Σl,℧ M : s, unit
Γ ⊢Σj,F (threadl M at d
′) : 〈⊥, l ⊓ s.w,⊥〉, unit
Figure 4: Type and effect system for checking Distributed Non-disclosure
Distributed Non-disclosure of Definition 3.3 is strictly weaker than the thread pool-
based Definition of Non-disclosure for Networks, in the sense that it considers more programs
as secure. In order to formalize this result, we denote by NDN (W,Σ,Υ,Γ) the set of pools
of threads that satisfy the former definition:
Proposition 3.5. NDN (W,Σ,Υ,Γ) ⊂ DND(W,Σ,Υ,Γ).
3.2. Type and Effect System. We now present a type and effect system [LG88] that
accepts programs that satisfy Distributed Non-disclosure, as defined in Sub-subsection 3.1.
The typing judgments used in Figure 4 have the form
Γ ⊢Σj,F M : s, τ
18 A. ALMEIDA MATOS AND J. CEDERQUIST
meaning that the expression M is typable with type τ and security effect s in the typing
context Γ : Var → Typ, which assigns types to variables. The turnstile has three parame-
ters: (1) the reference labeling Σ; (2) the flow policy declared by the context F , represents
the one that is valid in the evaluation context in which the expression M is typed, and
contributes to the meaning of operations and relations on security levels. (3) the security
level j represents the confidentiality level associated to the thread that the expression M is
part of, i.e. the confidentiality level of the location of that thread in the network.
The security effect s is composed of three security levels that are referred to by s.r, s.w
and s.t (in this order), and can be understood as follows: s.r is the reading effect, an upper-
bound on the security levels of the references that are read by M ; s.w is the writing effect,
a lower bound on the references that are written by M ; s.t is the termination effect, an
upper bound on the level of the references on which the termination of expression M might
depend. According to these intuitions, in the type system the reading and termination
levels are composed in a covariant way, whereas the writing level is contravariant.
Types have the following syntax (t is a type variable):
s ∈ Lev × Lev × Lev ::= 〈s.r, s.w, s.t〉
τ, σ, θ ∈ Typ ::= t | unit | bool | θ ref l | τ
s
−−→
j,F
σ
Typable expressions that reduce to () have type unit, and those that reduce to booleans
have type bool. Typable expressions that reduce to a reference which points to values of
type θ and has security level l have the reference type θ ref l. The security level l is used
to determine the effects of expressions that handle references. Expressions that reduce to a
function that takes a parameter of type τ , that returns an expression of type σ, and with a
latent effect s [LG88] have the function type τ
s
−−→
j,F
σ. The latent effect is the security effect
of the body of the function, while the latent flow policies are those that are assumed to hold
when the function is applied to an argument, and the latent security level j of the thread
containing the expression that appears in the type of expressions that reduce to functions.
We use a lattice on security effects, that is obtained from the point-wise composition
of three lattices of the security levels. More precisely:
s ⊑F s′
def
⇔ s.r ⊑F s′.r & s′.w ⊑F s.w & s.t ⊑F s′.t
s ⊔ s′
def
⇔ 〈s.r ⊔ s′.r, s.w ⊓ s′.w, s.t ⊔ s′.t〉 ⊤ = 〈⊤,⊥,⊤〉 ⊥ = 〈⊥,⊤,⊥〉
Our type and effect system applies restrictions to programs in order to enforce compli-
ance of all information flows to the flow policy that is declared by each context. This is
achieved by parameterizing the flow relation ⊑F with the flow policy F that parameterizes
the typing judgments. The flow policy is updated by the rule Flow, which allows to type
the body of the flow declaration in a more permissive way. Apart from the parameterization
of the flow relation with the current flow policy, the conditions imposed in the premises,
and the update of the security effects in the conclusion, are fairly standard in information
flow type systems and enforce syntactic rules of the kind “no low writes should depend on
high reads”, both with respect to the values that are read, and to termination behaviors
that might be derived. We refer the reader to [AC11] for explanations on all of these con-
ditions and updates, and focus next on the new aspects that are introduced in order to
prevent new forms of information leaks that appear in our distributed security setting (such
as Example 3.4), and that deserve further attention.
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In the allowed-condition rule Allow, the security level j that is associated to each
thread, and represents the confidentiality level of the position of the thread in the network,
is used to update the reading and termination effect. This is because the choice of the
branch (which depends on the threads location) can determine the final value and the
termination behavior of the condition. The security level of the thread is also constrained
not to be higher in confidentiality than the level at which the state can be changed (as it
could potentially leak information about the thread’s position) in rule Allow. Finally, in
rule Mig, the confidentiality level of the new thread is used to update the writing effect of
thread creation, which causes a change in the position-tracker.
We can now define the compatibility predicate that applies to this particular information
flow analysis:
Definition 3.6 ((Σ,Γ)-Compatibility). A memory S is said to be (Σ,Γ)-compatible if, for
every reference a ∈ dom(S), its value S(a) satisfies Γ ⊢Σj,F S(a) : s,Σ2(a), for every security
level j, flow policy F , and security effect s.
3.2.1. Soundness. The main result of this section, soundness, states that the type system
only accepts expressions that are secure in the sense of Definition 3.3. In the remainder of
this section we sketch the main definitions and results that can be used to reconstruct a
direct proof of this result. A similar proof is given in detail for a similar language (without
the allowed-condition or remote thread creation) in [AC11]. The main difference, besides
the treatment of new language constructs, is the assumption of memory compatibility that
is introduced in the present work.
Subject Reduction. In order to establish the soundness of the type system of Figure 4 we
need a Subject Reduction result, stating that the type of a thread is preserved by reduction.
When a thread performs a computation step, some of its effects may be performed by
reading, updating or creating a reference, and some may be discarded when a branch in
a conditional expression is taken. Then the effects of an expression “weaken” along the
computations. This result is established by Proposition 3.7 below.
Proposition 3.7 (Subject Reduction). Consider a threadMm such that Γ ⊢ΣΥ(m),F M : s, τ ,
and suppose that W ⊢ 〈{Mm}, T, S〉
d
−→
F ′
〈{M ′m} ∪ P, T ′, S′〉, for a memory S that is (Σ,Γ)-
compatible. Then, there is an effect s′ such that s′ ⊑ s and Γ ⊢ΣΥ(m),F M
′ : s′, τ , and S′
is also (Σ,Γ)-compatible. Furthermore, if P = {Nn}, for some expression N and thread
name n, then there exists s′′ such that s′′ ⊑ s and Γ ⊢ΣΥ(n),℧ N : s
′′, unit.
Proof. We follow the usual steps [WF94], where the main proof is a case analysis on the
transition W ⊢ 〈{Mm}, T, S〉
d
−→
F
〈{M ′m} ∪ P, T ′, S′〉.
Properties of the Semantics. If the evaluation of a thread Mm differs in the context of two
distinct states while not creating two distinct reference or thread names, this is because
either Mm is performing a dereferencing operation, which yields different results depending
on the memory, or because Mm is testing the allowed policy.
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Lemma 3.8 (Splitting Computations).
Consider a threadMm such thatW ⊢ 〈{Mm}, T1, S1〉
d
−→
F
〈P ′1, T
′
1, S
′
1〉 andW ⊢ 〈{M
m}, T2, S2〉
d
−→
F ′
〈P ′2, T
′
2, S
′
2〉 with P1
′ 6= P2
′. Then P ′1 = {M1
′m}, P ′2 = {M2
′m} for some M ′1 and M
′
2,
and there exists E such that F = ⌈E⌉ = F ′, where either:
• M = E[(! a)] for some reference a, and M ′1 = E[S1(a)], M
′
2 = E[S2(a)] with
〈T ′1, S
′
1〉 = 〈T1, S1〉 and 〈T
′
2, S
′
2〉 = 〈T2, S2〉, or
• M = E[(allowed F¯ then Nt else Nf )] for some F¯ ,Nt, Nf , and T1(m) 6= T2(m) with
〈T ′1, S
′
1〉 = 〈T1, S1〉 and 〈T
′
2, S
′
2〉 = 〈T2, S2〉.
Proof. By case analysis on the transition W ⊢ 〈{Mm}, T1, S1〉
d
−→
F
〈P ′1, T
′
1, S
′
1〉. Note that
the only rules that depend on the state are those for the reduction of E[(! a)] and of
E[(allowed F ′ then Nt else Nf )].
We can identify a class of threads that have the property of never performing any change
in the “low” part of the memory. These are classified as being “high” according to their
behavior:
Definition 3.9 (Operationally High Threads). Given a flow policy F and a security level
l, a set of threads H is a set of operationally (W,Σ,Υ,Γ, F, l)-high threads if the following
holds for all Mm ∈ H, and for all states 〈T, S〉 where S is (Σ,Γ)-compatible:
W ⊢ 〈{Mm}, T, S〉
d
−→
F ′
〈P ′, T ′, S′〉 implies 〈T, S〉 =F,l 〈T
′, S′〉 and P ′ ⊆ H
Furthermore, S′ is still (Σ,Γ)-compatible. The largest set of operationally (W,Σ,Υ,Γ, F, l)-
high threads is denoted by HW,Σ,Υ,ΓF,l . We then say that a thread M
m is operationally
(W,Σ,Υ,Γ, F, l)-high, if Mm ∈ HW,Σ,Υ,ΓF,l .
In order to lighten the notation, the parameters Σ and Υ are omitted in the rest of the
paper, written simply ‘operationally (W,Γ, F, l)-high’ and ‘HW,ΓF,l ’. Remark that for any W ,
Γ, F and l, the set of threads with values as expressions is a set of operationally (W,Γ, F, l)-
high threads. Furthermore, the union of a family of sets of operationally (W,Γ, F, l)-high
threads is a set of operationally (W,Γ, F, l)-high threads. Consequently, HW,ΓF,l exists. Notice
also that if F ′ ⊆ F , then HW,ΓF,l ⊆ H
W,Γ
F ′,l .
Soundness. The following result shows that the behavior of typable high threads (i.e. those
with a high security level) that is location sensitive (i.e. depend on their location) is
operationally high.
Lemma 3.10 (Location Sensitive Typable High Threads). For a given flow policy F
and security levels j and low, consider a thread Mm such that Γ ⊢Σj,F M : s, τ and M =
E[(allowed F ′ then Nt else Nf )] with j 6⊑
F low. Then, for all allowed-policy mappings W
and thread labelings Υ such that Υ(m) = j, we have that Mm ∈ HW,ΓF,low .
Proof. By induction on the structure of evaluation context E, making use of the flow re-
strictions that are introduced by the corresponding typing rule in each case. Notice that
expressions that dereference or test the allowed flow policy at a high security level have
high reading effect (and termination effect for the latter), while those that assign and cre-
ate a reference or thread at a low security level have a low writing effect. We show how
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operationally high expressions can be syntactically composed from other operationally high
expressions.
Theorem 3.11 (Soundness of Typing Distributed Non-disclosure). Consider a pool of
threads P , an allowed-policy mapping W , a reference labeling Σ, a thread labeling Υ and a
typing environment Γ. If for all Mm ∈ P there exist s, and τ such that Γ ⊢ΣΥ(m),℧ M : s, τ ,
then P satisfies the Distributed Non-disclosure property, i.e. P ∈ DND(W,Σ,Υ,Γ).
Proof. The proof follows the structure presented in [AC11]. The differences in the proof
stem mainly from the treatment of the new language constructs (remote thread creation
and allowed-condition, instead of suspensive local memory access), and the assumption of
memory compatibility, that is introduced in the present work. Informally, the steps are the
following:
(1) We build a syntactic symmetric binary relation between expressions that are typable
with a low termination effect, and whose terminating behaviors do not depend on
high references. This includes expressions that are typable with a low termination
effect, and that have just performed a high dereference. The binary relation should
be a “kind of” strong bisimulation with respect to the transition relation
d
−→
F
and
the parameterized low-equality =F,l. In particular, it should be such that if the
evaluation of two related expressions, in the context of two low-equal stores should
split (see Lemma 3.8), then the resulting expressions are still in the relation.
(2) We define a larger symmetric binary relation on all typable expressions that relates
operationally high threads, and, similarly to the previous one, relates the results
of the computations of two related expressions that are not operationally high in
the context of two low-equal memories. This includes all typable expressions that
have just performed a high dereference. For non operationally high threads, the
binary relation should again be a “kind of” strong bisimulation with respect to the
transition relation
d
−→
F
and the parameterized low-equality =F,l. The result Location
Sensitive Typable High Threads (Lemma 3.10) helps to show that if the evaluation
of two related expressions, in the context of two low-equal stores should split (see
Splitting Computations, Lemma 3.8), then the resulting expressions are still in the
relation.
(3) We exhibit a (W,Γ, l)-bisimulation on thread configurations that extends the previ-
ous one to relate operationally high threads with terminated computations.
Soundness is compositional, in the sense that it is enough to verify the typability of each
thread separately in order to ensure Distributed Non-disclosure for the whole network.
4. Controlling Declassification
In this section we study the formalization and enforcement of a security property accord-
ing to which declassification policies performed by migrating threads must comply to the
allowed flow policy of the domain in which they are performed. We formalize the property,
named Flow Policy Confinement, with respect to a distributed security setting and justify
the chosen formalization. We study its enforcement by means of three migration control
mechanisms, whose aim is to prevent migration of threads when the declassifications that
they would potentially perform are not allowed by that domain.
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The first enforcement mechanism consists of a purely static type and effect system
(Subsection 4.2) for checking confinement. This type system is inherently restrictive, as
the domains where each part of the code will actually compute cannot in general be known
statically. Furthermore, it requires information about the allowed flow policies of all the
domains in the networks to which analyzed programs might migrate. We therefore present
a more relaxed type and effect system to be used at runtime by the semantics of the
language for checking migrating threads for confinement to the allowed flow policy of the
destination domain (Subsection 4.3). Information about the allowed flow policies of the
domains is not required at static time. We show that this simple hybrid mechanism is
more precise than the purely static one. Finally, we propose a yet more precise type and
effect system that statically computes information about the declassification behaviors of
programs (Subsection 4.4). This information will be used at runtime, by the semantics of the
language, to support more efficient runtime checks that control migration of programs. We
conclude by proving that the third annotation-based mechanism is strictly more permissive
than the previous ones, while preserving the meaning of non-annotated programs.
4.1. Flow Policy Confinement. The property of Flow Policy Confinement states that
the declassifications that are declared by a program at each computation step comply to
the allowed policy of the domain where the step is performed. In a distributed setting with
concurrent mobile code, programs might need to comply simultaneously to different allowed
flow policies that change dynamically. We deal with this difficulty by placing individual
restrictions on each step that might be performed by a part of the program, taking into
account the possible location where it might take place.
Memory compatibility. Similarly to Subsection 3.1, memories are assumed to be compatible
to the given security setting and typing environment, requiring typability of their contents
according to the relevant enforcement mechanism. The memory compatibility predicate
will be defined for each security analysis that is performed over the next three subsections
(see Definitions 4.4, 4.8 and 4.12).4
Confined thread configurations. We define the property by means of a co-inductive relation
on thread configurations [AC14]. The location of each thread determines which allowed
flow policy it should obey at that point, and is used to place a restriction on the flow
policies that decorate the transitions. By using thread configurations, the formalization of
the property is simplified with respect to [AC13], which used the notion of located threads,
and a bisimulation-based definition.
Definition 4.1 ((W,Σ,Γ)-Confined Thread Configurations). Given an allowed-policy map-
ping W , a set CT C of thread configurations is a set of (W,Σ,Γ)-confined thread configura-
tions if it satisfies, for all P, T , and (W,Σ,Γ)-compatible stores S:
〈P, T 〉 ∈ CT C and W ⊢ 〈P, T, S〉
d
−→
F
〈P ′, T ′, S′〉 implies W (d) 4 F and 〈P ′, T ′〉 ∈ CT C
Furthermore, S′ is still (W,Σ,Γ)-compatible. The largest set of (W,Σ,Γ)-confined thread
configurations is denoted CT CW,Σ,Γ.
4For the sake of simplifying the exposition, the compatibility predicate uses three parameters W , Σ and
Γ, as they are parameters of the type system used by Definition 4.4, although in Definitions 4.8 and 4.12,
the parameter W is not needed.
INFORMATION FLOW IN A DISTRIBUTED SECURITY SETTING 23
For any W , Σ and Γ, the set of thread configurations where threads are values is a set of
(W,Σ,Γ)-confined thread configurations. Furthermore, the union of a family of (W,Σ,Γ)-
confined thread configurations is a (W,Σ,Γ)-confined thread configurations. Consequently,
CT CW,Σ,Γ exists.
The property is now formulated for pools of threads.
Definition 4.2 (Flow Policy Confinement). A pool of threads P satisfies Flow Policy
Confinement with respect to an allowed-policy mappingW , reference labeling Σ and typing
environment Γ, if all thread configurations satisfy 〈P, T 〉 ∈ CT CW,Σ,Γ. We then write
P ∈ FPC(W,Σ,Γ).
Notice that Flow Policy Confinement is parameterized by a particular mapping W from
domains to allowed flow policies. This means that security is defined relative to W . An
absolute notion of security holds when W is universally quantified.
Properties. It should be clear that Flow Policy Confinement speaks strictly about what flow
declarations a thread can do while it is at a specific domain. In particular, it does not restrict
threads from migrating to more permissive domains. It does not deal with information
flows, and offers no assurance that information leaks that are encoded at each point of the
program do obey the declared flow policies for that point. For example, the program in
Equation (3.3) always satisfies flow policy confinement when F = ℧, regardless of the levels
of references a and b. But, it violates Distributed Non-disclosure if Σ1(a) 6⊑
F Σ1(b), as well
as the allowed flow policy of the domain d if Σ1(a) 6⊑
W (d) Σ1(b).
Flow Policy Confinement, formulated for pools of threads according to Definition 4.2, is
similar to the one in [Alm09, AC13], which was formulated for thread configurations. The
present one does not fix the initial position of threads that satisfy the property. Furthermore,
it is more clearly defined in terms of a co-inductive relation on thread configurations [AC14],
while the former version used a bisimulation on located threads. In order to compare the
two versions of the property, we denote by FPC+LT(W,Σ,Γ) the set of pools of thread that
are secure, according to the former definition, when coupled with all possible initial position
trackers. Then, the two versions of the property are equivalent, up to quantification over
all possible initial position trackers.
Proposition 4.3. FPC(W,Σ,Γ) = FPC+LT(W,Σ,Γ).
4.2. Static Type and Effect System. We have seen that in a setting where code can
migrate between domains with different allowed security policies, the computation domain
might change during computation, along with the allowed flow policy that the program
must comply to. This can happen in particular within the branch of an allowed-condition:
(allowed F then (threadl (flow F in M1) at d) else M2) (4.1)
In this program, the flow declaration of the policy F is executed only if F has been tested
as being allowed by the domain where the program was started. It might then seem that
the flow declaration is guarded by an appropriate allowed construct. However, by the time
the flow declaration is performed, the thread is already located at another domain, where
that flow policy might not be allowed. It is clear that a static enforcement of a confinement
property requires tracking the possible locations where threads might be executing at each
point.
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[Nil] W ; Γ ⊢ΣA () : unit [BT] W ; Γ ⊢
Σ
A tt : bool [BF] W ; Γ ⊢
Σ
A ff : bool
[Loc] W ; Γ ⊢ΣA a : Σ2(a) ref [Var] W ; Γ, x : τ ⊢
Σ
A x : τ
[Abs]
W ; Γ, x : τ ⊢ΣA M : σ
W ; Γ ⊢ΣA′ (λx.M) : τ −→A
σ
[Rec]
W ; Γ, x : τ ⊢ΣA X : τ
W ; Γ ⊢ΣA (̺x.X) : τ
[App]
W ; Γ ⊢ΣA M : τ −→
A
σ W ; Γ ⊢ΣA N : τ
W ; Γ ⊢ΣA (M N) : σ
[Seq]
W ; Γ ⊢ΣA M : τ W ; Γ ⊢
Σ
A N : σ
W ; Γ ⊢ΣA (M ;N) : σ
[Ref]
W ; Γ ⊢ΣA M : θ
W ; Γ ⊢ΣA (ref l,θ M) : θ ref
[Assign]
W ; Γ ⊢ΣA M : θ ref W ; Γ ⊢
Σ
A N : θ
W ; Γ ⊢ΣA (M := N) : unit
[Der]
W ; Γ ⊢ΣA M : θ ref
W ; Γ ⊢ΣA (! M) : θ
[Cond]
W ; Γ ⊢ΣA M : bool
W ; Γ ⊢ΣA Nt : τ
W ; Γ ⊢ΣA Nf : τ
W ; Γ ⊢ΣA (if M then Nt else Nf ) : τ
[Allow]
W ; Γ ⊢ΣAupriseF Nt : τ
W ; Γ ⊢ΣA Nf : τ
W ; Γ ⊢ΣA (allowed F then Nt else Nf ) : τ
[Flow]
W ; Γ ⊢ΣA N : τ A 4 F
W ; Γ ⊢ΣA (flow F in N) : τ
[Mig]
W ; Γ ⊢Σ
W (d) M : unit
W ; Γ ⊢ΣA (threadl M at d) : unit
Figure 5: Type and effect system for checking Confinement
Figure 5 presents a new type and effect system [LG88] for statically enforcing confine-
ment over a migrating program. The type system guarantees that when operations are
executed by a thread within the scope of a flow declaration, the declared flow complies to
the allowed flow policy of the current domain. The typing judgments have the form
W ; Γ ⊢ΣA M : τ
meaning that the expressionM is typable with type τ in the typing context Γ : Var → Typ ,
which assigns types to variables, in a context where W is the mapping of domain names
to allowed flow policies. The turnstile has two parameters: (1) the reference labeling Σ, of
which only the type labeling Σ2, carrying the type of the references, is used; (2) the flow
policy allowed by the context A, which includes all flow policies that have been positively
tested by the program as being allowed at the computation domain where the expression
M is running.
Types have the following syntax (t is a type variable):
τ, σ, θ ∈ Typ ::= t | unit | bool | θ ref | τ −→
A
σ
The syntax is similar to the one used in Sub-subsection 3.2, but is simpler: The security
level of references does not appear in the reference types θ ref , while the type function types
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τ −→
A
σ includes only the latent allowed flow policy, the one that is assumed to hold when
the function is applied to an argument.
Our type and effect system applies restrictions to programs in order to enforce confine-
ment of all flow declarations of a policy F to be performed only once F has been tested
to be positively allowed by the domain’s allowed flow policy. This is achieved by means
of the tested allowed flow policy A that parameterizes the typing judgments, and by the
condition A 4 F in the Flow rule. Flow declarations can only be performed if the declared
flow policy is allowed by the flow policy that is tested by the context (Flow). Conversely,
allowed-conditions relax the typing of the allowed-branch by extending the flow policy that
is tested by the context with the policy that guards the condition (Allow).
Note that if an expression is typable with respect to an allowed flow policy A, then it
is also so for any more permissive allowed policy A′.
We refer to the enforcement mechanism that consists of statically type checking all
threads in a network according to the type and effect system of Figure 5, with respect to
the allowed flow policies of each thread’s initial domain, using the semantics represented in
Figure 3, as Enforcement Mechanism I.
To illustrate the restrictions that are imposed by the enforcement mechanism, we may
consider program
(allowed F then (flow FH≺L in plan A) else plan B) (4.2)
where plan A and plan B have no declassifications, and that is running in domain d. The
program is typable if W (d)upriseF 4 FH≺L. If F 4 FH≺L, then the program is always secure.
Otherwise, the program is W -secure if W (d) 4 FH≺L, or if W (d) 64 F (thanks to the
semantics of the allowed-condition).
We are now in position to define the compatibility predicate that applies to Enforcement
Mechanism I.
Definition 4.4 ((W,Σ,Γ)-Compatibility). A memory S is said to be (W,Σ,Γ)-compatible
if, for every reference a ∈ dom(S), its value S(a) satisfies the conditionW ; Γ ⊢Σ
℧
S(a) : Σ2(a).
4.2.1. Soundness. In order to establish the soundness of the type system of Figure 5 we
need a Subject Reduction result, stating that types that are given to expressions, along
with compatibility of memories, are preserved by computation.
Proposition 4.5 (Subject Reduction). Consider an allowed-policy mappingW and a thread
Mm such that W ; Γ ⊢ΣA M : τ , and suppose that W ⊢ 〈{M
m}, T, S〉
d
−→
F
〈{M ′m} ∪ P, T ′, S′〉,
for a memory S that is (W,Σ,Γ)-compatible. Then, W ; Γ ⊢Σ
AupriseW (T (m)) M
′ : τ , and S′ is
also (W,Σ,Γ)-compatible. Furthermore, if P = {Nn}, for some expression N and thread
name n, then W ; Γ ⊢Σ
W (T ′(n)) N : unit.
Proof. We follow the usual steps [WF94], where the main proof is a case analysis on the
transition W ⊢ 〈{Mm}, T, S〉
d
−→
F
〈{M ′m} ∪ P, T ′, S′〉.
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Enforcement Mechanism I guarantees security of networks with respect to confinement,
as is formalized by the following result.
Theorem 4.6 (Soundness of Enforcement Mechanism I). Consider an allowed-policy map-
ping W , reference labeling Σ, typing environment Γ, and a thread configuration 〈P, T 〉
such that for all Mm ∈ P there exists τ such that W ; Γ ⊢Σ
W (T (m)) M : τ . Then 〈P, T 〉 is a
(W,Σ,Γ)-confined thread configuration.
Proof. We show that the following is a set of (W,Σ,Γ)-confined thread configurations:
C = {〈P, T 〉 | ∀Mm ∈ P,∃τ . W ; Γ ⊢Σ
W (T (m)) M : τ}
By induction on the inference of W ; Γ ⊢Σ
W (T (m)) M : τ . We use Subject Reduction (Propo-
sition 4.5) and a case analysis on the last rule of the corresponding typing proof.
Safety and precision. The following result guarantees that typable threads ca execute until
termination.
Proposition 4.7 (Safety). Given an allowed-policy mapping W , consider a closed thread
Mm such that W ; ∅ ⊢ΣA M : τ . Then, for any memory S that is (W,Σ, ∅)-compatible and
position-tracker T , either the program M is a value, orW ⊢〈{Mm}, T, S〉
T (m)
−−−→
F ′
〈{M ′m}∪P, T ′, S′〉,
for some F ′, M ′, P , T ′ and S′.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of W ; Γ ⊢ΣA M : τ .
In face of a purely static migration control analysis, some secure programs are bound
to be rejected. There are different ways to increase the precision of a type system, though
they are all intrinsically limited to what can conservatively be predicted before runtime.
For example, for the program
(if (! a) then (threadl (flow F in M) at d1) else (threadl (flow F in M) at d2)) (4.3)
it is in general not possible to predict which branch will be executed (or, in practice, to
which domain the thread will migrate), for it depends on the contents of the memory. It
will then be rejected if W (d2) 64 F or W (d1) 64 F .
4.3. Runtime Type Checking. In this subsection we study a hybrid mechanism for en-
forcing confinement, that makes use of a relaxation of the type system of Figure 5, at
runtime. Migration is now conditioned by means of a runtime check for typability of mi-
grating threads with respect to the allowed flow policy of the destination domain. The
condition represents the standard theoretical requirement of checking incoming code before
allowing it to execute in a given machine.
The relaxation is achieved by replacing rule Mig by the one in Figure 6. The new
type system no longer imposes future migrating threads to conform to the policy of their
destination domain, but only to the most permissive allowed flow policy Ω. The rationale
is that it is only concerned about confinement of the non-migrating parts of the program.
This is sufficient, as all threads that are to be spawned by the program will be re-checked
at migration time.
The proposed modification to the semantics defined in Figure 3 appears in Figure 6.
The migration rule introduces the runtime check that controls migration (n fresh in T ).
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...
[Mig]
Γ ⊢ΣΩ M : unit
Γ ⊢ΣA (threadl M at d) : unit
...
Γ ⊢Σ
W (d) N : unit
W ⊢ 〈{E[(threadl N at d)]
m}, T, S〉
T (m)
−−−→
⌈E⌉
〈{E[()]m, Nn}, [n := d]T, S〉
Figure 6: Top: Relaxed type and effect system for checking Confinement (omitted rules are
as in Figure 5). Bottom: Operational semantics with runtime type checking for
migration control (omitted rules are as in Figure 3).
The idea is that a thread can only migrate to a domain if it respects its allowed flow
policy. The new remote thread creation rule (our migration primitive), now depends on
typability of the migrating thread. The typing environment Γ (which is constant) is now
an implicit parameter of the operational semantics. If only closed threads are considered,
then also migrating threads are closed. The allowed flow policy of the destination site now
determines whether or not a migration instruction may be consummated, or otherwise block
execution. E.g., the configuration
〈{E[(threadl (flow F in M) at d)]
m}, T, S〉 (4.4)
can only proceed if W (d) allows for F ; otherwise it gets stuck.
Notice that, thanks to postponing the migration control to runtime, the type system
no longer needs to be parameterized with information about the allowed flow policies of
all domains in the network, which is unrealistic. The only relevant ones are those of the
destination domain of migrating threads.
We refer to the enforcement mechanism that consists of statically type checking all
threads in a network according to the type and effect system of Figure 6 (left), with respect
to the allowed flow policies of each thread’s initial domain, using the semantics of Figure 6
(right), as Enforcement Mechanism II.
Notice that Enforcement Mechanism II restricts, on one hand, which programs are
accepted to run, but also trims their possible executions, with respect to a given allowed-
policy mapping W . The program in Equation (4.3) illustrates this mechanism, as it is
typable according to the relaxed type system (with respect to any W ), but will block at the
choice of the second branch if W (d2) 64 F .
We can now define the compatibility predicate that applies to Enforcement Mecha-
nism II.5
Definition 4.8 ((W,Σ,Γ)-Compatibility). A memory S is said to be (W,Σ,Γ)-compatible
if, for every reference a ∈ dom(S), its value S(a) satisfies the typing condition Γ ⊢Σ
℧
S(a) : Σ2(a).
5As mentioned in Subsection 4.1, for the sake of simplifying the exposition, the compatibility predicate
used in Definition 4.1 includes W as a parameter, although it is not used in Definitions 4.8 and 4.12 that
follow.
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4.3.1. Soundness. Similarly to what we did in Subsection 4.2, in order to establish the
soundness of the Enforcement Mechanism II we need a Subject Reduction result, stating
that types that are given to expressions, along with compatibility of memories, are preserved
by computation.
Proposition 4.9 (Subject Reduction). Consider a thread Mm such that Γ ⊢ΣA M : τ and
suppose that W ⊢ 〈{Mm}, T, S〉
d
−→
F
〈{M ′m} ∪ P, T ′, S′〉, for a memory S that is (W,Σ,Γ)-
compatible. Then, Γ ⊢Σ
AupriseW (T (m)) M
′ : τ , and S′ is also (W,Σ,Γ)-compatible. Furthermore,
if P = {Nn}, for some expression N and thread name n, then Γ ⊢Σ
W (T ′(n)) N : unit.
Proof. We follow the usual steps [WF94], where the main proof is a case analysis on the
transition W ⊢ 〈{Mm}, T, S〉
d
−→
F ′
〈{M ′m} ∪ P, T ′, S′〉.
Enforcement Mechanism II guarantees security of networks with respect to confinement,
as is formalized by the following result.
Theorem 4.10 (Soundness of Enforcement Mechanism II). Consider an allowed-policy
mapping W , reference labeling Σ, typing environment Γ, and a thread configuration 〈P, T 〉
such that for all Mm ∈ P there exists τ such that Γ ⊢Σ
W (T (m)) M : τ . Then 〈P, T 〉 is
(W,Σ,Γ)-confined.
Proof. We show that the following is a set of (W,Σ,Γ)-confined thread configurations:
C = {〈P, T 〉 | ∀Mm ∈ P,∃τ . Γ ⊢Σ
W (T (m)) M : τ}
is a set of (W,Σ,Γ)-confined thread configurations. By induction on the inference of
Γ ⊢Σ
W (T (m)) M : τ . We use Subject Reduction (Proposition 4.9) and a case analysis on
the last rule of the corresponding typing proof.
4.3.2. Safety, precision and efficiency. The proposed mechanism does not offer a safety
result, guaranteeing that program execution never gets stuck. Indeed, the side condition of
the thread creation rule introduces the possibility for the execution of a thread to block,
since no alternative is given. This can happen in the example in Equation (4.1), if the
flow policy F is not permitted by the allowed policy of the domain of the branch that is
actually executed, then the migration will not occur, and execution will not proceed. We
can, however, prove that the only way for a program to get stuck is if it triggers an unsafe
migration:
Proposition 4.11 (Safety (weakened)). Consider a closed threadMm such that ∅ ⊢ΣA M : τ .
Then, for any allowed-policy mappingW , memory S that is (W,Σ, ∅)-compatible and position-
tracker T , either the program M is a value, or:
• W ⊢ 〈{Mm}, T, S〉
T (m)
−−−→
F ′
〈{M ′m} ∪ P, T ′, S′〉, for some F ′, M ′, P , S′ and T ′, or
• M = E[(threadl N at d)], for some E, l and d such that ∅ ⊢
Σ
Ω N : unit but ∅ 6⊢
Σ
W (d) N : unit.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of Γ ⊢ΣA M : τ .
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In order to have safety, we could design a thread creation instruction that predicts an
alternative branch for execution in case the side condition fails. We choose not to pursue this
option, thus minimizing changes to the basic language under consideration. Nevertheless,
the condition that was introduced in the semantics of the thread creation sufficed to originate
new forms of information flow leaks, as the event of blockage of a computation can reveal
information about the control flow that led to it. These information leaks can be treated in
a similar manner as termination leaks, as in [Alm09], for blockage can be seen as a form of
non-termination. Such leaks are in fact rejected by the type and effect system of Figure 4,
as is discussed further ahead at the end of Section 4.
It is worth considering that the example in Equation (4.1) could be reformulated as
(threadl (allowed F then (flow F in M1) else M2) at d) (4.5)
in effect using the allowed-condition for encoding such alternative behaviors. Indeed, the
programmer can increase the chances that the program will terminate successfully by guard-
ing flow declarations with the new allowed-condition construct. Our type system does take
that effort into account, by subtracting the tested flow policy when typing the allowed-
branch. As a result, programs containing flow declarations that are too permissive accord-
ing to a certain domain might still be authorized to execute in it, as long as they occur in
the not-allowed-branch of our new construct which will not be chosen.
Returning to the example in Equation (4.3), thanks to the relaxed Mig rule, this
program is now always accepted statically by the type system. Depending on the result
of the test, the migration might also be allowed to occur if a safe branch is chosen. This
means that Enforcement Mechanism II accepts more secure programs, as well as more secure
executions of (statically) insecure programs.
A drawback with this enforcement mechanism lies in the computation weight of the
runtime type checks. This is particularly acute for an expressive language such as the one
we are considering. Indeed, recognizing typability of ML expressions has exponential (worst
case) complexity [Mai90].
4.4. Static Informative Typing for Runtime Effect Checking. We have seen that
bringing the type-based migration control of programs to runtime allows to increase the
precision of the confinement analysis. This is, however, at the cost of performance. It
is possible to separate the program analysis as to what are the declassification operations
that are performed by migrating threads, from the safety problem of determining whether
those declassification operations should be allowed at a given domain. To achieve this, we
now present an informative type system [AF12] that statically calculates a summary of
all the declassification operations that might be performed by a program, in the form of a
declassification effect. Furthermore, this type system statically annotates the program with
information about the declassifying behavior of migrating threads in order to support the
runtime decision of whether they can be considered safe by the destination domain. The
aim is to bring the overhead of the runtime check to static time.
The typing judgments of the type system in Figure 7 have the form:
Γ ⊢Σ M →֒ Mˆ : s, τ
Comparing with the typing judgments of Subsection 4.3, while the flow policy allowed by
the context parameter is omitted from the turnstile ‘⊢’, the security effect s represents a flow
policy which corresponds to the declassification effect : a lower bound to the flow policies that
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[NilI] Γ ⊢
Σ () →֒ () : ℧, unit [BtI] Γ ⊢
Σ tt →֒ tt : ℧, bool [BfI] Γ ⊢
Σ ff →֒ ff : ℧, bool
[LocI] Γ ⊢
Σ a →֒ a : ℧,Σ2(a) ref [VarI] Γ, x : τ ⊢
Σ x →֒ x : ℧, τ
[AbsI]
Γ, x : τ ⊢Σ M →֒ Mˆ : s, σ
Γ ⊢Σ (λx.M) →֒ (λx.Mˆ) : ℧, τ
s
−→ σ
[RecI]
Γ, x : τ ⊢Σ X →֒ Xˆ : s, τ
Γ ⊢Σ (̺x.X) →֒ (̺x.Xˆ) : s, τ
[AppI]
Γ ⊢Σ M →֒ Mˆ : s, τ
s′
−→ σ Γ ⊢Σ N →֒ Nˆ : s′′, τ ′′ τ 4 τ ′′
Γ ⊢Σ (M N) →֒ (Mˆ Nˆ) : suprise s′ uprise s′′, σ
[SeqI]
Γ ⊢Σ M →֒ Mˆ : s, τ Γ ⊢Σ N →֒ Nˆ : s′, σ
Γ ⊢Σ (M ;N) →֒ (Mˆ ; Nˆ) : suprise s′, σ
[RefI]
Γ ⊢Σ M →֒ Mˆ : s, θ′ θ 4 θ′
Γ ⊢Σ (refθ M) →֒ (refθ Mˆ) : s, θ ref
[DerI]
Γ ⊢Σ M →֒ Mˆ : s, θ ref
Γ ⊢Σ (! M) →֒ (! Mˆ ) : s, θ
[AssI]
Γ ⊢Σ M →֒ Mˆ : s, θ ref Γ ⊢Σ N →֒ Nˆ : s′, θ′ θ 4 θ′
Γ ⊢Σ (M := N) →֒ (Mˆ := Nˆ) : suprise s′, unit
[CondI]
Γ ⊢Σ M →֒ Mˆ : s, bool
Γ ⊢Σ Nt →֒ Nˆt : st, τt
Γ ⊢Σ Nf →֒ Nˆf : sf , τf
τt ≈ τf
Γ ⊢Σ (if M then Nt else Nf ) →֒ (if Mˆ then Nˆt else Nˆf ) : suprise st uprise sf , τt uprise τf
[AllowI]
Γ ⊢Σ Nt →֒ Nˆt : st, τt
Γ ⊢Σ Nf →֒ Nˆf : sf , τf
τt ≈ τf
Γ ⊢Σ (allowed F then Nt else Nf ) →֒ (allowed F then Nˆt else Nˆf ) :
st ⌣ F uprise sf , τt uprise τf
[FlowI]
Γ ⊢Σ N →֒ Nˆ : s, τ
Γ ⊢Σ (flow F in N) →֒ (flow F in Nˆ) : suprise F, τ
[MigI]
Γ ⊢Σ M →֒ Mˆ : s, unit
Γ ⊢Σ (threadl M at d) →֒ (thread
s
l Mˆ at d) : ℧, unit
Figure 7: Informative type and effect system for obtaining the Declassification Effect
are declared in the typed expression. The second expression Mˆ is the result of annotating
M . We thus consider an annotated version of the language of Subsection 2.2, where the
syntax of values and expressions (the sets are denoted Val ′ and Exp ′, respectively) differs
only in the remote thread creation construct, that has an additional policy F as parameter,
written (threadFl M at d). Also here, only the type labeling component Σ2 of the reference
labeling is used.
Types have the following syntax (t is a type variable):
τ, σ, θ ∈ Typ ::= t | unit | bool | θ ref | τ
s
−→ σ
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The syntax of types is the same as the one used in Subsections 4.2 and 4.3, except that the
flow policy that represents the latent declassification effect is written over the arrow of the
function type τ
s
−→ σ.
It is possible to relax the type system by matching types that have the same structure,
even if they differ in flow policies pertaining to them. We achieve this by overloading
4 to relate types where certain latent effects in the first are at least as permissive as the
corresponding ones in the second. The more general relation ≈ matches types where certain
latent effects differ: Finally, we define an operation uprise between two types τ and τ ′ such that
τ ≈ τ ′:
τ 4 τ ′ iff τ = τ ′, or τ = θ
F
−→ σ and τ ′ = θ
F ′
−→ σ′ with F 4 F ′ and σ 4 σ′
τ ≈ τ ′ iff τ = τ ′, or τ = θ
F
−→ σ and τ ′ = θ
F ′
−→ σ′ with σ ≈ σ′
τ uprise τ ′ = τ, if τ = τ ′, or θ
FupriseF ′
−−−→ σ uprise σ′, if τ = θ
F
−→ σ and τ ′ = θ
F ′
−→ σ′
The 4 relation is used in rules RefI, AssI and AppI, in practice enabling to associate
to references and variables (by reference creation, assignment and application) expressions
with types that contain stricter policies than required by the declared types. The relation
≈ is used in rules CondI and AllowI in order to accept that two branches of the same test
construct can differ regarding some of their policies. Then, the type of the test construct
combines both using uprise, thus reflecting the flow policies in both branches.
The declassification effect is constructed by aggregating (using the meet operation)
all relevant flow policies that are declared within the program. The effect is updated in
rule FlowI, each time a flow declaration is performed, and becomes more permissive as
the declassification effects of sub-expressions are met in order to form that of the parent
command. However, when a part of the program is guarded by an allowed-condition, some
of the information in the declassification effect can be discarded. This happens in rule
AllowI, where the declassification effect of the first branch is not used entirely: the part
that will be tested during execution by the allowed-condition is omitted. In rule MigI, the
declassification effect of migrating threads is also not recorded in the effect of the parent
program, as they will be executed (and tested) elsewhere. That information is however used
to annotate the migration instruction.
As an example, the thread creation of the program in Equation (4.2), still assuming that
plan A and plan B have no declassifications, would be annotated with the declassification
effect FH≺L ⌣ F . In particular, the effect would be ℧ if F 4 FH≺L.
One can show that the type system is deterministic, in the sense that it assigns to a
non-annotated expression a single annotated version of it, a single declassification effect,
and a single type.
4.4.1. Modified operational semantics, revisited. By executing annotated programs, the type
check that conditions the migration instruction can be replaced by a simple declassification
effect inspection. The new migration rule, presented in Figure 8, is similar to the one
in Subsection 4.3, but now makes use of the declassification effect (n fresh in T ). In the
remaining rules of the operational semantics the annotations are ignored. Note that the
values contained in memories are also assumed to use annotated syntax.
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W (d) 4 s
W ⊢ 〈{E[(threadsl N at d)]
m}, T, S〉
T (m)
−−−→
⌈E⌉
〈{E[()]m, Nn}, [n := d]T, S〉
Figure 8: Operational semantics with statically annotated programs for runtime migration
control (omitted rules are as in Figure 3)
We refer to the mechanism that consists of statically annotating all threads in a network
according to the type and effect system of Figure 7, assuming that each thread’s declassifi-
cation effect is allowed by its initial domain, while using the semantics of Figure 8 modified,
as Enforcement Mechanism III.
It is useful to define a family of functions annotΣ,Γ() : (Ref → Val)→ (Ref → Val ′)
which, given a typing environment Γ and a reference labeling Σ, extends the annotation
process to stores:
annotΣ,Γ(S) = Sˆ such that dom(S) = dom(Sˆ)
and ∀a ∈ dom(S),Γ ⊢Σ S(a) →֒ Sˆ(a) : ℧,Σ2(a)
We can now define the compatibility predicate that applies to Enforcement Mechanism III.
Definition 4.12 ((W,Σ,Γ)-Compatibility). A memory Sˆ is said to be (W,Σ,Γ)-compatible
if there exists a non-annotated memory S such that annotΣ,Γ(S) = Sˆ.
4.4.2. Soundness. The following proposition ensures that the annotation processing is pre-
served by the annotated semantics. This is formulated by stating that after reduction,
programs are still well annotated. Since the type system integrates both the annotating
process and the calculation of the declassification effect, the formulation of this result is
slightly non-standard. More precisely, the following result states that if a program is the
result of an annotation process, with a certain declassification effect and type, then after
one computation step it is still the result of annotating a program, and is given an at least
as strict declassification effect and type.
Proposition 4.13 (Subject Reduction, or Preservation of Annotations). Consider a thread
Mm such that Γ ⊢Σ M →֒ N : s, τ and suppose thatW ⊢ 〈{Nm}, T, S〉
d
−→
F
〈{N ′m} ∪ P, T ′, S′〉,
for a memory S that is (W,Σ,Γ)-compatible. Then there exist M ′, s′, τ ′ such that s uprise
W (T (m)) 4 s′, and τ 4 τ ′, and Γ ⊢Σ M ′ →֒ N ′ : s′, τ ′, and S′ is also (W,Σ,Γ)-compatible.
Furthermore, if P = {N ′′n} for some expression N ′′ and thread name n, then there exist
M ′′, s′′ such that W (T ′(n)) 4 s′′ and Γ ⊢Σ M ′′ →֒ N ′′ : s′′, unit.
Proof. We follow the usual steps [WF94], where the main proof is a case analysis on the
transition W ⊢ 〈{Nm}, T, S〉
d
−→
F ′
〈{N ′m} ∪ P, T ′, S′〉.
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We will now see that the declassification effect can be used for enforcing confinement.
Theorem 4.14 (Soundness of Enforcement Mechanism III). Consider an allowed-policy
mapping W , reference labeling Σ, typing environment Γ, and a thread configuration 〈P, T 〉
such that for all Mm ∈ P there exist Mˆ , s and τ such that Γ ⊢Σ M →֒ Mˆ : s, τ and
W (T (m)) 4 s. Then 〈Pˆ , T 〉, formed by annotating the threads in 〈P, T 〉, is (W,Σ,Γ)-
confined.
Proof. We show that the following is a set of (W,Σ,Γ)-confined thread configurations:
C = {〈P, T 〉 | ∀Mˆm ∈ P, ∃M,s, τ . Γ ⊢Σ M →֒ Mˆ : s, τ and W (T (m)) 4 s}
By induction on the inference of Γ ⊢Σ M →֒ Mˆ : s, τ . We use Subject Reduction (Proposi-
tion 4.13) and a case analysis on the last rule of the corresponding typing proof.
4.4.3. Safety, precision and efficiency. The weak safety result is formulated similarly to
Proposition 4.11:
Proposition 4.15 (Safety (weakened)). Consider a closed thread Mm for which we have
that ∅ ⊢Σ M →֒ Mˆ : s, τ . Then, for any allowed-policy mapping W , memory S that is
(W,Σ, ∅)-compatible and position-tracker T , either the program Mˆ is a value, or:
(1) W ⊢ 〈{Mˆm}, T, S〉
T (m)
−−−→
F ′
〈{Mˆ ′m} ∪ P, T ′, S′〉, for some F ′, Mˆ ′, P , S′ and T ′, or
(2) M = E[(threadl N at d)], for some E, l, d and sˆ such that Mˆ = E[(thread
sˆ
l Nˆ at d)]
and ∅ ⊢Σ N →֒ Nˆ : sˆ, τ but W (d) 64 sˆ.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of Γ ⊢Σ M : s, τ .
The relaxed type system of Subsection 4.3 for checking confinement, and its informative
counterpart of Figure 7, are strongly related. The following result states that typability
according to latter type system is at least as precise as the former.
Proposition 4.16. If for an allowed policy A and type τ we have that Γ ⊢ΣA M : τ , then
there exist N , s and τ ′ such that Γ ⊢Σ M →֒ N : s, τ ′ with A 4 s and τ 4 τ ′.
Proof. By induction on the inference of Γ ⊢ΣA M : τ , and by case analysis on the last rule
used in this typing proof.
The converse direction is not true, i.e. Enforcement Mechanism III accepts strictly
more programs than Enforcement Mechanism II. This can be seen by considering the secure
program
(if (! a) then (! (refθ1 M1)) else (! (refθ2 M2))) (4.6)
where θ1 = τ
F1−→ σ and θ2 = τ
F2−→ σ. This program is not accepted by the type system of
Section 4.3 because it cannot give the same type to both branches of the conditional (the
type of the dereference of a reference of type θ is precisely θ). However, since the two types
satisfy θ1 ≈ θ2, the informative type system can accept it and give it the type θ1 uprise θ2.
A more fundamental difference between the two enforcement mechanisms lays in the
timing of the computation overhead that is required by each mechanism. While mecha-
nism II requires heavy runtime type checks to occur each time a thread migrates, in III the
typability analysis is anticipated to static time, leaving only a comparison between two flow
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policies to be performed at migration time. The complexity of this comparison depends
on the concrete representation of flow policies. In the worst case, that of flow policies as
general downward closure operators (see Section 2), it is linear on the number of security
levels that are considered. When flow policies are flow relations, then it consists on a subset
relation check, which is polynomial on the size of the flow policies.
4.4.4. Preservation of the semantics. We now prove that the program transformation that is
encoded in the type system of Figure 7 preserves the semantics of the input expressions. To
this end, we define a simulation between pools of threads written in the original language
of Subsection 2.2, and pools of threads written in the language with annotations. The
behavior of pools of threads of the former should be able to simulate step-by-step those
of the latter, when operating on memories that are the same, up to the annotations that
distinguish the two languages (captured by means of the annotΣ,Γ() function.
The following simulation on pools of threads relates programs in the annotated language
whose behavior can be entirely performed by the corresponding program in the original
(non-restricted) language.
Definition 4.17 (∼W,Σ,Γ). A (W,Σ,Γ)-simulation is a binary relation S on pools of threads,
drawn from the original language and the annotated language, respectively, that satisfies,
for all thread configurations T and for all memories S, Sˆ
P1 S P2 and W ⊢ 〈P2, T, Sˆ〉
d
−→
F
〈P ′2, T
′, Sˆ′〉 and annotΣ,Γ(S) = Sˆ
implies that there exist P ′1, S
′ such that:
W ⊢ 〈P1, T, S〉
d
−→
F
〈P ′1, T
′, S′〉 and annotΣ,Γ(S′) = Sˆ′ and P ′1 S P
′
2
The largest (W,Σ,Γ)-simulation is denoted by ∼W,Σ,Γ.
For any W,Σ,Γ, the set of pairs of thread configurations where threads are values is
a (W,Σ,Γ)-simulation. Furthermore, the union of a family of (W,Σ,Γ)-simulations is a
(W,Σ,Γ)-simulation. Consequently, ∼W,Σ,Γ exists.
We can now check that the annotation process produces expressions that can be simu-
lated in the above sense. In other words this means that Enforcement Mechanism III only
enables behavior of programs that is already present in the original language.
Proposition 4.18. If Γ ⊢Σ M →֒ N : s, τ , then for all allowed-policy mappings W and
thread names m ∈ Nam we have that {Mm}∼W,Σ,Γ{Nm}.
Proof. We prove that the set
B = {〈{Mm}, {Nm}〉 | m ∈ Nam and ∃s, τ . Γ ⊢Σ M →֒ N : s, τ}
is a (W,Σ,Γ)-simulation according to Definition 4.17. By case analysis on the proof of
W ⊢ 〈{Mm}, T, S〉
d
−→
F
〈P ′2, T
′, S′〉 and of W ⊢ 〈{Nm}, T, Sˆ〉
d
−→
F
〈P ′2, T
′, Sˆ′〉.
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To see that the converse is not true, i.e. that the range of behaviors of migrating programs
is restricted with respect to the original language, it is enough to consider the program
(threadl (flow Ω in (a := 1)) at d) (4.7)
which is transformed into (threadΩl (flow Ω in (a := 1)) at d) by the informative type system.
This program blocks at the first execution step when W (d) 6= Ω.
5. Information Flow Compliance
In this section we clarify the meaning of secure information flow in a distributed security
setting, by interpreting the allowed flow policy of a domain as an imposition on the in-
formation flows that a mobile program is allowed to set up while computing at a given
domain. Using this notion, we propose a natural generalization of Non-interference that es-
tablishes the absence of illegal information flows in a distributed security setting. This new
property, named Distributed Non-interference, states that information flows should respect
the allowed flow policy of the domains where they originate. Finally, Distributed Non-
interference is used to validate the semantic coherence between Distributed Non-disclosure
and Flow Policy Confinement, the two properties that are studied in the previous two sec-
tions. As a consequence, programs that are accepted by enforcement mechanisms for both
properties, are known to respect Distributed Non-interference.
Distributed Non-interference. Informally, a program is said to set up an information flow
from security level l1 to security level l2 if, during computation, information that has con-
fidentiality level l1 can interfere with what is observable at security level l2. From the
point when the information is read by the program, to the point where it’s interference is
reflected in the observable state, the program might change location. Which allowed flow
policy should it comply to? We propose that it should comply to the allowed flow policy
A of the domain where the information was read. More precisely, using the notation from
Subsection 2.1, it must hold that l2 ⊑
A l1.
The location of a thread thus determines which allowed flow policy it should obey at
that point, and is used to place a restriction on the information flows that are initiated at
that step. In order to formalize this idea by means of a bisimulation, the portion of the state
that is observable, or read, at a domain d is adjusted according to the current allowed flow
policy that is given by W (d), in the first low-equality of the definition. The bisimulation
condition then determines how that information can affect future computation steps, as
the resulting thread configurations must still be bisimilar. In particular, the computation
cannot produce pairs of programs that produce distinguishable states.
Definition 5.1 (∼W,Σ,Υ,Γl ). Given an security level l, a (W,Σ,Υ,Γ, l)-bisimulation is a sym-
metric relation R on thread configurations that satisfies, for all P1, T1, P2, T2, and (W,Σ,Γ)-
compatible stores S1, S2:
〈P1, T1〉 R 〈P2, T2〉 and W ⊢ 〈P1, T1, S1〉
d
−→
F
〈P ′1, T
′
1, S
′
1〉 and 〈T1, S1〉 =W (d),l 〈T2, S2〉
with (dom(S1
′) \ dom(S1)) ∩ dom(S2) = ∅ and dom(T1
′) \ dom(T1)) ∩ dom(T2) = ∅ implies
that there exist P ′2, T
′
2, S
′
2 such that:
W ⊢ 〈P2, T2, S2〉 ։ 〈P
′
2, T
′
2, S
′
2〉 and 〈T
′
1, S
′
1〉 =℧,l 〈T
′
2, S
′
2〉 and 〈P
′
1, T
′
1〉 R 〈P
′
2, T
′
2〉
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Furthermore, S′1, S
′
2 are still (W,Σ,Γ)-compatible. The largest (W,Σ,Υ,Γ, l)-bisimulation
is denoted ∼W,Σ,Υ,Γl .
For any Σ, Υ, l, the set of pairs of thread configurations where threads are values
is a (W,Σ,Υ,Γ, l)-bisimulation. Furthermore, the union of a family of (W,Σ,Υ,Γ, l)-
bisimulations is a (W,Σ,Υ,Γ, l)-bisimulation. Consequently, ∼W,Σ,Υ,Γl exists. In order
to lighten the notation, the parameters Σ and Υ are omitted in the rest of the paper,
written simply ‘∼W,Γl ’.
Information flows that are initiated at a given step are captured by considering all
computations that initiate on every possible pair of stores that coincide in the observable
(reading) level. This enables compositionality of the property, accounting for the possible
changes to the store that are induced by external threads. Position trackers of configurations
are fixed across steps within the bisimulation game, reflecting the assumption that changes
in the position of a thread can only be induced by the thread itself (subjective migration).
Note that the above relation is not reflexive. In fact, only secure programs are related to
themselves:
Definition 5.2 (Distributed Non-interference). A pool of threads P satisfies Distributed
Non-interference with respect to an allowed-policy mapping W , reference and thread label-
ings Σ,Υ and typing environment Γ, if it satisfies 〈P, T1〉 ∼
W,Γ
l 〈P, T2〉 for all security levels l
and position trackers T1, T2 such that dom(P ) = dom(T1) = dom(T2) and T1 =℧,l T2. We
then write P ∈ DNI(W,Σ,Υ,Γ).
Distributed Non-interference is compositional by set union of pools of threads, assuming
disjoint naming of threads and a subjective migration primitive.
Non-interference. As expected, local Non-interference follows from Definition 5.2 when net-
works are collapsed into a single domain d∗, i.e. when Dom = {d∗}. The resulting property
is parameterized by W (d∗), and coincides with the view of Non-interference as the absence
of information leaks (in the sense defined in Section 2) when W (d∗) = ℧. However, here
we adopt the view of Non-interference as the absence of illegal flows, which is relative to
the particular allowed flow policy. This point is further discussed in Section 6.
Programs that violate Non-interference, such as the direct leak (b := (! a)) when running
at d such that Σ1(a) 6⊑
W (d) Σ1(b) are also insecure with respect to Distributed Non-
interference. The same holds for indirect leaks via control and termination.
In the following program, information flows from reference a to b via observation of the
end domain:
(if (! a) then (threadl (allowed F then (b := 0) else ()) at d1)
else (threadl (allowed F then (b := 1) else ()) at d2))
(5.1)
In fact, since the position of threads in the network is part of the observable state, a
migration leak [AC11] from level Σ1(a) to level l occurs as soon as the new thread is
created. The information is read before migration, so the leak is only secure if it is allowed
by the policy of the thread’s initial domain.
Let us now consider the simpler program
(if (! a) then (threadl (b := 0) at d1) else (threadl (b := 1) at d1)) (5.2)
to be executed at d such that Σ1(a) ⊑
W (d) l (where the migration leak is allowed). Since
the two threads produce different changes at the level of b, then the program is again secure
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only if the first domain d allows it, i.e. Σ1(a) ⊑
W (d) Σ1(b). The policy of the new domain d1
only rules over what happens from the point where the thread enters it. Since the behavior
of the code that actually migrates does not depend on the location of the corresponding
threads, no leak is taking place at this point of the program.
Notice that the declassification operations are transparent to the property. In partic-
ular, the program in Equation (3.3) violates Distributed Non-interference, regardless of F ,
if Σ1(a) 6⊑
W (d) Σ1(b).
5.1. Semantic Coherence. We now show that Distributed Non-interference is coherent
with the properties of Non-interference, Distributed Non-disclosure and Flow Policy Con-
finement.
While Distributed Non-disclosure establishes a match between the leaks that are per-
formed by a program and the declassifications that are declared in its code, Flow Policy
Confinement requires that the declassifications comply to the allowed flow policy of the do-
main where they occur. It is thus expected that a notion of Distributed Non-interference,
which ensures that leaks respect the relevant allowed flow policies, should follow from the
combination of the other two.
Theorem 5.3. DND(W,Σ,Υ,Γ) ∩ FPC(W,Σ,Γ) ⊆ DNI(W,Σ,Υ,Γ).
Proof. We use Definitions 3.3, 4.2 and 5.2 to show that the set:
C = ≈W,Γl ∩ CT C
W,Σ,Γ × CT CW,Σ,Γ ⊆ ∼W,Γl
Consider (〈P1, T1〉, 〈P2, T2〉) ∈ C, and suppose thatW ⊢ 〈P1, T1, S1〉
d
−→
F
〈P ′1, T
′
1, S
′
1〉 and that
T1 =W (d),l T2. Now consider S2 such that S1 =W (d),l S2 and dom(S1
′)−dom(S1)∩dom(S2) =
∅. Since 〈P1, T1〉 ∈ CT C
W,Σ,Γ, we know that W (d) 4 F and 〈P ′1, T
′
1〉 ∈ CT C
W,Σ,Γ. Because
of the former, we therefore have that 〈P1, T1〉 =F,l 〈P2, T2〉. Since 〈P1, T1〉 ≈
W,Γ
l 〈P2, T2〉,
this implies that ∃P ′2, T
′
2, S
′
2 such that W ⊢ 〈P2, T2, S2〉 ։ 〈P
′
2, T
′
2, S
′
2〉 and 〈T
′
1, S
′
1〉 =℧,l
〈T ′2, S
′
2〉 and 〈P
′
1, T
′
1〉 ≈
W,Γ
l 〈P
′
2, T
′
2〉. Since 〈P2, T2〉 ∈ CT C
W,Σ,Γ, whether 〈P ′2, T
′
2〉 results
from zero or one step, we have that 〈P ′2, T
′
2〉 ∈ CT C
W,Σ,Γ. We can then conclude that
(〈P ′1, T
′
1〉, 〈P
′
2, T
′
2〉) ∈ C.
To see that the sets are not equal, consider again the program in Equation (3.3). While
it is secure regarding Distributed Non-interference if H ⊑W (d) L, if F = ℧ it violates
Distributed Non-disclosure, but respects Flow Policy Confinement; and if F = Ω it respects
Distributed Non-disclosure, but violates Flow Policy Confinement if W (d) 64 F .
5.2. Enforcement. While it is possible to design direct enforcement mechanisms for Dis-
tributed Non-interference (such as the proof of concept presented in [AC14], the point that
is relevant to this work is that enforcement of Distributed Non-interference can be obtained
by simultaneously enforcing Distributed Non-Disclosure and Flow Policy Confinement, as
follows from Theorem 5.3.
It is worth highlighting that, in order to apply the above consideration, the semantics
of programs that are in effect must be the same when enforcing the two properties. This
means in particular that if a hybrid mechanism such as Enforcement Mechanisms II and III
of the previous section is to be used, Distributed Non-disclosure must be ensured for the
modified semantics, in order to exclude the emergence of side-channels. It turns out that the
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type system of Section 3 is still sound with respect to the modified semantics of Figures 6
and 8. Indeed, when considering the alternative semantics, the results Subject Reduction,
Splitting Computations and Location Sensitive Typable High Threads (prop-iflow-split and
(Proposition 3.7 and Lemmas 3.8 and 3.10, respectively), hold unchanged. Also the results
outlined in the proof of Soundness (Theorem 3.11) still hold. Intuitively, regardless of the
state, the same remote thread creation always either succeeds or suspends, so the outcome
is the same.
The programs of Equation (5.1) and (5.2) would be rejected by the type system of
Figure 4 (Section 3) if Σ1(a) 6⊑
℧ Σ1(b), because the illegal flows would not be matched by
an appropriate flow declaration. If written within a flow declaration that allows information
to flow from Σ1(a) to Σ1(b), and when starting at a domain d, then the program would
be rejected by the type systems of Figures 5 and 6 (Section 4) if F 64 W (d) because the
program would be declaring intent of performing a declassification that is not allowed by
the domain where it would take place. Returning to the program of Equation (3.3), it would
be rejected by the type system of Figure 4 if Σ1(a) 6⊑
F Σ1(b), and by that of Figure 5 if
F 64W (d). When running under Enforcement Mechanisms II and III, it would suspend at
the point of remote thread creation if F 64W (d).
6. Related work and Discussion
Distributed security setting. This paper is founded on a distributed computation model in
which domains are units of security policies [BCGL02], in the sense that behaviors that
take place at the same domain are subjected to the same security policy: the allowed flow
policy. Other dimensions that have been considered for the semantics of domains include
the unification of communication (the behavior of communication between entities is de-
termined by their location) [CG98, HR02, SWP99], of mobility (entire domains move as a
block) [FGL+96, CG98, VC99], of failures (failure in a domain affect the entities that are
located there in a similar way) [Ama97, FGL+96] or of memory access (completion of mem-
ory accesses depends on location) [SY97]. Formal distributed security settings have been
studied over the generic notion of programmable domain [SS03], which offers expressivity
to equip each domain with means to encode and enforce its own policies. Besides security,
these distributed policies may regard other goals such as failure resilience, resource manage-
ment and correctness of mobile code. Particular attention has been given to various forms
of programmable membranes [Bou05], where computing power and policy specification is
explicitly associated to the boundaries of computation domains, akin to firewalls (discussed
further ahead under the topic Controlling code mobility). Policies that are associated to
domains can more specifically be expressed as mathematical objects of different degree of
expressiveness, such as types or finite automata [MV05, HMR03, GHS05, HRY05].
Domains’ security assurances can be differentiated as security levels, in the context of
controlling information flows. Myers and Liskov’s Decentralized Label Model (DLM) [ML98,
ML00] provides a way of expressing decentralized labels (referred to as policies, in a different
use of the word) that extend the concrete setting of security levels as sets of principals, by
distributing them according to ownership. Zdancewic et. al [ZZNM02] propose in Jif/Split
a technique for automatically partitioning programs by placing code and data onto hosts
in accordance with DLM labels in the source code. Jif/Split assigns to each host arbitrary
trust levels that are granted by the same principals of the system. It ensures that if a host
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is subverted, the only data whose confidentiality or integrity is threatened during execu-
tion of a part of the program, is data owned by principals that trust that host. Chong et.
al [CLM+07] present Swift as a specialization of this idea for Web applications. Zheng and
Myers [ZM06] address the issue of how availability of domains (hosts) might affect informa-
tion flows in a distributed computation. Here the label on a host represents the strength
of the policies that the host is trusted to enforce. Fournet et. al [FLGR09, FP11] present
a compiler that produces distributed code where communications are implemented using
cryptographic mechanisms, and ensures that all confidentiality and integrity properties are
preserved, despite the presence of active adversaries. While associating security levels to
domains is a step towards considering heterogeneous security status, in the above works
these levels are understood with respect to a single flow policy.
The Fabric programming system [LAGM17], incorporates information flow methods
into a platform for distributed computation over shared persistent data. Host nodes are
represented by principals, who can declare trust in other principals, from which a global
trust lattice is derived. The goal is to ensure that the security of a principal does not
depend on any part of the system that it considers to be an adversary. Nothing is assumed
about the behavior of nodes, which can be malicious. This is compatible with a distributed
security setting in which the policies of each node are unknown. However, enforcement of
information flow control for mobile code is done with respect to a global policy, bounded by
the provider label of that code. Most recently, FlowFence [FPR+16] addresses information
flow security in the Internet of Things (IoT). Based on an evaluation of representative
examples of existing IoT frameworks, it advocates and supports differentiation of policies
defined by both producers and consumers of apps, specifying the permissible flows that
govern their data, against which the declared app’s flow policies are checked. Though
not formally defined, policies are described as sets of flow rules between taint labels (data
tags) and sinks (sensitive data outlets), stating which data can flow to which sinks. The
paper presents the Opacified Computation model, for enforcing source to sink information
flow control as declared by consumers’ policies. To our knowledge, the work presented in
this paper (which includes [Alm09, AC13, AC14]) is the only one that studies formally
information flow security in the presence of distributed allowed flow policies.
Information flow and locality. Information flow security for location-aware programs has
been studied in the absence of a distributed security setting. Mantel and Sabelfeld [MS03]
provide a type system for preserving confidentiality for different kinds of channels established
over a publicly observable medium in a distributed setting. Interaction between domains
is restricted to the exchange of values (no code mobility), and the security setting is not
distributed. Castagna, Bugliesi and Craffa study Non-interference for a purely functional
distributed and mobile calculus [CBC02]. In these works no declassification mechanisms
are contemplated. Our previous work that is closest to this one [AC11] studies insecure
information flows that are introduced by mobility in the context of a stateful distributed
language that includes flow declarations. In the computation model that is considered, do-
mains are memory access units. Threads own references that move along with them during
migration, which gives rise to migration leaks that result from memory synchronization
issues: non-local read and write access fail, and thus may reveal information about the
location of a thread. Considering a shared global state in this paper allows us to make
evident the distributed nature of the security setting, from which distributed behavior of
programs emerges, while factoring out the technicalities of dealing with distributed and/or
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mobile references. In this context, migration leaks appear as a result of inspection of the
allowed flow policy, since information about current policy can carry information about the
location itself.
The Fabric programming language [LAGM17] supports mobile code, allowing to dynam-
ically combine code from multiple sources. Programs use remote calls to explicitly transfer
execution to a different node, by means of a mechanism of function shipping. Stores are dis-
tributed into storage nodes, and code into worker nodes, which as said earlier are principals.
Access to a store by a worker implies an information flow channel, referred to as a read chan-
nel that could have connections to the concept of migration leaks [AC11]. The distributed
computation model is not formally defined, so there is no formal account of the new forms
of leaks in isolation, nor how they to the migration leaks discussed earlier [Alm09, AC11].
When seen as a means for running code under different allowed flow policies, and
in particular more permissive ones, analogies can be drawn between migration and the
notion of declassification as a flow declaration. Similarities extend to the fact that there
is a lexical scope to the migrating code, as there is for the flow declaration. However,
differences between the two are more fundamentally expressed through the distinct roles of
the flow policies that concern them: while a declared flow policy represents an intention to
perform a leak (declassification) that is rejected by the strictest baseline security lattice, an
allowed flow policy that is held by a domain represents a limit that should not be crossed.
This distinction is embodied by the formulation of two independent security properties
that relate to each of the two flow policies: Distributed Non-disclosure, that places no
restriction on the usage of declassification enabling constructs by the programmer, and
Flow Policy Confinement, which does not speak of information flows but solely of whether
declassification is allowed to be performed by a particular thread at a particular domain.
At a more technical level, migration has expression in the semantics of the language, with
a potential impact on the observable state (eg. via the allowed flow policy), while the
flow declaration is used solely with specification purposes. Furthermore, in the considered
language setting, domains cannot be nested into different shades of allowed flow policies,
and code cannot move in and out of a flow declaration.
Enabling and controlling declassification. Sabelfeld and Sands survey the literature regard-
ing the subject of declassification [SS05], from the perspective of that all declassifica-
tion mechanisms provide some sort of declassification control. Mechanisms that enable
changes in the policy are included in this study. Declassification mechanisms are then
classified according to four main dimensions for control: what information should be re-
leased [SM04, LZ05], when it should be allowed to happen [CM04], who should be autho-
rized to use it [MSZ06], and where in the program it can be stated [MS04, BS06, HTHZ05]
or a combination of thereof [BCR08]. The lexical scoping of the flow declaration could
be seen to place it under the “where” category. However, it was proposed [AB09] as a
means to enable the expression of declassification (as opposed to attempt to control it)
within an information flow control framework. In that view, our type system for enforcing
non-disclosure is best understood as a verification of accordance between code and policy
specification in the form of flow declaration. More recently Broberg et al. [BvDS15] pro-
posed a unifying framework for reasoning about dynamic policies, according to which the
term ‘declassification’ is a particular case of dynamic policy change that is traditionally
data oriented. Dynamic policy specification mechanisms are analysed through a structure
of three control levels: Level 0, defining which set of flow relations can be used; Level 1,
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describing how the active flow relation changes during execution; and Level 2, restricting
which policy changes may occur. Using this classification, mechanisms that are designed to
enable declassification, such as the flow policy declaration, operate at Level 1, while those
for controlling (in the sense of restricting) its use, such as migration control, operate at
Level 2.
It is helpful to see declassification control as dependent on the context in which it may
occur (formalized as meta information that is argument to a meta policy [BvDS15]). Flow
Policy Confinement captures semantically the requirement that declassification between
certain levels can only occur within computation domains that allow it. Chong and My-
ers [CM04] associate declassification policies to variables as a way of restricting the sequence
of levels through which they can be downgraded, provided some conditions are satisfied.
Control is then specified for each data item, and policies cannot be tested by the program.
Conditions are used in the definition of a generalized non-interference property to mark
the steps where declassification occurs, in order to allow information release only if they
are satisfied. The Jif language [Mye99, ML00, CMVZ09], founded on the aforementioned
DLM [ML98, ML00], offers a separate concept of authority which regulates which declassifi-
cations are allowed. The acts-for relation, describing delegation of trust between principals,
is expressed similarly to a flow policy. A delegation operation enables programmers to ex-
tend the acts-for hierarchy in the scope of an expression. Its mechanics is similar to our
flow declaration, in that the program can change the valid flow policy. However, its purpose
is to express control over the use of downgrading, which must be robust [ZM01, MSZ06],
i.e. take place via declassify operations and be trusted by the principals whose policies are
relaxed. Also the use of delegation is controlled in order to ensure permission from the
delegating principal [TZ07]. Hicks et al. [HKMH06] introduce, in a featherweight version
of Jif, the possibility of restricting changes to the acts-for policy to the use of declassifier
functions that are specified in a global and static policy. The Paralocks and Paragon policy
specification languages [BS10, BvDS13] operate over a lock state, by opening or closing
locks that guard information flows. As Paragon offers the possibility to place locks on
policies, it is possible to define multiple layers of control, which can simultaneously express
declassification enabling and restriction.
Declassification control criteria can be largely orthogonal to information flow legality,
and can be captured semantically by means of security properties whose concerns are distinct
from those of information flow properties. Boudol and Kolundz˘ija [BK07] use standard ac-
cess control primitives to control the access level of programs that perform declassifications
in the setting of a local language, ensuring that a program can only declassify information
that it has the right to read. Besides presenting a standard information-flow security result
(soundness of the proposed enforcement mechanism regarding Non-disclosure), they formal-
ize a separate access control result that implies the property that a secure program does
not attempt to read a reference for which it does not hold the appropriate reading clear-
ance. This approach was adopted to control declassification in a calculus for multiparty
sessions with delegation, and enforced by means of a type system that guarantees both ses-
sion safety and a form of access control [CCDCR10]. In order to achieve robustness in the
presence of run-time principals, Tse and Zdancewic [TZ07] use a system of capabilities for
making declassification and endorsement depend on a run-time authority. Downgrading op-
erations of information that is owned by a principal require that the principal has granted
the appropriate capabilities. While a type-safety result is proven, the enforced property
is not formalized. Arden et al. [ALM15, AM16] propose the Flow-Limited Authorization
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Model (FLAM) [ALM15], a logic for reasoning about trust and information flow policies
in which these two concepts are unified. The model allows to control how delegations and
revocations may affect authorization decisions. It is formally shown to enforce a new robust
authorization security condition, which rejects leaks that are present in earlier work.
Dynamic information flow policies. Security policies can in be used in the role of declarations
that capture security relevant behavior, or of security requirements, both of which can
change during program execution. In the present work we use dynamic instances of both
forms of flow polices: declared flow policies as a declassification enabling mechanism, that is
set up by the program to delimit different lexical scopes within which different patterns of
flows that break the basic global policy can be established; distributed allowed flow policies,
coupled with the notion of thread location, that govern what each thread is allowed to
do, and can change dynamically (in relation to that thread to that thread) along with the
migration of the thread. Returning to the terminology of Broberg et al. [BvDS15], these two
roles would correspond to specification mechanisms of control Level 1 and 2, respectively.
Dynamic security polices can be seen as being under the responsibility of an authority.
In the present work, the units of authority are locations, and their policies take the form of
allowed flow policies. Jif’s acts-for relation of the DLM [ML98, ML00, CMVZ09] (referred-to
above), represents a policy that defines the current global run-time authority and is shaped
by multiple principals. The acts-for policy is dynamic, as it can be extended via delegation
within a lexical scope [TZ07]. Authority can be expressed over language objects in the form
of dynamic security labels, while the underlying security lattice remains fixed [ZM04, TZ07].
Hicks et al. [HTHZ05] consider a generalization of the global acts-for policy scenario that
copes with asynchronous updates during run-time. This policy is closer to the concept of
allowed flow policy as external to the program’s own policies, and is studied in a simpler
non-distributed context, in the absence of declassification. Swamy et al. [SHTZ06] use role-
based allowed policies where membership and delegation of roles can change dynamically.
Programming languages can provide constructs for interacting with flow policies us-
ing operations for changing the policy, or for being aware of the current flow policy, in
order to adapt its behavior accordingly. Boudol and Kolundz˘ija’s test l then M else N
instruction[BK07], that tests whether the access level l is granted by the context, is used to
control the access level of programs that perform declassifications. Broberg and Sands, use
flow locks [BS06] to selectively provide access to memory locations. They introduce flexible
constructs for manipulating locks, namely open and close. Extending the idea of the flow
locks, the expressive policy languages Paralocks and Paragon [BS10, BvDS13] introduces
the ability to express policies modelling roles (in the style of role-based access control) and
run-time principals and relations. The language includes creation of new actors via newactor
forall, and open and close for changing the current policy. This language includes a when
command is a conditional which executes one of two branches depending on the state of
a particular lock. Both dynamic and static tests to the authority’s policy are supported
in Jif, via the switch-label and the actsFor), and have been formally studied in related
models that include dynamic labels [ZM07] and dynamic principals [TZ07].
Enforcing dynamic (allowed) flow policies raises the challenge of that, even when
they change synchronously with the program (i.e. are deterministically determined by
it [DHS15]), it is not in general known, for each program point, what policy will apply at
execution time. Here we proposed solutions in the realm of migration control, by preventing
a thread that can perform an action to migrate to a domain where that action is disallowed.
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Inversely, in [HTHZ05], where the allowed policy can change asynchronously, updates to
the policy that would be inconsistent with the executing program (said to “violate” the
program’s policy), are considered illegal. Swamy et. al [SHTZ06] use database-style trans-
actions which, when a change in policy is inconsistent with some of the flows in the program,
can roll it back to a consistent state.
Controlling code mobility. A variety of formal distributed computation models have been
designed with the purpose of studying mechanisms for controlling code mobility. These
range from type systems for statically controlling migration as an access control mech-
anism [MV05, HMR03, HRY05], to runtime mechanisms that are based on the concept
of programmable membranes [Bou05]. The later are a specialization of the aforemen-
tioned programmable domains for performing automatic checks to migrating code, with
the aim of controlling the movements of entities across the boundaries of the domain.
This control can be performed by processes that interact with external and internal pro-
grams [LS00, SS03, Bou05], and can implement specialized type systems or other automatic
verification mechanisms [GHS05].
In the present work we abstract away from the particular machinery that implements
the migration control checks, and express declaratively, via the language semantics, the
condition that must be satisfied for the boundary transposition to be allowed. The de-
classification effect can be seen as a certificate that moves with code in order to aid its
verification, similarly to the proof-carrying code model [Nec97]. However, as we have seen,
checking the validity of the declassification effect is not simpler than checking the program
against a concrete allowed policy (as presented in Subsection 4.3). The concept of trust
can be used to lift the checking requirements of code whose history of visited domains pro-
vides enough assurance [GHS05, MV05]. These ideas could be applied to the present work,
assisting the decision of trusting the declassification effect, otherwise leading to a full type
check of the code.
Migration control has recently been applied in the context of building practical secure
distributed systems that perform information flow and declassification control. As men-
tioned earlier, in Fabric [LAGM17], mobile code is subject to run-time verification. Besides
provider-bounded information flow checking, this includes validation of trust between the
caller and callee nodes. Since running the code depends on the success of these checks, they
amount to a form of migration control.
Hybrid mechanisms and information flow policies. Hybrid mechanisms for enforcing infor-
mation flow policies have been subject of active interest for over a decade (see other detailed
reviews [MC11, BBJ16]).
The idea of associating a runtime type analysis to the semantics of programs for control-
ling declassification was put forward as a proof-of-concept [Alm09], and further developed
in the hybrid mechanisms of the present and work. Both are presented as abstract anal-
ysis predicates that condition a migration instruction. Mechanisms that interact in more
complex ways with the semantics of the program could be defined by means of a monitor,
such as Askarov and Sabelfeld’s for embedding an on-the-fly static analysis in a lock-step
information flow monitor [AS09]. Focusing on the expressivity of the analyses, the former
work [Alm09] considers a similar language as the one studied here, with local thread cre-
ation and a basic goto migration instruction. A notion of declassification was inferred at
runtime, using a coarser informative type and effect system. Future migrations were not
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taken into account when analyzing the declassifications that could occur at the target site,
so the program
(threadl (threadl (flow F in M) at d2) at d1) (6.1)
would be rejected if F was not allowed by W (d1). The three enforcement mechanisms of
Section 4 are more refined, as they only reject it if F is not allowed by W (d2) by the control
mechanism associated to d2. Enforcement Mechanism II is the closest to the former work,
but uses a more permissive “checking” type system. Enforcement Mechanism III uses a
type and effect system for statically calculating declassification effects that is substantially
more precise than the former work, thanks to the matching relations and operations that it
uses. This enables to take advantage of the efficiency of flow policy comparisons.
Other previous work explores the usefulness of employing informative type and effect
systems in building hybrid security analysis mechanisms [AF12]. There, the term ‘declassi-
fication effect’ represents a conservative approximation of the illegal information flows (as
opposed to the declassification policies, investigated here) that are set up by the program,
inferred by means of a dependency analysis, in the form of downward closure operators that
represent information flow policies. The advantages of determining these policies statically
in order to efficiently verify runtime compliance to dynamic security policies analyses is
illustrated, for an expressive core-ML language, in the context of asynchronous dynamic
updates to a local allowed flow policy. Delft et al. [DHS15] also advocate for the advantages
of separating the dependency analysis and policy enforcement in the context of a hybrid
mechanism, in order to enforce compliance to dynamic policies. Dependencies between re-
sources that are established by a program in a simple while language with output channels
are extracted by means of a more precise and generic flow-sensitive type system [HS06], in
the form of a mapping from each program variables to its (conservatively approximated)
set of dependencies (variables).
In FlowFence [FPR+16] both application producers and consumers can declare their
information flow policies. These policies are compared using operations such as intersection
and subtraction, that are reminiscent (the formal definitions are not presented) of the
pseudo-subtraction operation and permissiveness relation defined in Subsection 2.1, which
was mainly used in calculating the declassification effect in Figure 7. Our declassification
effect of a program can be seen as the least permissive policy that the program complies to,
and can therefore declare in its manifest.
7. Conclusions and Future work
In this work we considered a simple network model of a distributed security setting, and
provided a thorough study of information flow issues that arise within it. Adopting the
standpoint of separating the enabling and controlling facets of declassification, we defined
and studied two security properties that are related to declassification: Distributed non-
disclosure, which regards the compliance of information leaks to declassification declarations
in the code, and Flow Policy Confinement, which regards compliance of those declarations to
the allowed flow policies of each site. For each, we proposed mechanisms for enforcing them,
ranging from purely static to hybrid approaches. Finally, we tied up the both properties and
respective mechanisms by showing that, in combination, they imply a generalization of Non-
interference. We propose this property, which we refer to as Distributed Non-interference,
as a baseline information flow property that is adequate for distributed security settings.
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We showed how the problem of migration control can be applied to that of declassifi-
cation control. By comparing three related enforcement mechanisms, we argued that the
concept of declassification effect offers advantages in achieving both precision and efficiency.
We believe that similar mechanisms can be applied in other contexts. This new security
effect can be associated at runtime to a program, containing information about the declas-
sifying environments (or of other behavior of interest) that can potentially be established
by that program. It is flexible enough to allow programs containing operations that are
forbidden at certain sites to be considered secure nevertheless, as long as these operations
are guarded by an appropriate context testing construct. The techniques that were studied
are largely independent of the declassification mechanism that is used, which testifies to
how a layer of control can be added to the most permissive declassification mechanisms.
We expect that our language framework can be easily adapted to studying other lan-
guage constructs and settings, security properties and enforcement mechanisms. We end
with a few notes on possible lines for future work:
• In our model, domains are the sole authorities of security policy, which must be
respected by migrating threads when executing at each domain. The model can be
refined to enable migrating programs to establish a security policy over how their
information should be handled, possibly in a setting where references can move
along with threads [AC11]. The concern would be to prevent information that is
carried by programs from becoming accessible to others with more permissive flow
policies.
• It is known that when considering a distributed memory model (where accessibility
to remote references depends on location), memory synchronization issues can lead
to migration leaks [AC11]. In other words, distribution of memory access can be
used to reveal information about location. The present paper shows that migration
leaks can also result from a distributed security setting combined with a program
construct for inspecting the domain’s flow policies. Other forms of distribution
(as for instance failure or communication-based distribution) and migration (eg.
ambient migration [CG98]) could create other forms of dependencies. Studying them
would bring a better understanding of indirect possibilities of leaking information
about the location of entities in networks.
• The property of Flow Policy Confinement is perhaps the simplest form of imposing
compliance of declassifications to distributed allowed flow policies. It would be
interesting to consider properties with more complex (and restrictive) concerns,
possibly taking into account the history of domains that a thread has visited when
defining secure code migrations. For instance, one might want to forbid threads
from moving to domains with more favorable allowed flow policies. The enforcement
of such a property would be easily achieved, using the abstractions of this paper,
by introducing a condition on the allowed flow policies of origin and destination
domains.
• We have considered a new instance of the problem of enforcing compliance of declas-
sifications to a dynamically changing allowed flow policy: In our setting, changes
in the allowed flow policy result from migration of programs during execution in a
synchronous way. Lifting the assumption of that the domain’s allowed flow policies
are static, towards allowing them to change asynchronously with program execu-
tion would more realistically capture full policy dynamicity, but would be outside
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the realm of migration control. Other mechanisms are therefore in demand for the
scenario of a dynamic and distributed security setting.
• As a more long term aim, and having in mind recent developments in the area
of providing built-in security by construction into the IoT [FPR+16], it would be
worthwhile to explore the interplay between the technical framework that is here
proposed and that is conceptual in nature, and emerging real-world global computing
settings.
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This Appendix contains the proofs of the technical results that are omitted or sketched
in the paper.
Appendix A. Proofs for ‘Controlling Information Flow’
A.1. Formalization of Distributed Non-disclosure. In [AC11] Non-disclosure is de-
fined for networks, considering a distributed setting with code mobility, by means of a
bisimulation on pools of threads. In this paper we used a bisimulation on thread configu-
rations. We prove that the new definition is weaker than the first.
Definition on pools of threads. In order to compare the precision of Non-Disclosure for
Networks with Distributed Non-disclosure as proposed here, we recall the definition of the
former, using the notations of the present paper.
Definition A.1 (≈˙W,Σ,Υ,Γl ). Given a security level l, a (W,Σ,Υ,Γ, l)-bisimulation is a
symmetric relation R on pools of threads that satisfies, for all P1, P2, and for all (Σ,Γ)-
compatible stores S1, S2:
P1 R P2 and W ⊢ 〈P1, T1, S1〉
d
−→
F
〈P ′1, T
′
1, S
′
1〉 and 〈T1, S1〉 =
Σ1,Υ
F,l 〈T2, S2〉
with dom(S1
′)− dom(S1) ∩ dom(S2) = ∅ and dom(T1
′)− dom(T1) ∩ dom(T2) = ∅ implies
that there exist P ′2, T
′
2, S
′
2 such that:
W ⊢ 〈P2, T2, S2〉։ 〈P
′
2, T
′
2, S
′
2〉 and 〈T
′
1, S
′
1〉 =
Σ1,Υ
℧,l 〈T
′
2, S
′
2〉 andP
′
1 R P
′
2
Furthermore, S′1, S
′
2 are still (Σ,Γ)-compatible. The largest (W,Σ,Υ,Γ, l)-bisimulation, the
union of all such bisimulations, is denoted ≈˙W,Σ,Υ,Γl .
For any Σ, Υ, Γ and l, the set of pairs of thread configurations where threads are values
is an (W,Σ,Υ,Γ, l)-bisimulation. Furthermore, the union of a family of (W,Σ,Υ,Γ, l)-
bisimulations is a (W,Σ,Υ,Γ, l)-bisimulation. Consequently, ≈˙W,Σ,Υ,Γl exists.
Definition A.2 (Non-disclosure for Networks). A pool of threads P satisfies the Non-
disclosure for Networks property with respect to an allowed-policy mapping W , a reference
labeling Σ, a thread labeling Υ and a typing environment Γ, if it satisfies P ≈˙W,Σ,Υ,Γl P for
all security levels l. We then write P ∈ NDN (W,Σ,Υ,Γ).
Comparison. Definition 3.3 is strictly weaker than the thread pool-based Definition A.2, in
the sense that it considers more programs as secure. This is formalized by the following
proposition.
Proposition A.3 (Proposition 3.5). NDN (W,Σ,Υ,Γ) ⊂ DND(W,Σ,Υ,Γ).
Proof. We consider P in NDN (W,Σ,Υ,Γ), i.e. P is such that for all security levels l we
have P ≈˙W,Σ,Υ,Γl P according to Definition A.1. Given any pair of position trackers T1, T2
such that dom(P ) = dom(T1) = dom(T2) and T1 =
Σ1,Υ
℧,l T2, we prove that for all levels l we
have 〈P, T1〉 ≈
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
l 〈P, T2〉 according to Definition 3.3. To this end, we consider the set
N={〈〈P1, T1〉, 〈P2, T2〉〉 | dom(P )=dom(T1)=dom(T2) and T1=
Σ1,Υ
℧,l T2 and P1≈˙
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
l P2}
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and prove that N ⊆ ≈W,Σ,Υ,Γl (according to Definition 3.3).
Assume that 〈〈P1, T1〉, 〈P2, T2〉〉 ∈ N , and suppose that for any given (Σ,Γ)-compatible
memories S1, S2 we have W ⊢ 〈P1, T1, S1〉
d
−→
F
〈P ′1, T
′
1, S
′
1〉 and 〈T1, S1〉 =
Σ1,Υ
F,l 〈T2, S2〉, with
dom(S1
′)− dom(S1) ∩ dom(S2) = ∅ and dom(T1
′)− dom(T1) ∩ dom(T2) = ∅. Then, by
Definition A.1 there exist P ′2, T
′
2, S
′
2 such that
W ⊢ 〈P2, T2, S2〉։ 〈P
′
2, T
′
2, S
′
2〉 and 〈T
′
1, S
′
1〉 =
Σ1,Υ
℧,l 〈T
′
2, S
′
2〉 and P
′
1 R P
′
2
Furthermore, S′1, S
′
2 are still (Σ,Γ)-compatible. It is now easy to see that 〈〈P
′
1, T
′
1〉, 〈P
′
2, T
′
2〉〉 ∈
N .
The example in Equation (3.4) shows that NDN (W,Σ,Υ,Γ) 6= DND(W,Σ,Υ,Γ).
A.2. Type system.
A.2.1. Subject Reduction. In order to establish the soundness of the type system of Figure 4
we need a Subject Reduction result, stating that types that are given to expressions are
preserved by computation. To prove it we follow the usual steps [WF94]. In the following,
Pse is the set of pseudo-values, as defined in Figure 2.
Remark A.4.
(1) If X ∈ Pse and Γ ⊢Σj,F X : s, τ , then for all security levels j
′, flow policies F ′ and
security effects s′, we have that Γ ⊢Σj′,F ′ X : s
′, τ .
(2) For any flow policies F,F ′, such that F ′ 4 F , we have that Γ ⊢Σj,F M : τ implies
Γ ⊢Σj,F ′ M : τ .
Lemma A.5.
(1) If Γ ⊢Σj,F M : s, τ and x /∈ dom(Γ) then Γ, x : σ ⊢
Σ
j,F M : s, τ .
(2) If Γ, x : σ ⊢Σj,F M : s, τ and x /∈ fv(M) then Γ ⊢
Σ
j,F M : s, τ .
Proof. By induction on the inference of the type judgment.
Lemma A.6 (Substitution).
If Γ, x : σ ⊢Σj,F M : s, τ and Γ ⊢
Σ
j′,F ′ X : s
′, σ then Γ ⊢Σj,F {x 7→ X}M : s, τ .
Proof. By induction on the inference of Γ, x : τ ⊢Σj,F M : s, σ, and by case analysis on the
last rule used in this typing proof, using the previous lemma. Let us examine the cases
related to the new language constructs:
Mig: HereM = (threadl M¯ at d¯) and we have that Γ, x : σ ⊢
Σ
l,℧ M¯ : s¯, τ , with τ = unit
and s¯ = 〈⊥, l ⊔ s.w,⊥〉. By induction hypothesis, then Γ ⊢Σl,℧ {x 7→ X}M¯ : s¯, τ .
Therefore, by rule Mig, Γ ⊢Σj,F (threadl {x 7→ X}M¯ at d¯) : s, τ .
Flow: Here M = (flow F¯ in M¯), Γ, x : σ ⊢Σ
j,FupriseF¯
M¯ : s, τ . By induction hypothesis,
Γ ⊢Σ
j,FupriseF¯
{x 7→ X}M¯ : s, τ . Then, by Flow, we have Γ ⊢Σj,F (flow F¯ in {x 7→ X}M¯ ) :
s, τ .
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Allow: HereM = (allowed F¯ then Nt else Nf ) and we have Γ, x : σ ⊢
Σ
j,F Nt : st, τ and
Γ, x : σ ⊢Σj,F Nf : sf , τ with j ⊑
F st.w, sf .w and s = st ⊔ sf ⊔ 〈j,⊤, j〉. By induc-
tion hypothesis, Γ, x : σ ⊢Σj,F {x 7→ X}Nt : st, τ and Γ, x : σ ⊢
Σ
j,F {x 7→ X}Nf : sf , τ .
Therefore, by ruleAllow, we have that Γ, x : σ ⊢Σj,F (allowed F¯ then {x 7→ X}Nt else {x 7→ X}Nf ) :
s, τ .
Lemma A.7 (Replacement).
If Γ ⊢Σj,F E[M ] : s, τ is a valid judgment, then the proof gives M a typing Γ ⊢
Σ
j,Fuprise⌈E⌉ M : s¯, τ¯
for some s¯ and τ¯ such that s¯ ⊑ s. In this case, if Γ ⊢Σ
j,Fuprise⌈E⌉
N : s¯′, τ¯ with s¯′ ⊑ s¯, then
Γ ⊢Σj,F E[N ] : s
′, τ , for some s′ such that s′ ⊑ s.
Proof. By induction on the structure of E. Let us examine the case of the flow declaration,
which is the only non-standard evaluation context:
E[M ] = (flow F ′ in E¯[M ]): By Flow, we have Γ ⊢Σj,FupriseF ′ E¯[M ] : s, τ . By induction
hypothesis, the proof gives M a typing Γ ⊢Σ
j,FupriseF ′uprise⌈E¯⌉
M : sˆ, τˆ , for sˆ, τˆ such that
sˆ ⊑ s. Also by induction hypothesis, Γ ⊢Σj,FupriseF ′ E¯[N ] : s
′, τ , for some s′ such that
s′ ⊑ s. Then, again by Flow, we have Γ ⊢Σj,F (flow F
′ in E¯[N ]) : s′, τ .
We check that the type of a thread is preserved by reduction, while its effects “weaken”.
Proposition A.8 (Subject Reduction – Proposition 3.7).
Consider a thread Mm such that Γ ⊢ΣΥ(m),F M : s, τ , and suppose that W ⊢ 〈{M
m}, T, S〉
d
−→
F ′
〈{M ′m} ∪ P, T ′, S′〉, for a memory S that is (Σ,Γ)-compatible. Then, there is an effect
s′ such that s′ ⊑ s and Γ ⊢ΣΥ(m),F M
′ : s′, τ , and S′ is also (Σ,Γ)-compatible. Furthermore,
if P = {Nn}, for some expression N and thread name n, then there exists s′′ such that
s′′ ⊑ s and Γ ⊢ΣΥ(n),℧ N : s
′′, unit.
Proof. Suppose that M = E¯[M¯ ] and W ⊢Σ,Υ 〈{M¯m}, T, S〉
d
−→
F¯
〈{M¯ ′m} ∪ P ′, T¯ ′, S¯′〉. We
start by observing that this implies F = F¯uprise⌈E¯⌉,M ′ = E¯[M¯ ′], P = P ′, T¯ ′ = T ′ and S¯′ = S′.
We can assume, without loss of generality, that M¯ is the smallest in the sense that there is
no Eˆ, Mˆ , Nˆ such that Eˆ 6= [] and Eˆ[Mˆ ] = M¯ for which we can write W ⊢Σ,Υ 〈{Mˆm}, T, S〉
d
−→
Fˆ
〈{Mˆ ′m} ∪ P, T ′, S′〉.
By Replacement (Lemma A.7), we have Γ ⊢Σ
Υ(m),Fuprise⌈E¯⌉
M¯ : s¯, τ¯ in the proof of Γ ⊢ΣΥ(m),F
E¯[M¯ ] : s, τ , for some s¯ and τ¯ . We proceed by case analysis on the transition W ⊢Σ,Υ
〈{M¯m}, T, S〉
d
−→
F¯
〈{M¯ ′m} ∪ P, T ′, S′〉, and prove that if S′ 6= S then:
• There is an effect s¯′ such that s¯′ ⊑ s¯ and Γ ⊢Σ
Υ(m),Fuprise⌈E¯⌉
M¯ ′ : s¯′, τ¯ . Furthermore, for
every reference a ∈ dom(S′) implies Γ ⊢Σ
jˆ,Fˆ
S′(a) : sˆ,Σ2(a), for every security level
jˆ, flow policy Fˆ and security effect sˆ.
• If P = {Nn} for some expression N and thread name n, then there is an effect s¯′′
such that s¯.w ⊑ s¯′′.w and a thread name d′ such that Γ ⊢ΣΥ(n),℧ N : s¯
′′, unit.
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We present only the cases corresponding to reductions of the non-standard language con-
structs:
M¯ = (allowed F ′ then Nt else Nf): Suppose that W (d) 4 F
′ (the other case is
analogous). Here we have M¯ ′ = Nt, S = S
′ and P = ∅. By Allow, we have that
Γ ⊢Σ
Υ(m),Fuprise⌈E¯⌉
Nt : st, τ¯ , where st ⊑ s¯.
M¯ = (flow F ′ in V ): Here we have M¯ ′ = V , S = S′ and P = ∅. By rule Flow, we
have that Γ ⊢Σ
Υ(m),Fuprise⌈E¯⌉upriseF ′
V : s¯, τ . and by Remark A.4, we have Γ ⊢Σ
Υ(m),Fuprise⌈E¯⌉
V : s¯, τ¯ .
M¯ = (threadk N at d
′): Here we have M¯ ′ = (), P = {Nn} for some thread name n,
S = S′ and T ′(n) = d. By Mig, we have that Γ ⊢ΣΥ(n),℧ N : sˆ, unit, with s.w ⊑ sˆ.w
and τ¯ = unit, and by Nil we have that Γ ⊢Σ
Υ(m),Fuprise⌈E¯⌉
() : s¯, unit.
By Replacement (Lemma A.7), we can finally conclude that Γ ⊢ΣΥ(m),F E¯[M¯
′] : s′, τ , for
some s′ ⊑ s.
A.2.2. Basic Properties.
Properties of the Semantics. One can show that if a thread is able to perform a step in one
memory, while creating a new thread (or not), when executing on a low-equal memory it
can also perform a step and produce a low-equal result, while creating a new thread (or
not).
Lemma A.9 (Guaranteed Transitions). Consider an allowed-policy mapping W , a thread
Mm and two states 〈T1, S1〉, 〈T2, S2〉 such that W ⊢ 〈{M
m}, T1, S1〉
d
−→
F
〈P ′1, T
′
1, S
′
1〉, and for
some F ′ we have 〈T1, S1〉 =
Σ1,Υ
FupriseF ′,low 〈T2, S2〉. Then:
• If P ′1 = {M
′m
1 }, and (dom(S1
′)− dom(S1)) ∩ dom(S2) = ∅, then there exist M
′
2, T
′
2
and S′2 such that W ⊢ 〈{M
m}, T2, S2〉
d
−→
F
〈{M ′m2 }, T
′
2, S
′
2〉 and 〈T
′
1, S
′
1〉 =
Σ1,Υ
FupriseF ′,low
〈T ′2, S
′
2〉.
• If P ′1 = {M
′m, Nn} for some expression N and (dom(T1
′)− dom(T1)) ∩ dom(T2) =
∅, then there exist M ′2, T
′
2 and S
′
2 such that we have W ⊢ 〈{M
m}, T2, S2〉
d
−→
F
〈{M ′m, Nn}, T ′2, S
′
2〉 and 〈T
′
1, S
′
1〉 =
Σ1,Υ
FupriseF ′,low 〈T
′
2, S
′
2〉.
Proof. By case analysis on the proof of W ⊢ 〈{Mm}, T1, S1〉
d
−→
F
〈P ′1, T
′
1, S
′
1〉. In most cases,
this transition does not modify or depend on the state 〈T1, S1〉, and we may let P
′
2 = P
′
1
and 〈T ′2, S
′
2〉 = 〈T2, S2〉.
M = E[(allowed A then Nt else Nf)] and W (T1(m)) 4 A: Here, P
′
1 = {E[Nt]
m},
F = ⌈E⌉, and 〈T ′1, S
′
1〉 = 〈T1, S1〉. There are two possible cases:
• If W (T2(m)) 4 A, then W ⊢ 〈{Mm}, T2, S2〉
d
−→
F
〈{Nt
m}, T2, S2〉.
• If W (T2(m)) 64 A, then W ⊢ 〈{M
m}, T2, S2〉
d
−→
F
〈{Nf
m}, T2, S2〉.
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Clearly, in both cases, by assumption, 〈T1, S1〉 =
Σ1,Υ
FupriseF ′,low 〈T2, S2〉.
The case where W (T1(m)) 64 A is analogous.
M = E[(threadk N at d
′)]: Here, for a thread name n, P ′1 = {E[()]
m, Nn}, F =
⌈E⌉, T ′1 = T1 ∪ {n 7→ d
′}, and S′1 = S1. Since we assume that n /∈ dom(T2), we
also have that W ⊢ 〈{Mm}, T2, S2〉
d
−→
F
〈{E[()]m, Nn}, T2 ∪ {n 7→ d
′}, S2〉. Clearly,
〈T1 ∪ {n 7→ d
′}, S1〉 =
Σ1,Υ
FupriseF ′,low 〈T2 ∪ {n 7→ d
′}, S2〉.
Effects.
Lemma A.10 (Update of Effects).
(1) If Γ ⊢Σj,F E[(! a)] : s, τ then Σ1(a) ⊑ s.r.
(2) If Γ ⊢Σj,F E[(a := V )] : s, τ , then s.w ⊑ Σ1(a).
(3) If Γ ⊢Σj,F E[(ref l,θ V )] : s, τ , then s.w ⊑ l.
(4) If Γ ⊢Σj,F E[(threadl M at d
′)] : s, τ , then s.w ⊑ l.
(5) If Γ ⊢Σj,F E[(allowed F then Nt else Nf )] : s, τ , then j ⊑ s.r, s.t.
Proof. By induction on the structure of E.
High Expressions. Some expressions can be easily classified as “high” by the type system,
which only considers their syntax. These cannot perform changes to the “low” memory
simply because their code does not contain any instruction that could perform them. Since
the writing effect is intended to be a lower bound to the level of the references that the
expression can create or assign to, expressions with a high writing effect can be said to be
syntactically high:
Definition A.11 (Syntactically High Expressions). An expressionM is syntactically (Σ,Γ, j, F, l)-
high if there exists s, τ such that Γ ⊢Σj,F M : s, τ with s.w 6⊑
F l. The expression M is a syn-
tactically (Σ,Γ, j, F, l)-high function if there exists j′, F ′, s, τ, σ such that Γ ⊢Σj′,F ′ M : ⊥, τ
s
−−→
j,F
σ
with s.w 6⊑F l.
Syntactically high expressions have an operationally high behavior.
Lemma A.12 (High Expressions). If M is a syntactically (Σ,Γ, j, F, l)-high expression,
and Υ is such that Υ(m) = j, then, for all allowed-policy mappings W , the thread Mm is
an operationally (W,Σ,Υ,Γ, F, l)-high thread.
Proof. We show that, for any given allowed-policy mapping W , if Υ(m) = j, then the set
{Mm | ∃j . M is syntactically (Σ,Γ, j, F, l)-high}
is a set of operationally (W,Σ,Υ,Γ, F, l)-high threads, i.e.: ifM is syntactically (Σ,Γ, j, F, l)-
high, that is if there exists s, τ such that Γ ⊢Σj,F M : s, τ with s.w 6⊑
F l, and, for some
policy mapping W and all states 〈T, S〉 such that S is (Σ,Γ)-compatible, if W ⊢Σ,Υ
〈{Mm}, T, S〉
d
−→
F ′
〈{M ′m} ∪ P, T ′, S′〉 then 〈T, S〉 =Σ1,ΥF,l 〈T
′, S′〉. This is enough since,
by Subject Reduction (Theorem A.8), M ′ is syntactically (Σ,Γ, j, F, l)-high and S′ is still
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(Σ,Γ)-compatible, and if P = {Nn} for some expression N and thread name n, then by
Remark A.4 also N is syntactically (Σ,Γ, k, F, l)-high for some k. We proceed by cases on
the proof of the transition W ⊢Σ,Υ 〈{Mm}, T, S〉
d
−→
F ′
〈{M ′m} ∪ P, T ′, S′〉. The lemma is
trivial in all the cases where 〈T, S〉 = 〈T ′, S′〉.
M = E[(threadk N at d
′)]: Here P = {Nn} for some thread name n, S′ = S,
T ′ = [n := d′]T and Υ(n) = k. By Update of Effects (Lemma A.10), s.w ⊑ k. This
implies k 6⊑F l, thus Υ(n) 6⊑F l, hence T ′ =Σ1,ΥF,l T .
A.2.3. Soundness.
Behavior of “Low”-Terminating Expressions. According to the intended meaning of the
termination effect, the termination or non-termination of expressions with low termination
effect should only depend on the low part of the state. In other words, two computations of
a same typable thread running under two “low”-equal states should either both terminate
or both diverge. In particular, this implies that termination-behavior of these expressions
cannot be used to leak “high” information when composed with other expressions (via
termination leaks).
We aim at proving that any typable threadMm that has a low-termination effect always
presents the same behavior according to a strong bisimulation on low-equal states: if two
continuations Mm1 and M
m
2 of M
m are related, and if Mm1 can perform an execution step
over a certain state, then Mm2 can perform the same low changes to any low-equal state
in precisely one step, while the two resulting continuations are still related. This implies
that any two computations of Mm under low-equal states should have the same “length”,
and in particular they are either both finite or both infinite. To this end, we design a
reflexive binary relation on expressions with low-termination effects that is closed under the
transitions of Guaranteed Transitions (Lemma A.9).
The inductive definition of T Σ,Γj,F,low is given in Figure 9. Notice that it is a symmetric
relation. In order to ensure that expressions that are related by T Σ,Γj,F,low perform the same
changes to the low memory, its definition requires that the references that are created or
written using (potentially) different values are high.
Remark A.14. If for Σ, Γ, j, F and low we have M1 T
Σ,Γ
j,F,low M2 and M1 ∈ Val , then
M2 ∈ Val .
From the following lemma one can conclude that the relation T Σ,Γj,F,low relates the possible
outcomes of expressions that are typable with a low termination effect, and that perform a
high read over low-equal memories.
Lemma A.15. If Γ ⊢Σj,F E[(! a)] : s, τ with s.t ⊑
F low and Σ1(a) 6⊑Fuprise⌈E⌉ low, then for any
values V0, V1 ∈ Val such that Γ ⊢
Σ
j,℧ Vi : ⊥, θ we have E[V0] T
Σ,Γ
j,F,low E[V1].
Proof. By induction on the structure of E.
E[(! a)] = (flow F ′ in E1[(! a)]): By rule Flow we have Γ ⊢
Σ
j,FupriseF ′ V : s, τ . By in-
duction hypothesis E1[V0] T
j
FupriseF ′,low E1[V1], so we conclude by Replacement (Lemma A.7)
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Definition A.13 (T Σ,Γj,F,low). We have that M1 T
Σ,Γ
j,F,low M2 if Γ ⊢
Σ
j,F M1 : s1, τ and
Γ ⊢Σj,F M2 : s2, τ for some s1, s2 and τ with s1.t ⊑
F low and s2.t ⊑
F low and one of
the following holds:
Clause 1: M1 and M2 are both values, or
Clause 2: M1 =M2, or
Clause 3: M1 = (M¯1; N¯ ) and M2 = (M¯2; N¯) where M¯1 T
Σ,Γ
j,F,low M¯2, or
Clause 4: M1 = (ref l,θ M¯1) and M2 = (ref l,θ M¯2) where M¯1 T
Σ,Γ
j,F,low M¯2, and l 6⊑
F
low , or
Clause 5: M1 = (! M¯1) and M2 = (! M¯2) where M¯1 T
Σ,Γ
j,F,low M¯2, or
Clause 6: M1 = (M¯1 := N¯1) and M2 = (M¯2 := N¯2) with M¯1 T
Σ,Γ
j,F,low M¯2, and
N¯1 T
Σ,Γ
j,F,low N¯2, and M¯1, M¯2 both have type θ ref l for some θ and l such that l 6⊑
F low ,
or
Clause 7: M1 = (flow F
′ in M¯1) and M2 = (flow F
′ in M¯2) with M¯1 T
Σ,Γ
j,FupriseF ′,low M¯2.
Figure 9: The relation T Σ,Γj,F,low
and Clause 7. Therefore s¯.t ⊑F low , and since Σ1(a) 6⊑
FupriseE low implies Σ1(a) 6⊑
FupriseE1
low , then by induction hypothesis we have E1[V0] T
Σ,Γ
j,F,low E1[V1]. By Replacement
(Lemma A.7) and Clause 8 we can conclude.
We can now prove that T Σ,Γj,F,low behaves as a “kind of” strong bisimulation:
Proposition A.16 (Strong Bisimulation for Low-Termination).
Consider a given allowed-policy mapping W , reference labeling Σ, thread labeling Υ, typing
environment Γ, flow policy F , security level low, two expressions M1 and M2 and thread
name m. If, for states 〈T1, S1〉,〈T2, S2〉 with S1, S2 being (Σ,Γ)-compatible we have that:
M1 T
Σ,Γ
Υ(m),F,low M2 andW ⊢ 〈{M1
m}, T1, S1〉
d
−→
F ′
〈P ′1, T
′
1, S
′
1〉 and 〈T1, S1〉 =
Σ1,Υ
FupriseF ′,low 〈T2, S2〉,
with (dom(S1
′)− dom(S1)) ∩ dom(S2) = ∅, then there exist P
′
2, T
′
2 and S
′
2 such that
W ⊢ 〈{M2
m}, T2, S2〉
d
−→
F ′
〈P ′2, T
′
2, S
′
2〉 and M
′
1 T
Σ,Γ
j,F,low M
′
2 and 〈T
′
1, S
′
1〉 =
Σ1,Υ
FupriseF ′,low 〈T
′
2, S
′
2〉
Furthermore, if P ′1 = {M
′m
1 } then P
′
2 = {M
′m
2 }, if P
′
1 = {M
′m
1 , N
n} for some thread Nn
and (dom(T1
′)− dom(T1))∩dom(T2) = ∅ then P
′
2 = {M
′m
2 , N
n}, and S′1, S
′
2 are still (Σ,Γ)-
compatible.
Proof. By case analysis on the clause by which M1 T
Σ,Γ
j,F,low M2, and by induction on the
definition of T Σ,Γj,F,low . In the following, we use Subject Reduction (Theorem A.8) to guarantee
that the termination effect of the expressions resulting from M1 and M2 is still low with
respect to low and F . This, as well as typability (with the same type) for j, F and low , is
a requirement for being in the T Σ,Γj,F,low relation.
Clause 2: Here M1 =M2. By Guaranteed Transitions (Lemma A.9), then:
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• If P ′1 = {M
′m
1 }, and (dom(S1
′) − dom(S1)) ∩ dom(S2) = ∅, then there ex-
ist M ′2, T
′
2 and S
′
2 such that W ⊢ 〈{M
m}, T2, S2〉
d
−→
F ′
〈{M ′m2 }, T
′
2, S
′
2〉 and
〈T ′1, S
′
1〉 =
Σ1,Υ
FupriseF ′,low 〈T
′
2, S
′
2〉. There are two cases to consider:
M ′2 =M
′
1: Then we have M
′
1 T
Σ,Γ
j,F,low M
′
2, by Clause 2 and Subject Reduc-
tion (Theorem A.8).
M ′2 6=M
′
1: Then by Splitting Computations (Lemma 3.8) we have two
possibilities:
(1) there exist E and a such that M ′1 = E[S1(a)], F
′ = ⌈E⌉, M ′2 =
E[S2(a)], 〈T
′
1, S
′
1〉 = 〈T1, S1〉 and 〈T
′
2, S
′
2〉 = 〈T2, S2〉. Since S1(a) 6=
S2(a), we have that Σ1(a) 6⊑
FupriseF ′ low . Therefore, M ′1 T
Σ,Γ
j,F,low M
′
2, by
Lemma A.15 above.
(2) there exists E such that M ′1 = E[(allowed F¯ then Nt else Nf )], F
′ =
⌈E⌉, and T1(m) 6= T2(m) with 〈T
′
1, S
′
1〉 = 〈T1, S1〉 and 〈T
′
2, S
′
2〉 = 〈T2, S2〉.
Since T1(m) 6= T2(m), we have Υ(m) = j 6⊑
F low , and by Update of
Effects (Lemma A.10) we have j ⊑F s.t, so s.t 6⊑F low , which contradicts
the assumption.
• If P ′1 = {M
′m
1 , N
n} for some expressionN and (dom(T1
′)− dom(T1))∩dom(T2) =
∅, then for some M , l and d we have M1 = E[(threadl M at d)], and there ex-
ist M ′2, T
′
2 and S
′
2 such that W ⊢ 〈{M
m}, T2, S2〉
d
−→
F
〈{M ′2, N
n}, T ′2, S
′
2〉 and
〈T ′1, S
′
1〉 =
Σ1,Υ
FupriseF ′,low 〈T
′
2, S
′
2〉. By Splitting Computations (Lemma 3.8), neces-
sarily M ′m1 = M
′m
2 . Then we have M
′
1 T
Σ,Γ
j,F,low M
′
2, by Clause 2 and Subject
Reduction (Theorem A.8).
Clause 7: Here we have M1 = (flow F¯ in M¯1) and M2 = (flow F¯ in M¯2) and
M¯1 T
Σ,Γ
j,FupriseF¯ ,low
M¯2. There are two cases.
M¯1 can compute: In this case we haveM
′
1 = (flow F¯ in M¯
′
1) withW ⊢ 〈{M¯
m
1 }, T1, S1〉
d
−−→
F ′′
〈{M¯ ′m1 }, T
′
1, S
′
1〉 with F
′ = F¯ upriseF ′′. To use the induction hypothesis, there
are three possible cases:
• If P¯ ′1 = {M¯
′m
1 }, and (dom(S1
′) − dom(S1)) ∩ dom(S2) = ∅, then there
exist M¯ ′2, T
′
2 and S
′
2 such that W ⊢ 〈{M¯
m
2 }, T2, S2〉
d
−−→
F ′′
〈{M¯ ′m2 }, T
′
2, S
′
2〉
with M¯ ′1 T
Σ,Γ
j,FupriseF¯ ,low
M¯ ′2 and 〈T
′
1, S
′
1〉 =
Σ1,Υ
FupriseF ′upriseF¯ ,low
〈T ′2, S
′
2〉. Notice that
〈T ′1, S
′
1〉 =
Σ1,Υ
FupriseF ′,low 〈T
′
2, S
′
2〉.
• If P¯ ′1 = {M¯
′m
1 , N
n} for some expression N and (dom(T1
′)− dom(T1)) ∩
dom(T2) = ∅, then there exist M¯
′
2, T
′
2, S
′
2 such thatW ⊢ 〈{M¯
m
2 }, T2, S2〉
d
−−→
F ′′
〈{M¯ ′m2 , N
n}, T ′2, S
′
2〉 with M¯
′
1 T
Σ,Γ
j,FupriseF¯ ,low
M¯ ′2 and 〈T
′
1, S
′
1〉 =
Σ1,Υ
FupriseF ′upriseF¯ ,low
〈T ′2, S
′
2〉. Notice that we have 〈T
′
1, S
′
1〉 =
Σ1,Υ
FupriseF ′,low 〈T
′
2, S
′
2〉.
In all three cases, we use Clause 7 and Subject Reduction (Theorem A.8) to
conclude.
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M¯1 is a value: In this case P
′
1 = {M¯
m
1 }, F
′ = ℧ and 〈T ′1, S
′
1〉 = 〈T1, S1〉. Then
M¯2 ∈ Val by Remark A.14, so W ⊢ 〈{M2
m}, T2, S2〉
d
−→
F ′
〈{M¯m2 }, T2, S2〉. We
conclude using Clause 1 and Subject Reduction (Theorem A.8).
We have seen in Remark A.14 that when two expressions are related by T Σ,Γj,F,low and
one of them is a value, then the other one is also a value. From a semantic point of view,
when an expression has reached a value it means that it has successfully completed its
computation. We will now see that when two expressions are related by T Σ,Γj,F,low and one of
them is unable to resolve into a value, in any sequence of unrelated computation steps, then
the other one is also unable to do so. We shall use the notion of derivative of an expression
M :
Definition A.17 (Derivative of an Expression). Given an expression M , we say that M ′
is a (W,Σ,Υ,Γ, j)-derivative of M if and only if
• M ′ =M , or
• there exist m such that Υ(m) = j, F , d, P , two states 〈T1, S1〉 and 〈T
′
1, S
′
1〉 such
that S1, S
′
1 are (Σ,Γ)-compatible, and a derivative M
′′ of M such that:
W ⊢ 〈{M ′′m}, T1, S1〉
d
−→
F
〈{M ′m} ∪ P, T ′1, S
′
1〉
Definition A.18 (Non-resolvable Expressions). An expressionM is (W,Σ,Γ)-non-resolvable,
denoted M†W,Σ,Υ,Γj , if there is no (W,Σ,Υ,Γ, j)-derivative M
′ of M such that M ′ ∈ Val .
Lemma A.19. If M T Σ,Γj,F,low N for some F , low and j, then M†
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
j implies N†
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
j .
Proof. Let us suppose that ¬N†W,Σ,Υ,Γj . That means that there exists a finite number of
states 〈T1, S1〉, . . . , 〈Tn, Sn〉, and 〈T
′
1, S
′
1〉, . . . , 〈T
′
n, S
′
n〉, of expressions N1, . . . , Nn and of
thread names m1, . . . ,mn with Υ(m1) = . . . = Υ(mn) = j and
W ⊢ 〈{Nm1}, T1, S1〉 −→ 〈{N
m1
1 } ∪ P1, T
′
1, S
′
1〉 and
W ⊢ 〈{Nm21 }, T2, S2〉 −→ 〈{N
m2
2 } ∪ P2, T
′
2, S
′
2〉 and
...
W ⊢ 〈{Nmnn }, Tn, Sn〉 −→ 〈{N
mn
n } ∪ Pn, T
′
n, S
′
n〉
and S1, . . . , Sn, S
′
1, . . . , S
′
n are (Σ,Γ)-compatible, and such that Nn ∈ Val . By Strong
Bisimulation for Low-Termination (Proposition A.16), we have that there exists a finite
number of states 〈T¯ ′1, S¯
′
1〉, . . . , 〈T¯
′
n, S¯
′
n〉, of expressions M1, . . . , Mn, and of pools of threads
P1, . . . , Pn such that
W ⊢ 〈{Mm1}, T1, S1〉 −→ 〈{M
m1
1 } ∪ P¯1, T¯
′
1, S¯
′
1〉 and
W ⊢ 〈{Mm21 }, T2, S2〉 −→ 〈{M
m2
2 } ∪ P¯2, T¯
′
2, S¯
′
2〉 and
...
W ⊢ 〈{Mmnn−1}, Tn, Sn〉 −→ 〈{M
mn
n } ∪ P¯n, T¯
′
n, S¯
′
n〉
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such that S¯′1, . . . , S¯
′
n are (Σ,Γ)-compatible and:
M1 T
Σ,Γ
j,F,low N1, and . . . , and Mn T
Σ,Γ
j,F,low Nn
By Remark A.14, we then have that Mn ∈ Val . Since Mn is a (W,Σ,Υ,Γ, j)-derivative of
M , we conclude that ¬M†W,Σ,Γj .
The following lemma deduces operational “highness” of threads from that of its sub-
expressions.
Lemma A.20 (Composition of High Expressions). Suppose that M is typable with respect
to Σ, Γ, j and F . Then, for all allowed-policy mappings W :
(1) If M = (M1 M2) and either
• M1†
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
j and M1
m ∈ HW,Σ,Υ,ΓF,l , or
• M1
m,M2
m ∈ HW,Σ,Υ,ΓF,l and M1 is a syntactically (Σ,Γ, j, F, l)-high function,
then Mm ∈ HW,Σ,Υ,ΓF,l .
(2) If M = (if M1 then Mt else Mf ) and M1
m,Mt
m,Mf
m ∈ HW,Σ,Υ,ΓF,low , then M
m ∈
HW,Σ,Υ,ΓF,low .
(3) If M = (ref l,θ M1) and l 6⊑
F low and M1
m ∈ HW,Σ,Υ,ΓF,low , then M
m ∈ HW,Σ,Υ,ΓF,low .
(4) If M = (M1;M2) and either
• M1†
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
j and M1
m ∈ HW,Σ,Υ,ΓF,low , or
• M1
m,M2
m ∈ HW,Σ,Υ,ΓF,low ,
then Mm ∈ HW,Σ,Υ,ΓF,low .
(5) If M = (M1 :=M2) and M1 has type θ ref l with l 6⊑
F low and either
• M1†
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
j and M1
m ∈ HW,Σ,Υ,ΓF,low , or
• M1
m,M2
m ∈ HW,Σ,Υ,ΓF,low ,
then Mm ∈ HW,Σ,Υ,ΓF,low .
(6) If M = (flow F ′ in M1) and M1
m ∈ HW,Σ,Υ,ΓF,low , then M
m ∈ HW,Σ,Υ,ΓF,low .
(7) If M = (allowed F then Mt else Mf ) and Mt
m,Mf
m ∈ HW,Σ,Υ,ΓF,low , then M
m ∈
HW,Σ,Υ,ΓF,low .
Lemma A.21. If M1 T
Σ,Γ
Υ(m),F,low M2 for some Σ, Υ, Γ, F , low and m, then M
m
1 ∈
HW,Σ,Υ,ΓF,l , implies M
m
2 ∈ H
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
F,l .
Proof. By induction on the definition of M1 T
Σ,Γ
j,F,low M2, using Lemma A.19.
Clause 7: Here we have M1 = (flow F
′ in M¯1) and M2 = (flow F
′ in M¯2) with
M¯1 T
Σ,Γ
j,FupriseF ′,low M¯2. Clearly we have that M¯1 ∈ H
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
F,low , so by induction hypothesis
also M¯2 ∈ H
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
F,low . Therefore, by Composition of High Expressions (Lemma A.20)
we have that M2 ∈ H
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
F,low .
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Behavior of Typable Low Expressions. In this second phase of the proof, we consider the
general case of threads that are typable with any termination level. As in the previous
subsection, we show that a typable expression behaves as a strong bisimulation, provided
that it is operationally low. For this purpose, we make use of the properties identified
for the class of low-terminating expressions by allowing only these to be followed by low-
writes. Conversely, high-terminating expressions can only be followed by high-expressions
(see Definitions 3.9 and A.11).
The following result shows that the behavior of typable high threads (i.e. those with a
high security level) that are location sensitive (i.e. depend on their location) is operationally
high.
Lemma A.22 (Location Sensitive Typable High Threads – Lemma 3.10). For a given
flow policy F and security level low, consider a thread Mm such that Γ ⊢Σj,F M : s, τ and
M = E[(allowed F ′ then Nt else Nf )] with j 6⊑
F low. Then, for all allowed-policy mappings
W and thread labelings Υ such that Υ(m) = j, we have that Mm ∈ HW,ΓF,low .
Proof. By induction on the structure of E, using Update of Effects (Lemma A.10) and
High Expressions (Lemma A.12). Consider that we have M = E[M0], where M0 =
(allowed F ′ then Nt else Nf ).
E[M0] =M0: Then, by Allow, we have Γ ⊢
Σ
j,F (allowed F
′ then Nt else Nf ) : s, τ
where Γ ⊢Σj,F Nt : st, τ , Γ ⊢
Σ
j,F Nf : sf , τ and j ⊑
F st.w, sf .w. This means
st.w, sf .w 6⊑
F low , so by High Expressions (Lemma A.12), thenNt
m, Nf
m ∈ HW,Σ,Υ,ΓF,low .
By Composition of High Expressions (Lemma A.20), Mm ∈ HW,Σ,Υ,ΓF,low .
E[M0] = (E1[M0] M1): Then by ruleApp we have that Γ ⊢
Σ
j,F E1[M0] : s1, τ1
s′1−−→
F,j
σ1
and Γ ⊢Σj,F M1 : s
′′
1, τ1 with s1.r ⊑
F s′1.w and s1.t ⊑
F s′′1.w. By Update of Effects
(Lemma A.10) we have j ⊑ s1.r, which implies that j ⊑
F s1.r and s1.r 6⊑
F low .
Therefore, s′1.w 6⊑
F low , which means that E1[M0] is a syntactically (Σ,Γ, j, F, low )-
high function, and M1 is syntactically (Σ,Γ, j, F, low )-high. By High Expressions
(Lemma A.12) we have M1
m ∈ HW,Σ,Υ,ΓF,low . By induction hypothesis E1[M0]
m ∈
HW,Σ,Υ,ΓF,low . Then, by Lemma A.20, M
m ∈ HW,Σ,Υ,ΓF,low .
E[M0] = (V E1[M0]): Then by App we have Γ ⊢
Σ
j,F V : s1, τ1
s′1−−→
F,j
σ1 and Γ ⊢
Σ
j,F
E1[M0] : s
′′
1, τ1 with s
′′
1.r ⊑
F s′1.w and s1.t ⊑
F s′′1.w. By Update of Effects (Lemma A.10)
we have j ⊑ s′′1.r, which implies that j ⊑
F s′′1.r and s
′′
1.r 6⊑
F low . Therefore,
s′1.w 6⊑
F low , which means that V is a syntactically (Σ,Γ, j, F, low )-high function.
By induction hypothesis E1[M0]
m ∈ HW,Σ,Υ,ΓF,low . Then, by Composition of High Ex-
pressions (Lemma A.20), Mm ∈ HW,Σ,Υ,ΓF,low .
E[M0] = (if E1[M0] then Mt else Mf): Then byCond we have that Γ ⊢
Σ
j,F E1[M0] :
s1, bool, and Γ ⊢
Σ
j,F Mt : s
′
1, τ1 and Γ ⊢
Σ
j,F Mf : s
′′
1 , τ1 with s1.r ⊑
F s′1.w, s
′
1.w. By
Update of Effects (Lemma A.10) we have j ⊑ s1.r, which implies that j ⊑
F s1.r and
s1.r 6⊑
F low . Therefore, s′1.w, s
′
1.w 6⊑
F low , so by High Expressions (Lemma A.12)
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we have Mt
m,Mt
m ∈ HW,Σ,Υ,ΓF,low . By induction hypothesis E1[M0]
m ∈ HW,Σ,Υ,ΓF,low .
Then, by Composition of High Expressions (Lemma A.20), Mm ∈ HW,Σ,Υ,ΓF,low .
E[M0] = (E1[M0];M1): Then by Seq we have that Γ ⊢
Σ
j,F E1[M0] : s1, τ1 and Γ ⊢
Σ
j,F
M1 : s
′
1, τ
′
1 with s1.t ⊑
F s′1.w. By Update of Effects (Lemma A.10) we have j ⊑ s1.t,
which implies that j ⊑F s1.t and s1.t 6⊑
F low . Therefore, s′1.w 6⊑
F low , and by High
Expressions (Lemma A.12) we have M1
m ∈ HW,Σ,Υ,ΓF,low . By induction hypothesis
E1[M0]
m ∈ HW,Σ,Υ,ΓF,low . Then, by Composition of High Expressions (Lemma A.20),
Mm ∈ HW,Σ,Υ,ΓF,low .
E[M0] = (ref l,θ E1[M0]): Then by Ref we have that Γ ⊢
Σ
j,F E1[M0] : s1, θ with
s1.t ⊑
F l. By Update of Effects (Lemma A.10) we have j ⊑ s1.t, which implies
that j ⊑F s1.t and s1.t 6⊑
F low . Therefore, l 6⊑F low , and by induction hypothesis
E1[M0]
m ∈ HW,Σ,Υ,ΓF,low . Then, by Composition of High Expressions (Lemma A.20),
Mm ∈ HW,Σ,Υ,ΓF,low .
E[M0] = (! E1[M0]): Easy, by induction hypothesis.
E[M0] = (E1[M0] :=M1): Then by Assign we have Γ ⊢
Σ
j,F E1[M0] : s1, θ ref l¯
and Γ ⊢Σj,F M1 : s
′
1, τ1 with s1.t ⊑
F s′1.w and s1.r ⊑
F l¯. By Update of Effects
(Lemma A.10) we have j ⊑ s1.r, which implies that j ⊑
F s1.r and s1.r 6⊑
F low .
Therefore, l¯ 6⊑F low and s′1.w 6⊑
F low . Hence, by High Expressions (Lemma A.12)
we have M1
m ∈ HW,Σ,Υ,ΓF,low . By induction hypothesis E1[M0]
m ∈ HW,Σ,Υ,ΓF,low . Then, by
Composition of High Expressions (Lemma A.20), Mm ∈ HW,Σ,Υ,ΓF,low .
E[M0] = (V := E1[M0]): Then by Assign we have Γ ⊢
Σ
j,F V : s1, θ ref l¯ and Γ ⊢
Σ
j,F
E1[M0] : s
′
1, τ1 with s
′
1.r ⊑
F l¯. By Update of Effects (Lemma A.10) we have j ⊑ s′1.r,
which implies that j ⊑F s′1.r and s
′
1.r 6⊑
F low . Therefore, l¯ 6⊑F low , and by induc-
tion hypothesis E1[M0]
m ∈ HW,Σ,Υ,ΓF,low . Then, by Composition of High Expressions
(Lemma A.20), Mm ∈ HW,Σ,Υ,ΓF,low .
E[M0] = (flow F
′ in E1[M0]): Then by Flow we have Γ ⊢
Σ
j,FupriseF ′ E1[M0] : s1, τ1.
By induction hypothesis E1[M0]
m ∈ HW,Σ,Υ,ΓFupriseF ′,low , which implies E1[M0]
m ∈ HW,Σ,Υ,ΓF,low .
Then, by Composition of High Expressions (Lemma A.20), we conclude that Mm ∈
HW,Σ,Υ,ΓF,low .
We now design a binary relation on expressions that uses T Σ,Γj,F,low to ensure that high-
terminating expressions are always followed by operationally high ones. The definition of
RW,Σ,Υ,Γj,F,low is given in Figure 10. Notice that it is a symmetric relation. In order to ensure that
expressions that are related by RW,Σ,Υ,Γj,F,low perform the same changes to the low memory, its
definition requires that the references that are created or written using (potentially) different
values are high, and that the body of the functions that are applied are syntactically high.
Remark A.24. If M1 T
Σ,Γ
j,F,low M2, then M1 R
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
j,F,low M2.
The above remark is used to prove the following lemma.
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Definition A.23 (RW,Σ,Υ,Γj,F,low ). We have that M1 R
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
j,F,low M2 if Γ ⊢
Σ
j,F M1 : s1, τ and
Γ ⊢Σj,F M2 : s2, τ for some Γ, s1, s2 and τ and one of the following holds:
Clause 1’: M1
m,M2
m ∈ HW,Σ,Υ,ΓF,low , for all allowed-policy mappings W , or
Clause 2’: M1 =M2, or
Clause 3’: M1 = (if M¯1 then N¯t else N¯f ) and M2 = (if M¯2 then N¯t else N¯f ) with
M¯1 R
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
j,F,low M¯2, and N¯t
m
, N¯f
m
∈ HW,Σ,Υ,ΓF,low , or
Clause 4’: M1 = (M¯1 N¯1) andM2 = (M¯2 N¯2) with M¯1 R
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
j,F,low M¯2, and N¯
m
1 , N¯
m
2 ∈
HF,low , and M¯1, M¯2 are syntactically (Σ,Γ, j, F, low )-high functions, or
Clause 5’: M1 = (M¯1 N¯1) and M2 = (M¯2 N¯2) with M¯1 T
Σ,Γ
j,F,low M¯2, and
N¯1 R
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
j,F,low N¯2, and M¯1, M¯2 are syntactically (Σ,Γ, j, F, low )-high functions, or
Clause 6’: M1 = (M¯1; N¯ ) and M2 = (M¯2; N¯) with M¯1 R
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
j,F,low M¯2, and N¯
m ∈
HW,Σ,Υ,ΓF,low , or
Clause 7’: M1 = (M¯1; N¯ ) and M2 = (M¯2; N¯) with M¯1 T
Σ,Γ
j,F,low M¯2, or
Clause 8’: M1 = (ref l,θ M¯1) and M2 = (ref l,θ M¯2) with M¯1 R
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
j,F,low M¯2, and l 6⊑
F
low , or
Clause 9’: M1 = (! M¯1) and M2 = (! M¯2) with M¯1 R
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
j,F,low M¯2, or
Clause 10’: M1 = (M¯1 := N¯1) and M2 = (M¯2 := N¯2) with M¯1 R
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
j,F,low M¯2, and
N¯m1 , N¯
m
2 ∈ H
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
F,low , and M¯1, M¯2 both have type θ refl for some θ and l such that
l 6⊑F low , or
Clause 11’: M1 = (M¯1 := N¯1) and M2 = (M¯2 := N¯2) with M¯1 T
Σ,Γ
j,F,low M¯2, and
N¯1 R
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
j,F,low N¯2, and M¯1, M¯2 both have type θ ref l for some θ and l such that
l 6⊑F low , or
Clause 12’: M1 = (flow F
′ in M¯1) and M2 = (flow F
′ in M¯2) with M¯1 R
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
j,FupriseF ′,low
M¯2.
Figure 10: The relation RW,Σ,Υ,Γj,F,low
Lemma A.25. If M1 R
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
Υ(m),F,low M2, for some Σ, Υ, Γ, F , low and m, then M
m
1 ∈
HW,Σ,Υ,ΓF,low implies M
m
2 ∈ H
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
F,low .
Proof. By induction on the definition of M1 R
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
Υ(m),F,low M2, using Lemma A.21.
We have seen in Splitting Computations (Lemma 3.8) that two computations of the
same expression can split only if the expression is about to read a reference that is given
different values by the memories in which they compute. In Lemma A.26 we saw that
the relation T Σ,Γj,F,low relates the possible outcomes of expressions that are typable with a
low termination effect. Finally, from the following lemma one can conclude that the above
relation RW,Σ,Υ,Γj,F,low relates the possible outcomes of typable expressions in general.
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Lemma A.26. If Γ ⊢Σj,F E[(! a)] : s, τ with l 6⊑Fuprise⌈E⌉ low, then for any values V0, V1 ∈ Val
such that Γ ⊢Σj,F Vi : θ we have E[V0] R
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
j,F,low E[V1].
Proof. By induction on the structure of E using Replacement (Lemma A.7), Lemma A.15,
Lemma A.12.
E[(! a)] = (flow F ′ in E1[(! a)]): By rule Flow we have Γ ⊢
Σ
j,FupriseF ′ V : s, τ . By in-
duction hypothesis E1[V0] T
j
FupriseF ′,low E1[V1], so we conclude by Replacement (Lemma A.7)
and Clause 12’.
We now state a crucial result of the paper: the relation T Σ,Γj,F,low is a “sort of” strong
bisimulation.
Proposition A.27 (Strong Bisimulation for Typable Low Threads).
Consider a given allowed-policy mapping W , reference labeling Σ, thread labeling Υ, typing
environment Γ, flow policy F , security level low, two expressions M1 and M2 and thread
name m such that Mm1 /∈ H
Σ,Υ,Γ
F,low . If, for states 〈T1, S1〉,〈T2, S2〉 with S1, S2 being (Σ,Γ)-
compatible we have that there exist d, F ′, P ′1, T
′
1, S
′
1 such that
M1 R
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
Υ(m),F,low M2 andW ⊢ 〈{M1
m}, T1, S1〉
d
−→
F ′
〈P ′1, T
′
1, S
′
1〉 and 〈T1, S1〉 =
Σ1,Υ
FupriseF ′,low 〈T2, S2〉,
with (dom(S1
′)− dom(S1)) ∩ dom(S2) = ∅, then there exist P
′
2, T
′
2 and S
′
2 such that
W ⊢ 〈{M2
m}, T2, S2〉
d
−→
F ′
〈P ′2, T
′
2, S
′
2〉 and M
′
1 R
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
j,F,low M
′
2 and 〈T
′
1, S
′
1〉 =
Σ1,Υ
FupriseF ′,low 〈T
′
2, S
′
2〉
Furthermore, if P ′1 = {M
′m
1 } then P
′
2 = {M
′m
2 }, if P
′
1 = {M
′m
1 , N
n} for some thread Nn
and (dom(T1
′)− dom(T1))∩dom(T2) = ∅ then P
′
2 = {M
′m
2 , N
n}, and S′1, S
′
2 are still (Σ,Γ)-
compatible.
Proof. By case analysis on the clause by which M1 R
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
j,F,low M2, and by induction on
the definition of RW,Σ,Υ,Γj,F,low . In the following, we use Subject Reduction (Theorem A.8) to
guarantee typability (with the same type) for j, low and F , which is a requirement for being
in the RW,Σ,Υ,Γj,F,low relation. We also use the Strong Bisimulation for Low Termination Lemma
(Lemma A.16). Lemma A.19 is used to prove the cases for Clauses 5’, 7’ and 11’.
Clause 2’: Here M1 =M2. By Guaranteed Transitions (Lemma A.9), then:
• If P ′1 = {M
′m
1 }, and (dom(S1
′) − dom(S1)) ∩ dom(S2) = ∅, then there exist
M ′2, T
′
2 and S
′
2 such that W ⊢
Σ,Υ 〈{Mm2 }, T2, S2〉
d
−→
F ′
〈{M ′m2 }, T
′
2, S
′
2〉 with
〈T ′1, S
′
1〉 =
Σ1,Υ
FupriseF ′,low 〈T
′
2, S
′
2〉. There are two cases to consider:
M ′2 =M
′
1: Then we haveM
′
1 T
Σ,Γ
j,F,low M
′
2 and S
′
1, S
′
2 still (Σ,Γ)-compatible,
by Clause 2’ and Subject Reduction (Theorem A.8).
M ′2 6=M
′
1: Then by Splitting Computations (Lemma 3.8) we have two
possibilities:
(1) there exists E and a such that M ′1 = E[S1(a)], F
′ = ⌈E⌉, M ′2 =
E[S2(a)], 〈T
′
1, S
′
1〉 = 〈T1, S1〉 and 〈T
′
2, S
′
2〉 = 〈T2, S2〉. Since S1(a) 6=
S2(a), we have that Σ1(a) 6⊑
FupriseF ′ low . Therefore, M ′1 R
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
j,F,low M
′
2, by
Lemma A.26 above.
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(2) there exists E such that M ′1 = E[(allowed F¯ then Nt else Nf )], F
′ =
⌈E⌉, and T1(m) 6= T2(m) with 〈T
′
1, S
′
1〉 = 〈T1, S1〉 and 〈T
′
2, S
′
2〉 = 〈T2, S2〉.
Since T1(m) 6= T2(m), we have Υ(m) = j 6⊑
F low , and by Lemma A.22
we have M1 ∈ H
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
F,low , which contradicts our assumption.
• If P ′1 = {M
′m
1 , N
n}, for some expressionN and (dom(T1
′)− dom(T1))∩dom(T2) =
∅, then for someM , l and d we have M1 = E[(threadl M at d)], and there exist
M ′2, T
′
2 and S
′
2 such that we haveW ⊢
Σ,Υ 〈{Mm2 }, T2, S2〉
d
−→
F ′
〈{M ′m2 , N
n}, T ′2, S
′
2〉
and with 〈T ′1, S
′
1〉 =
Σ1,Υ
FupriseF ′,low 〈T
′
2, S
′
2〉 whereM
′
1 =M
′
2. Then we haveM
′
1 T
Σ,Γ
j,F,low M
′
2
and S′1, S
′
2 are still (Σ,Γ)-compatible, by Clause 2’ and Subject Reduction (The-
orem A.8).
Clause 12’: HereM1 = (flow F
′ in M¯1) andM2 = (flow F
′ in M¯2) with M¯1 R
j
FupriseF ′,low
M¯2. We can assume that M¯
m
1 /∈ H
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
FupriseF ′,low , since otherwise M¯
m
1 ∈ H
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
F,low and by
Composition of High Expressions (Lemma A.20) Mm1 ∈ H
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
F,low . There are then
two possibilities:
• If P ′1 = {M
′m
1 }, and (dom(S1
′) − dom(S1)) ∩ dom(S2) = ∅, then W ⊢
Σ,Υ
〈{M¯m1 }, T1, S1〉
d
−−→
F ′′
〈{M¯ ′m1 } ∪ P, T
′
1, S
′
1〉 with F
′ = F¯ upriseF ′′, for some P . By in-
duction hypothesis, we have that W ⊢Σ,Υ 〈{M¯m2 }, T2, S2〉
d
−−→
F ′′
〈{M¯ ′m2 }, T
′
2, S
′
2〉,
and M ′1 R
j
FupriseF¯ ,low
M ′2, and S
′
1, S
′
2 still (Σ,Γ)-compatible, and also 〈T
′
1, S
′
1〉
=Σ1,Υ
FupriseF¯ ,low
〈T ′2, S
′
2〉. Notice that 〈T
′
1, S
′
1〉 =
Σ1,Υ
F,low 〈T
′
2, S
′
2〉. We use Subject Re-
duction (Theorem A.8) and Clause 12’ to conclude.
• If P ′1 = {M
′m
1 , N
n} for some expressionN and (dom(T1
′)− dom(T1))∩dom(T2) =
∅, then W ⊢Σ,Υ 〈{M¯m1 }, T1, S1〉
d
−−→
F ′′
〈{M¯ ′m1 , N
n} ∪ P, T ′1, S
′
1〉 with F
′ = F¯ uprise
F ′′. By induction hypothesis, we have that W ⊢Σ,Υ 〈{M¯m2 }, T2, S2〉
d
−−→
F ′′
〈{M¯ ′m2 , N
n}, T ′2, S
′
2〉, and M
′
1 R
j
FupriseF¯ ,low
M ′2, and S
′
1, S
′
2 still (Σ,Γ)-compatible,
and also 〈T ′1, S
′
1〉 =
Σ1,Υ
FupriseF¯ ,low
〈T ′2, S
′
2〉. Notice that 〈T
′
1, S
′
1〉 =
Σ1,Υ
F,low 〈T
′
2, S
′
2〉. We
use Subject Reduction (Theorem A.8) and Clause 12’ to conclude.
Behavior of Sets of Typable Threads. To conclude the proof of the Soundness Theorem, it
remains to exhibit an appropriate bisimulation on thread configurations.
Definition A.28 (AW,Σ,Υ,Γlow ). Given an allowed-policy mapping W , a reference labeling Σ,
a thread labeling Υ, a typing environment Γ and a security level low , the relation AW,Σ,Υ,Γ
low
is inductively defined as follows:
a)
Mm ∈ HW,Σ,Υ,Γ
℧,low
{Mm} AW,Σ,Υ,Γlow ∅
b)
Mm ∈ HW,Σ,Υ,Γ
℧,low
∅ AW,Σ,Υ,Γlow {M
m}
c)
M1 R
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
Υ(m),℧,low M2
{M1
m} AW,Σ,Υ,Γlow {M2
m}
d)
P1 A
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
low P2 Q1 A
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
low Q2
P1 ∪Q1 A
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
low
P2 ∪Q2
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Proposition A.29. Given an allowed-policy mapping W , a reference labeling Σ, a thread
labeling Υ, a typing environment Γ and a security level low, for all allowed-policy mappings
W the relation
BW,Σ,Υ,Γlow = {(〈P1, T1〉, 〈P2, T2〉) | P1 A
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
low P2 and T1 =
Σ1,Υ
℧,l T2}
is a (W,Σ,Υ,Γ, l)-bisimulation according to Definition 3.2.
Proof. It is easy to see, by induction on the definition of AW,Σ,Υ,Γlow , that the relation
BW,Σ,Υ,Γlow is symmetric. We show, by induction on the definition of A
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
low , that if
〈P1, T1〉 B
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
low
〈P2, T2〉 and if for any given (Σ,Γ)-compatible stores S1, S2 such that
〈T1, S1〉 =
Σ1,Υ
F,low 〈T2, S2〉 we have W ⊢
Σ,Υ 〈P1, T1, S1〉
d
−→
F
〈P ′1, T
′
1, S
′
1〉, and (dom(S1
′) −
dom(S1)) ∩ dom(S2) = ∅ and (dom(T1
′)− dom(T1)) ∩ dom(T2) = ∅, then there exist T
′
2,
P ′2 and S
′
2 such that W ⊢
Σ,Υ 〈P2, T2, S2〉։ 〈P
′
2, T
′
2, S
′
2〉 and 〈P
′
1, T
′
1〉 B
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
low 〈P
′
2, T
′
2〉 and
〈T ′1, S
′
1〉 =
Σ1,Υ
℧,low 〈T
′
2, S
′
2〉. Furthermore, S
′
1, S
′
2 are still (Σ,Γ)-compatible.
Rule a): Then P1 = {M
m}, P2 = ∅, andM
m ∈ HW,Σ,Υ,Γ
℧,low . Therefore, P
′
1 ⊆ H
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
G,low ,
and 〈T ′1, S
′
1〉 =
Σ1,Υ
℧,low 〈T1, S1〉 and S
′ is still (Σ,Γ)-compatible. We have that W ⊢Σ,Υ
〈P2, T2, S2〉 ։ 〈P2, T2, S2〉 and by transitivity 〈T
′
1, S
′
1〉 =
Σ1,Υ
℧,low 〈T2, S2〉. By Rules
a) and d), we have P ′1 A
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
low
∅. Then, 〈P ′1, T
′
1〉 B
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
low
〈∅, T ′2〉. Rule b) is
analogous.
Rule c): Then P1 = {M1
m} and P2 = {M2
m}, and we have M1 R
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
Υ(m),℧,low M2. If
Mm1 ∈ H
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
℧,low , then by Rule a), we have that P
′
1 A
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
low ∅ and 〈T
′
1, S
′
1〉 =
Σ1,Υ
℧,low
〈T ′2, S
′
2〉. Also, by Lemma A.25, we have that M
m
2 ∈ H
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
℧,low , so by Rule b)
∅ AW,Σ,Υ,Γlow P2. By Rule d), we have P
′
1 A
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
low P2. Then, 〈P
′
1, T
′
1〉 B
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
low 〈P
′
2, T
′
2〉.
If Mm1 /∈ H
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
℧,low , there are two cases to be considered:
P ′1 = {M
′
1
m}: Then by Strong Bisimulation for Typable Low Threads (Propo-
sition A.27) there exist T ′2, M
′
2 and S
′
2 such that W ⊢
Σ,Υ 〈{M2
m}, T2, S2〉
d
−→
F ′
〈{M ′2
m}, T ′2, S
′
2〉 with M
′
1 R
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
Υ(m),℧,low M
′
2, and 〈T
′
1, S
′
1〉 =
Σ1,Υ
℧,low 〈T
′
2, S
′
2〉 and
S′1, S
′
2 are still (Σ,Γ)-compatible. Then, by Rule c), {M
′
1
m} AW,Σ,Υ,Γlow {M
′
2
m}.
Then, 〈{M ′m1 }, T
′
1〉 B
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
low 〈{M
′m
2 }, T
′
2〉.
P ′1 = {M
′
1
m
,Nn}: We proceed as in the previous case to conclude that there
exists M ′m2 such that {M
′
1
m} AW,Σ,Υ,Γlow {M
′
2
m}. By Subject Reduction (The-
orem A.8), by Lemma A.5, and by Clause 2’ we have N RW,Σ,Υ,ΓΥ(n),℧,low N , and
so by Rule c) we have {Nn} AW,Σ,Υ,Γlow {N
n}. Therefore, by Rule d), we have
{M ′1
m, Nn} AW,Σ,Υ,Γlow {M
′
2
m, Nn}. Then, 〈{M ′1
m, Nn}, T ′1〉 B
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
low 〈{M
′
2
m, Nn}, T ′2〉.
Rule d): Then P1 = P¯1∪Q¯1 and P2 = P¯2∪Q¯2, with P¯1 A
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
low
P¯2 and Q¯1 A
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
low
Q¯2.
Suppose that W ⊢Σ,Υ 〈P¯1, T1, S1〉
d
−→
F
〈P¯ ′1, T
′
1, S
′
1〉 – the case where Q¯1 reduces is
analogous. By induction hypothesis, there exist T ′2, P¯
′
2 and S
′
2 such that W ⊢
Σ,Υ
〈P¯2, T2, S2〉 ։ 〈P¯
′
2, T
′
2, S
′
2〉 with P¯
′
1 A
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
low
P¯ ′2, and 〈T
′
1, S
′
1〉 =
Σ1,Υ
℧,low 〈T
′
2, S
′
2〉 and
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S′1, S
′
2 are still (Σ,Γ)-compatible. Then, we have W ⊢
Σ,Υ 〈P¯2 ∪ Q¯2, T2, S2〉 ։
〈P¯ ′2 ∪ Q¯2, T
′
2, S
′
2〉, and by Rule d) we have P¯
′
1 ∪ Q¯1 A
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
low
P¯ ′2 ∪ Q¯2. Then,
〈P¯ ′1 ∪ Q¯1, T
′
1〉 B
W,Σ,Υ,Γ
low
〈P¯ ′2 ∪ Q¯2, T
′
2〉.
Appendix B. Proofs for ‘Controlling Declassification’
B.1. Formalization of Flow Policy Confinement. In [Alm09, AC13] Flow Policy Con-
finement is defined for networks, considering a distributed setting with code mobility, by
means of a bisimulation on located threads. In this paper we define Flow Policy Confine-
ment for pools of threads without fixing the initial position of threads, and is based on a
bisimulation on thread configurations. We prove that the two variations of the definition
are equivalent.
Definition on located threads. The property is defined co-inductively on sets of located
threads, consisting of pairs 〈d,Mm〉 that carry information about the location d of a thread
Mm. The location of each thread determines which allowed flow policy it should obey at
that point, and is used to place a restriction on the flow policies that decorate the transi-
tions: at any step, they should comply to the allowed flow policy of the domain where the
thread who performed it is located.
Definition B.1 ((W,Σ,Γ)-Confined Located Threads). Given an allowed-policy mapping
W , a set of (W,Σ,Γ)-confined located threads is a set CLT of located threads that satisfies,
for all 〈d,Mm〉 ∈ CLT and states 〈T, S〉 with S being (W,Σ,Γ)-compatible memory S:
〈d,Mm〉 ∈ CLT and T (m) = d and W ⊢ 〈{Mm}, T, S〉
d
−→
F ′
〈{M ′m} ∪ P, T ′, S′〉 implies
W (T (m)) 4 F and 〈T ′(m),M ′m〉 ∈ CLT .
Furthermore, if P = {Nn} then also 〈T ′(n), Nn〉 ∈ CLT , and S′ is still (W,Σ,Γ)-compatible.
The largest set of (W,Σ,Γ)-confined located threads is denoted CLT Σ,ΓW .
For any W , Σ and Γ, the set of located threads where threads are values is a set of
(W,Σ,Γ)-confined located threads. Furthermore, the union of a family of sets of (W,Σ,Γ)-
confined located threads is a set of (W,Σ,Γ)-confined located threads. Consequently,
CT CW,Σ,Γ exists.
The notion of confinement used in [Alm09, AC13] is implicitly defined for thread con-
figurations (by means of located threads), instead of for pools of threads, such as in the
present paper. The following definition generalizes that notion to one that works for any
initial position tracker, and is thus defined for pools of threads.
Definition B.2 (Flow Policy Confinement (on located threads)). A pool of threads P
satisfies Flow Policy Confinement with respect to an allowed-policy mappingW , a reference
labeling Σ and a typing environment Γ, if for all domains d ∈ Dom and threads Mm ∈ P
we have that 〈d,Mm〉 ∈ CLT Σ,ΓW . We then write P ∈ FPC
+
LT(W,Σ,Γ).
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Comparison. Flow Policy Confinement, defined over thread configurations, is equivalent to
when defined over located threads.
Proposition B.3 (Proposition 4.3). FPC(W,Σ,Γ) = FPC+LT(W,Σ,Γ).
Proof. We assume that P ∈ FPC+LT(W,Σ,Γ), and show that the set
CT C = {〈P, T 〉 | ∀Mm ∈ P . 〈T (m),Mm〉 ∈ CLT Σ,ΓW and dom(P ) = dom(T )}
satisfies CT C ⊆ CT CΣ,ΓW . Given any thread configuration 〈P, T 〉 ∈ CT C, and any thread
Mm ∈ P , it is clear that 〈T (m),Mm〉 ∈ CLT Σ,ΓW . If
W ⊢Σ,Υ 〈P, T, S〉
d
−→
F
〈P ′, T ′, S′〉
then for some P ′′, T ′′ such that P = {Mm} ∪ P ′′ and T = {m 7→ d} ∪ T ′′ we have that
either:
• W ⊢Σ,Υ 〈{Mm}, T, S〉
d
−→
F
〈{M ′m}, T ′, S′〉 where P ′ = {M ′m} ∪ P ′′ and T ′ = {m 7→
d} ∪ T ′′. In this case, by hypothesis, W (T (m)) 4 F and also 〈T ′(m),M ′m〉 ∈
CLT Σ,ΓW .
• W ⊢Σ,Υ 〈{Mm}, T, S〉
d
−→
F
〈{M ′m, Nn}, T ′, S′〉 where P ′ = {M ′m, Nn} ∪ P ′′ and
T ′ = {m 7→ d, n 7→ d′} ∪ T ′′ for some d′. In this case, by hypothesis, W (T (m)) 4 F
and also 〈T ′(m),M ′m〉, 〈T ′(n), Nn〉 ∈ CLT Σ,ΓW .
In both cases, we can conclude that ∀Mm ∈ P ′ . 〈T ′(m),Mm〉 ∈ CLT Σ,ΓW and dom(P
′) =
dom(T ′), so 〈P ′, T ′〉 ∈ CT C. We then have that CT C ⊆ CT CΣ,ΓW , and also that for all 〈P, T 〉
such that dom(P ) = dom(T ), we have that 〈P, T 〉 ∈ CT C. Then, P ∈ FPC(W,Σ,Γ).
We now assume that P ∈ FPC(W,Σ,Γ), and show that the set
CLT = {〈T (m),Mm〉 | ∃P, T . 〈P, T 〉 ∈ CT CΣ,ΓW and M
m ∈ P}
satisfies CLT ⊆ CLT Σ,ΓW . Given any located thread 〈d,M
m〉 ∈ CLT and position tracker
T such that T (m) = d, and any (W,Σ,Γ)-compatible memory S, it is clear that also
〈{Mm}, {m 7→ d}〉 ∈ CT CΣ,ΓW . Then, if:
• W ⊢Σ,Υ 〈{Mm}, T, S〉
d
−→
F
〈{M ′m}, T ′, S′〉, then by hypothesis, we have W (d) 4 F
and 〈{M ′m}, T ′〉 ∈ FPC(W,Σ,Γ). Therefore, 〈T ′(m),M ′m〉 ∈ CLT .
• W ⊢Σ,Υ 〈{Mm}, T, S〉
d
−→
F
〈{M ′m, Nn}, T ′, S′〉, then by hypothesis, we have W (d) 4
F and 〈{M ′m, Nn}, T ′〉 ∈ FPC(W,Σ,Γ). Therefore, both 〈T ′(m),M ′m〉, 〈T ′(n), N ′n〉 ∈
CLT .
We then have that CLT ⊆ CLT Σ,ΓW , and also that for all 〈d,M
m〉 such that Mm ∈ P , we
have that 〈d,Mm〉 ∈ CLT . Then, P ∈ FPC+LT(W,Σ,Γ).
B.2. Type System.
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B.2.1. Subject reduction and safety. In order to establish the soundness of the type system of
Figure 5 we need a Subject Reduction result, stating that types that are given to expressions
are preserved by computation. To prove it we follow the usual steps [WF94]. In the
following, Pse is the set of pseudo-values, as defined in Figure 2.
Remark B.4.
(1) If X ∈ Pse and W ; Γ ⊢ΣA X : τ , then for all flow policies A
′, we have that W ; Γ ⊢ΣA′
X : τ .
(2) For any flow policies A and A′ such that A′ 4 A, we have that W ; Γ ⊢ΣA M : τ
implies W ; Γ ⊢ΣA′ M : τ .
Lemma B.5.
(1) If W ; Γ ⊢ΣA M : τ and x /∈ dom(Γ) then W ; Γ, x : σ ⊢
Σ
A M : τ .
(2) If W ; Γ, x : σ ⊢ΣA M : τ and x /∈ fv(M) then W ; Γ ⊢
Σ
A M : τ .
Proof. By induction on the inference of the type judgment.
Lemma B.6 (Substitution).
If W ; Γ, x : σ ⊢ΣA M : τ and W ; Γ ⊢
Σ
A′ X : σ then W ; Γ ⊢
Σ
A {x 7→ X}M : τ .
Proof. By induction on the inference of W ; Γ, x : σ ⊢ΣA M : τ , and by case analysis on the
last rule used in this typing proof, using the previous lemma.
Nil: Here {x 7→ X}M = M , and since x /∈ fv(M) then by Lemma B.5 we have
W ; Γ ⊢Σj M : s, τ .
Var: If M = x then σ = τ and {x 7→ X}M = X. By Remark B.4, we have
W ; Γ ⊢ΣA X : τ . If M 6= x then {x 7→ X}M = M , where x /∈ fv(M). Therefore, by
Lemma B.5, we have W ; Γ ⊢ΣA M : τ .
Abs: HereM = (λy.M¯), andW ; Γ, x : σ, y : τ¯ ⊢Σ
A¯
M¯ : σ¯ where τ = τ¯ −→
A¯
σ¯. We can as-
sume that y /∈ dom(W ; Γ, x : σ) (otherwise rename y). Therefore {x 7→ X}(λy.M¯ ) =
(λy.{x 7→ X}M¯). By assumption and Lemma B.5 we can write W ; Γ, y : τ¯ ⊢ΣA′
X : σ. By induction hypothesis, W ; Γ, y : τ¯ ⊢Σ
A¯
{x 7→ X}M¯ : σ¯. Then, by Abs,
W ; Γ ⊢ΣA (λy.{x 7→ X}M¯) : τ .
Rec: Here M = (̺y.X¯), and W ; Γ, x : σ, y : τ ⊢ΣA X¯ : τ . We can assume y /∈
dom(W ; Γ, x : σ) (otherwise rename y). Therefore {x 7→ X}(̺y.X¯) = (̺y.{x 7→ X}X¯).
By assumption and Lemma B.5 we haveW ; Γ, y : τ ⊢ΣA′ X : σ. By induction hypoth-
esis, W ; Γ, y : τ ⊢ΣA {x 7→ X}X¯ : τ . Then, by Rec, W ; Γ ⊢
Σ
A (̺y.{x 7→ X}X¯) : τ .
Cond: Here M = (if M¯ then N¯t else N¯f ) and we have W ; Γ, x : σ ⊢
Σ
A M¯ : bool,
and W ; Γ, x : σ ⊢ΣA Nt : τ1 and W ; Γ, x : σ ⊢
Σ
A Nf : τ2. By induction hypothesis,
W ; Γ, x : σ ⊢ΣA {x 7→ X}M¯ : bool,W ; Γ, x : σ ⊢
Σ
A {x 7→ X}Nt : τ1 andW ; Γ, x : σ ⊢
Σ
A
{x 7→ X}Nf : τ2. Therefore, we haveW ; Γ, x : σ ⊢
Σ
A (if {x 7→ X}M¯ then {x 7→ X}Nt else {x 7→ X}Nf ) :
τ by rule Cond.
Mig: Here M = (threadl M¯ at d) and we have that W ; Γ, x : σ ⊢
Σ
W (d) M¯ : τ , with τ =
unit. By induction hypothesis, then W ; Γ, x : σ ⊢Σ
W (d) {x 7→ X}M¯ : τ . Therefore,
by rule Mig, W ; Γ, x : σ ⊢ΣA (threadl {x 7→ X}M¯ at d) : τ .
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Flow: Here M = (flow F¯ in M¯) and W ; Γ, x : σ ⊢ΣA M¯ : τ , with A 4 F¯ . By induc-
tion hypothesis, W ; Γ, x : σ ⊢ΣA {x 7→ X}M¯ : τ . Then, by Flow, W ; Γ, x : σ ⊢
Σ
A
(flow F¯ in {x 7→ X}M¯) : τ .
Allow: Here M = (allowed F¯ then N¯t else N¯f ) and we have that W ; Γ, x : σ ⊢
Σ
A M¯ :
bool and W ; Γ, x : σ ⊢Σ
AupriseF¯
N¯t : τ1 and W ; Γ, x : σ ⊢
Σ
A N¯f : τ2. By induction hypoth-
esis, W ; Γ, x : σ ⊢Σ
AupriseF¯
{x 7→ X}N¯t : τ1 and W ; Γ, x : σ ⊢
Σ
A {x 7→ X}N¯f : τ2. There-
fore, by ruleCond, we have thatW ; Γ, x : σ ⊢ΣA (allowed F¯ then {x 7→ X}Nt else {x 7→ X}Nf ) :
s, τ .
The proofs for the cases Loc, BT and BF are analogous to the one for Nil, while the
proofs for Ref, App, Seq, Der and Assign are analogous to the one for Cond.
Lemma B.7 (Replacement).
If W ; Γ ⊢ΣA E[M ] : τ is a valid judgment, then the proof gives M a typing W ; Γ ⊢
Σ
Auprise⌈E⌉ M : τ¯
for some τ¯ . In this case, if W ; Γ ⊢Σ
Auprise⌈E⌉ N : τ¯ , then W ; Γ ⊢
Σ
A E[N ] : τ .
Proof. By induction on the structure of E.
E[M ] =M : This case is direct.
E[M ] = (if E¯[M ] then N¯t else N¯f): By Cond, we have W ; Γ ⊢
Σ
A E¯[M ] : bool,
and also W ; Γ ⊢ΣA N¯t : τ and W ; Γ ⊢
Σ
A N¯f : τ . By induction hypothesis, the proof
gives M a typing W ; Γ ⊢Σ
Auprise⌈E¯⌉
M : τˆ , for some τˆ .
Also by induction hypothesis, W ; Γ ⊢ΣA E¯[N ] : bool. Again by Cond, we have
W ; Γ ⊢ΣA (if E¯[N ] then N¯t else N¯f ) : τ .
E[M ] = (flow F¯ in E¯[M ]): By Flow, we have W ; Γ ⊢ΣA E¯[M ] : τ and A 4 F¯ . By
induction hypothesis, the proof gives M a typing W ; Γ ⊢Σ
Auprise⌈E¯⌉
M : τˆ , for some τˆ .
Also by induction hypothesis, W ; Γ ⊢ΣA E¯[N ] : τ . Then, again by Flow, we have
W ; Γ ⊢ΣA (flow F¯ in E¯[N ]) : τ .
The proofs for the cases E[M ] = ⌈(E[M ] := N)⌉, E[M ] = ⌈(V := E[M ])⌉, E[M ] = ⌈(! E[M ])⌉,
E[M ] = ⌈(E[M ] N)⌉, E[M ] = ⌈(V E[M ])⌉, E[M ] = ⌈(E[M ];N)⌉ and E[M ] = ⌈ref l,θE[M ]⌉,
are all analogous to the proof for the case E[M ] = (if E¯[M ] then Nt else Nf ).
We check that the type of a thread and the compatibility of memories is preserved by
reduction.
Proposition B.8 (Subject Reduction – Proposition 4.5). Consider an allowed-policy map-
ping W and a thread Mm such that W ; Γ ⊢ΣA M : τ , and suppose W ⊢ 〈{M
m}, T, S〉
d
−→
F
〈{M ′m} ∪ P, T ′, S′〉, for a memory S that is (W,Σ,Γ)-compatible. Then, W ; Γ ⊢Σ
AupriseW (T (m))
M ′ : τ , and S′ is also (W,Σ,Γ)-compatible.
Proof. Suppose that we haveM = E¯[M¯ ] and thatW ⊢ 〈{M¯m}, T, S〉
d
−→
F¯
〈{M¯ ′m} ∪ P ′, T¯ ′, S¯′〉.
We start by observing that this implies F = F¯ uprise ⌈E¯⌉, M ′ = E¯[M¯ ′], P = P ′, T¯ ′ = T ′
and S¯′ = S′. We can assume, without loss of generality, that M¯ is the smallest in the
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sense that there is no Eˆ, Mˆ , Nˆ such that Eˆ 6= [] and Eˆ[Mˆ ] = M¯ for which we can write
W ⊢ 〈{Mˆm}, T, S〉
d
−→
Fˆ
〈{Mˆ ′m} ∪ P, T ′, S′〉.
By Replacement (Lemma B.7), we have W ; Γ ⊢Σ
Auprise⌈E¯⌉
M¯ : τ¯ in the proof of W ; Γ ⊢ΣA
E¯[M¯ ] : τ , for some τ¯ . We proceed by case analysis on the transition W ⊢ 〈{M¯m}, T, S〉
d
−→
F¯
〈{M¯ ′m} ∪ P, T ′, S′〉, and prove that if S′ 6= S then:
• There exists τ¯ ′ such that W ; Γ ⊢Σ
Auprise⌈E¯⌉upriseW (T (m))
M¯ ′ : τ¯ ′ and τ¯ 4 τ¯ ′. Furthermore,
for every reference a ∈ dom(S′) we have Γ ⊢Σ
℧
S′(a) : Σ2(a).
• If P = {Nn} for some expression N and thread name n, then also W ; Γ ⊢Σ
W (T ′(n))
N : unit. (Note that in this case S = S′.)
By case analysis on the structure of M¯ :
M¯ = ((λx.Mˆ) V ): Here we have M¯ ′ = {x 7→ V }Mˆ , S = S′ and P = ∅. By
rule App, there exist τˆ and σˆ such that W ; Γ ⊢Σ
Auprise⌈E¯⌉
(λx.Mˆ) : τˆ −−−−→
Auprise⌈E¯⌉
σˆ and
W ; Γ ⊢Σ
Auprise⌈E¯⌉
V : τˆ with σˆ = τ¯ . By Abs, then W ; Γ, x : τˆ ⊢Σ
Auprise⌈E¯⌉
Mˆ : σˆ.
Therefore, by Lemma B.6, we get W ; Γ ⊢Σ
Auprise⌈E¯⌉
{x 7→ V }Mˆ : τ¯ . By Remark B.4,
W ; Γ ⊢Σ
Auprise⌈E¯⌉upriseW (T (m))
{x 7→ V }Mˆ : τ¯ .
M¯ = (̺x.X): Here we have M¯ ′ = ({x 7→ (̺x.X)} X), S = S′ and P = ∅. By
rule Rec, we have W ; Γ, x : τ¯ ⊢Σ
Auprise⌈E¯⌉
X : τ¯ . Therefore, by Lemma B.6, we
get W ; Γ ⊢Σ
Auprise⌈E¯⌉
{x 7→ (̺x.X)}X : τ¯ . By Remark B.4, W ; Γ ⊢Σ
Auprise⌈E¯⌉upriseW (T (m))
{x 7→ (̺x.X)}X : τ¯ .
M¯ = (if tt then Nt else Nf ): Here we have M¯
′ = Nt, S = S
′ and P = ∅. By
Cond, we have that W ; Γ ⊢Σ
Auprise⌈E¯⌉
Nt : τ¯ . By Remark B.4, W ; Γ ⊢
Σ
Auprise⌈E¯⌉upriseW (T (m))
Nt : τ¯ .
M¯ = (ref l,θ V ): Here we have M¯
′ = a, lab = a : θ ref l for some reference name a,
type θ and security level l, S′ = S ∪ {(a, V )} and P = ∅. By Ref, τ¯ = θ ref and
W ; Γ ⊢Σ
Auprise⌈E¯⌉
V : θ, and by Remark B.4 thenW ; Γ ⊢Σ
℧
V : θ. By Lemma B.5 we have
W ; Γ ⊢Σ
℧
S′(a) : θ for every a ∈ dom(S′). By Loc, we have W ; Γ ⊢Σ
Auprise⌈E¯⌉
a : θ ref ,
and τ¯ = θ ref .
M¯ = (! a): Here we have M¯ ′ = S(a), S = S′ and P = ∅. By Der, we have
that W ; Γ ⊢Σ
Auprise⌈E¯⌉
a : τ¯ ref , and by Loc we know that Σ2(a) = τ¯ . By com-
patibility assumption, then W ; Γ ⊢Σ
℧
S(a) : Σ2(a), and by Remark B.4, then
W ; Γ ⊢Σ
Auprise⌈E¯⌉upriseW (T (m))
S(a) : τ¯ .
M¯ = (a := V ): Here we have M¯ ′ = (), and P = ∅. By Assign, τ¯ = unit, and
W ; Γ ⊢Σ
Auprise⌈E¯⌉
a : θ ref andW ; Γ ⊢Σ
Auprise⌈E¯⌉
V : θ, for some θ. By Loc, θ = Σ2(a) and by
Remark B.4 we haveW ; Γ ⊢Σ
℧
V : Σ2(a). ByNil, we have thatW ; Γ ⊢
Σ
Auprise⌈E¯⌉upriseW (T (m))
() : τ¯ , with τ¯ = unit.
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M¯ = (flow F ′ in V ): Here we have M¯ ′ = V , S = S′ and P = ∅. By rule Flow, we
have that W ; Γ ⊢Σ
Auprise⌈E¯⌉
V : τ¯ and by Remark B.4, we have W ; Γ ⊢Σ
Auprise⌈E¯⌉upriseW (T (m))
V :
τ¯ .
M¯ = (allowed F ′ then Nt else Nf) and W (T (m)) 4 F
′: Here we have M¯ ′ =
Nt, S = S
′ and P = ∅. By Allow, we have that W ; Γ ⊢Σ
Auprise⌈E¯⌉upriseF ′
Nt : τ¯ . By
Remark B.4, then W ; Γ ⊢Σ
Auprise⌈E¯⌉upriseW (T (m))
Nt : τ¯ .
M¯ = (allowed F ′ then Nt else Nf) and W (T (m)) 64 F
′: Here we have M¯ ′ =
Nf , S = S
′ and P = ∅. By Allow, we have that W ; Γ ⊢Σ
Auprise⌈E¯⌉
Nf : τ¯ . By
Remark B.4, then W ; Γ ⊢Σ
Auprise⌈E¯⌉upriseW (T (m))
Nf : τ¯ .
M¯ = (threadk N at d¯): Here we have M¯
′ = (), P = {Nˆn} for some thread name
n, S = S′, and T ′(n) = d¯. By Nil, we have W ; Γ ⊢ΣA () : unit. By Remark B.4, then
W ; Γ ⊢Σ
Auprise⌈E¯⌉upriseW (d)
() : unit. Furthermore, by Mig, we have that W ; Γ ⊢Σ
W (d¯)
N : unit
and τ¯ = unit.
The cases M¯ = (if ff then Nt else Nf ) and M¯ = (V ; Mˆ) are analogous to the one for
M¯ = (if tt then Nt else Nf ).
By Replacement (Lemma B.7), we finally conclude that W ; Γ ⊢Σ
AupriseW (T (m)) E¯[M¯
′] : τ .
Proposition B.9 (Safety – Proposition 4.7). Given an allowed-policy mapping W , consider
a closed thread Mm such that W ; ∅ ⊢ΣA M : τ . Then, for any memory S that is (W,Σ, ∅)-
compatible and position-tracker T , either the program M is a value, or
Proof. By induction on the derivation of W ; Γ ⊢ΣA M : τ . If M ∈ V al, then case 1 holds.
Flow: If M = (flow F in N), then W ; Γ ⊢ΣA N : τ . By induction hypothesis, then one
of the following cases holds for N :
Case 1: Then case 2 holds for M , with M ′ = N , d = T (m) and F ′ = F .
Case 2: Suppose that there exists F ′, N ′, P , S′ and T ′ such thatW ⊢ 〈{Nm}, T, S〉
d
−→
F ′
〈{N ′m} ∪ P, T ′, S′〉. ThenW ⊢ 〈{Mm}, T, S〉
d
−−−→
F ′∪F
〈{(flow F in N ′)m} ∪ P, T ′, S′〉,
so case 2 holds for M .
Allow: If M = (allowed F then Nt else Nf ), then we have that W ⊢ 〈{M
m}, T, S〉
T (m)
−−−→
∅
〈{M ′m}, T, S〉, with M ′ = Nt of M
′ = Nf depending on whether W (T (m)) 4
F or W (T (m)) 64 F (respectively). Therefore, case 2 holds for M .
Mig: If M = (threadl N at d), then W ⊢ 〈{M
m}, T, S〉
T (m)
−−−→
W
〈{()m, Nn}, T, S〉, so
case 2 holds for M .
B.2.2. Soundness.
Theorem B.10 (Soundness of Enforcement Mechanism I – Theorem 4.6). Consider an
allowed-policy mapping W , reference labeling Σ, typing environment Γ, and a thread con-
figuration 〈P, T 〉 such that for all Mm ∈ P there exists τ such that W ; Γ ⊢Σ
W (T (m)) M : τ .
Then 〈P, T 〉 is a (W,Σ,Γ)-confined thread configuration.
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Proof. Consider the following set:
C = {〈P, T 〉 | ∀Mm ∈ P,∃τ . W ; Γ ⊢Σ
W (T (m)) M : τ}
We show that C is a set of (W,Σ,Γ)-confined thread configurations. If 〈P, T 〉 ∈ C and for a
given (W,Σ,Γ)-compatible store S we have that there exist P ′, T ′, S′ such thatW ⊢ 〈P, T, S〉
d
−→
F
〈P ′, T ′, S′〉, then, there is a threadMm such that P = {Mm}∪P¯ andW ⊢ 〈{Mm}, T, S〉
d
−→
F
〈{Mm} ∪ P¯ ′, T ′, S′〉, with P ′ = {Mm} ∪ P¯ ′∪P¯ and T (m) = d. By induction on the infer-
ence ofW ; Γ ⊢Σ
W (T (m)) M : τ , we prove thatW (d) 4 F , andW ; Γ ⊢
Σ
W (T ′(m)) M
′ : τ . Further-
more, if P¯ = Nn for some expression N and thread name n, then W ; Γ ⊢Σ
W (T ′(n)) N : unit.
Since typability of the threads that result from the transition step, as well as the
(W,Σ,Γ)-compatibility of the stores, is guaranteed by Subject Reduction (Proposition 4.5),
we prove only the conditions regarding the compliance of the declared flow policies to the
current domain’s allowed flow policy. Assuming thatW ; Γ ⊢Σ
W (d) M : τ , and by case analysis
on the last rule in the corresponding typing proof:
Flow: Here M = (flow F¯ in M¯), and we have W ; Γ ⊢Σ
W (d) M¯ : τ , with W (d) 4 F¯ .
There are two cases to consider:
M¯ can compute: Then W ⊢ 〈{M¯}, T, S〉
d
−→
F¯ ′
〈{M¯ ′} ∪ P¯ ′, T ′, S′〉, with F = F¯ uprise
F¯ ′. By induction hypothesis, then W (d) 4 F¯ ′. Since W (d) 4 F¯ , then W (d) 4
F .
M¯ ∈ Val : Then we have F = ℧, so W (T (m)) 4 F holds vacuously.
Allow: Here M = (allowed A¯ then N¯t else N¯f ), and we have F = ℧. Therefore
W (T (m)) 4 F holds vacuously.
Mig: In this case M = (threadl M¯ at d¯), with W ; Γ ⊢
Σ
W (d¯)
M¯ : unit. Then we have
F = ℧, so W (T (m)) 4 F holds vacuously.
The cases for Ref, Der, Assign, Seq, App and Cond are similar to Flow, since for
the cases where the sub-expressions are not all values, these sub-expressions require typing
assumptions that have the same A parameter as the concluding judgment, and for the cases
where the expression is ready to reduce, the flow policy that decorates the transition is ℧.
The cases for Rec and Mig are similar to Allow, since the constructs are not evaluation
contexts, and therefore the transition is decorated with the top flow policy F = ℧.
B.3. Runtime Type Checking.
B.3.1. Subject Reduction and weak safety.
Proposition B.11 (Subject Reduction – Proposition 4.9). Consider a thread Mm such
that Γ ⊢ΣA M : τ and suppose that W ⊢ 〈{M
m}, T, S〉
d
−→
F
〈{M ′m} ∪ P, T ′, S′〉, for a memory
S that is (W,Σ,Γ)-compatible. Then, Γ ⊢Σ
AupriseW (T (m)) M
′ : τ , and S′ is also (W,Σ,Γ)-
compatible.
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Proof. The proof is the same as the one for Proposition B.8, with exception for the treatment
of the case where the step corresponds to the creation of a new thread:
M¯ = (threadl N at d): Here we have M¯
′ = (), P = {Nˆn} for some thread name n,
T ′(n) = d and (by the migration condition) Γ ⊢Σ
W (d) N : unit, where τ¯ = unit. By
Nil we have that Γ ⊢ΣA () : unit.
Proposition B.12 (Safety (weakened) – Proposition 4.11). Consider a closed thread Mm
such that ∅ ⊢ΣA M : τ . Then, for any allowed-policy mapping W , memory S that is (W,Σ, ∅)-
compatible and position-tracker T , either:
(1) the program M is a value, or
(2) W ⊢ 〈{Mm}, T, S〉
T (m)
−−−→
F ′
〈{M ′m} ∪ P, T ′, S′〉, for some F ′, M ′, P , S′ and T ′, or
(3) M = E[(threadl N at d)], for some E, l, d such that ∅ ⊢
Σ
Ω N : unit but ∅ 6⊢
Σ
W (d) N : unit.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of Γ ⊢ΣA M : τ . If M ∈ V al, then case 1 holds.
Flow: If M = (flow F in N), then Γ ⊢ΣA N : τ . By induction hypothesis, then one of
the following cases holds for N :
Case 1: Then case 2 holds for M , with M ′ = N , d = T (m) and F ′ = F .
Case 2: Suppose that there exists F ′, N ′, P , S′ and T ′ such thatW ⊢ 〈{Nm}, T, S〉
d
−→
F ′
〈{N ′m} ∪ P, T ′, S′〉. ThenW ⊢ 〈{Mm}, T, S〉
d
−−−→
F ′∪F
〈{(flow F in N ′)m} ∪ P, T ′, S′〉,
so case 2 holds for M .
Case 3: Suppose that there exists an evaluation context E¯, a security level l and
a domain name d such that N = E[(threadl N
′ at d)] and Γ ⊢ΣΩ N
′ : unit but
Γ 6⊢Σ
W (d) N
′ : unit. Then, case 3 also holds for M for the evaluation context
E = (flow F in E¯[]).
Allow: If M = (allowed F then Nt else Nf ), then we have that W ⊢ 〈{M
m}, T, S〉
T (m)
−−−→
∅
〈{M ′m}, T, S〉, with M ′ = Nt of M
′ = Nf depending on whether W (T (m)) 4
F or W (T (m)) 4 F (respectively). Therefore, case 2 holds for M .
Mig: If M = (threadl N at d), then Γ ⊢
Σ
Ω N : unit, and either:
Γ ⊢Σ
W (d) N : unit: Then, W ⊢ 〈{M
m}, T, S〉
T (m)
−−−→
∅
〈{()m, Nn}, T, S〉. Therefore,
case 2 holds for M .
Γ 6⊢Σ
W (d) N : unit: Then, case 3 holds forM for the evaluation context E = E¯.
B.4. Declassification effect.
B.4.1. Subject Reduction and weak safety. In order to prove Subject Reduction, we follow
the usual steps [WF94]. In the following, Pse is the set of pseudo-values, as defined in
Figure 2.
Remark B.13. If Γ ⊢Σ M →֒ N : s, τ then M ∈ Val iff N ∈ Val and s = ℧.
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Remark B.14. If Γ ⊢Σ M →֒ N : s, τ andM ∈ Pse with rn(M) ⊆ dom(Σ), then N ∈ Pse
and s = ℧.
Lemma B.15.
(1) If Γ ⊢Σ M →֒ Mˆ : s, τ and x /∈ dom(Γ) then W ; Γ, x : σ ⊢Σ M →֒ Mˆ : s, τ .
(2) If W ; Γ, x : σ ⊢Σ M →֒ Mˆ : s, τ and x /∈ fv(M) then Γ ⊢Σ M →֒ Mˆ : s, τ .
Proof. By induction on the inference of the type judgment.
Lemma B.16 (Substitution).
If W ; Γ, x : σ ⊢Σ M →֒ N : s, τ and Γ ⊢Σ X1 →֒ X2 : ℧, σ
′ with σ 4 σ′, then Γ ⊢Σ
{x 7→ X1}M →֒ {x 7→ X2}N : s, τ
′ with τ 4 τ ′.
Proof. By induction on the inference of W ; Γ, x : σ ⊢Σ M →֒ N : s, τ , and by case analysis
on the last rule used in this typing proof, using Lemma B.15.
NilI: Here {x 7→ X1}M = M , and {x 7→ X2}N = N , and since x /∈ fv(M) then by
Lemma B.15 we have Γ ⊢Σ M →֒ N : s, τ .
VarI: IfM = x thenN = x, s = ℧, σ = τ , {x 7→ X1}M = X1, and {x 7→ X2}N = X2.
It is then direct that Γ ⊢Σ X1 →֒ X2 : s, σ
′, and we take τ ′ = σ′. If M 6= x then
N 6= x, {x 7→ X1}M = M and {x 7→ X1}M = M where x /∈ fv(M). Therefore, by
Lemma B.15, we have Γ ⊢Σ M →֒ N : s, τ .
AbsI: Here M = (λy.M¯), N = (λy.N¯ ), s = ℧, and W ; Γ, x : σ, y : τ¯ ⊢
Σ M¯ →֒ N¯ : s¯, σ¯
where τ = τ¯
s¯
−→ σ¯. We can assume that y /∈ dom(W ; Γ, x : σ) (otherwise re-
name y). Then {x 7→ X1}(λy.M¯ ) = (λy.{x 7→ X1}M¯ ) and {x 7→ X2}(λy.N¯) =
(λy.{x 7→ X2}N¯). By assumption and Lemma B.15 we can write W ; Γ, y : τ¯ ⊢
Σ
X1 →֒ X2 : ℧, σ
′. By induction hypothesis,W ; Γ, y : τ¯ ⊢Σ {x 7→ X1}M¯ →֒ {x 7→ X2}N¯ :
s¯, σ¯′ with σ¯ 4 σ¯′. By AbsI, Γ ⊢
Σ (λy.{x 7→ X1}M¯) →֒ (λy.{x 7→ X2}N¯) : s, τ¯
s¯
−→ σ¯′,
and we take τ ′ = τ¯
s¯
−→ σ¯′.
RecI: Here M = (̺y.X¯1), M = (̺y.X¯2), by Remark B.14 we have s = ℧, and
W ; Γ, x : σ, y : τ ⊢Σ X¯1 →֒ X¯2 : s, τ . We can assume that y /∈ dom(W ; Γ, x : σ) (oth-
erwise rename y). Then {x 7→ X1}(̺y.X¯1) = (̺y.{x 7→ X1}X¯1) and {x 7→ X2}(̺y.X¯2) =
(̺y.{x 7→ X2}X¯2). By assumption and Lemma B.15 we have W ; Γ, y : τ ⊢
Σ X1 →֒
X2 : s, σ
′. By induction hypothesis, W ; Γ, y : τ ⊢Σ {x 7→ X1}X¯1 →֒ {x 7→ X2}X¯2 :
℧, τ ′, with tau 4 τ ′. Then, by RecI, Γ ⊢
Σ (̺y.{x 7→ X1}X¯1) →֒ (̺y.{x 7→ X2}X¯2) :
℧, τ ′.
Ref I: Here M = (refθ M¯), N = (refθ N¯) and we have Γ ⊢
Σ M¯ →֒ N¯ : s¯, θ′
where θ 4 θ′ and τ = θ ref . By induction hypothesis, Γ ⊢Σ {x 7→ X1}M¯ →֒
{x 7→ X2}N¯ : s¯, θ
′′ with θ′ 4 θ′′. Then, θ 4 θ′′, so we conclude by RefI that
Γ ⊢Σ (refθ {x 7→ X1}M¯ ) →֒ (refθ {x 7→ X2}N¯) : s, τ .
CondI: Here M = (if M¯ then M¯t else M¯f ), N = (if N¯ then N¯t else N¯f ) and we
have that W ; Γ, x : σ ⊢Σ M¯ →֒ N¯ : s¯, bool, W ; Γ, x : σ ⊢Σ M¯t →֒ N¯t : s¯t, τ¯t
and W ; Γ, x : σ ⊢Σ M¯f →֒ N¯f : s¯f , τ¯f with s = s¯ uprise s¯t uprise s¯f , τ¯t ≈ τ¯f and τ =
τ¯t uprise τ¯f . By induction hypothesis, W ; Γ, x : σ ⊢
Σ {x 7→ X1}M¯ →֒ {x 7→ X2}N¯ :
s¯, bool, W ; Γ, x : σ ⊢Σ {x 7→ X1}M¯t →֒ {x 7→ X2}N¯t : s¯t, τ¯t
′ and W ; Γ, x : σ ⊢Σ
{x 7→ X1}M¯f →֒ {x 7→ X2}N¯f : s¯f , τ¯f ’ with τ¯t 4 τ¯t
′ and τ¯f 4 τ¯f
′. Still τ¯t
′ ≈ τ¯f
′, so
INFORMATION FLOW IN A DISTRIBUTED SECURITY SETTING 75
byCondI we haveW ; Γ, x : σ ⊢
Σ (if {x 7→ X1}M¯ then {x 7→ X1}M¯t else{x 7→ X1}M¯f )
→֒ (if {x 7→ X2}N¯ then {x 7→ X2}N¯t else {x 7→ X2}N¯f ) : s, τ¯t
′ uprise τ¯f
′. We then take
τ ′ = τ¯t
′ uprise τ¯f
′.
AppI: Here M = (M¯1 M¯2) and we have that Γ ⊢
Σ M¯1 →֒ N¯1 : s¯1, θ¯
s¯3−→ σ¯ and Γ ⊢Σ
M¯2 →֒ N¯2 : s¯2, θ¯
′′ where s = s¯1 uprise s¯2 uprise s¯3, θ¯ 4 θ¯
′′, and τ = σ¯. By induction hypoth-
esis, W ; Γ, x : σ ⊢Σ {x 7→ X1}M¯1 →֒ {x 7→ X2}N¯1 : s¯t, θ¯
s¯3
′
−−→ σ¯′ and W ; Γ, x : σ ⊢Σ
{x 7→ X2}M¯f →֒ {x 7→ X2}N¯2 : s¯f , θ¯
′′′ with s¯3 4 s¯3
′, σ¯ 4 σ¯′ and θ¯′′ 4 θ¯′′′. It
is still the case that θ¯ 4 θ¯′′′. Therefore, by rule AppI we have that W ; Γ, x : σ ⊢
Σ
({x 7→ X1}M¯1 {x 7→ X1}M¯2) →֒ (if {x 7→ X2}M¯2 then {x 7→ X2}N¯t else {x 7→ X2}N¯2) :
s, σ¯′, and we take τ ′ = σ¯′.
MigI: Here M = (threadl M¯ at d), N = (thread
s¯
l N¯ at d), s = ℧ and we have
W ; Γ, x : σ ⊢Σ M¯ →֒ N¯ : s¯, τ¯ and τ = unit. By induction hypothesis, then
Γ ⊢Σ {x 7→ X1}M¯ →֒ {x 7→ X2}N¯ : s¯, τ¯ . Therefore, by rule MigI, we have
Γ ⊢Σ (threadl {x 7→ X1}M¯ at d) →֒ (thread
s¯
l {x 7→ X2}N¯ at d) : ℧, τ .
FlowI: HereM = (flow F¯ in M¯), N = (flow F¯ in N¯) andW ; Γ, x : σ ⊢
Σ M¯ →֒ N¯ : s¯, τ
with s = s¯ uprise F¯ . By induction hypothesis, Γ ⊢Σ {x 7→ X1}M¯ →֒ {x 7→ X2}N¯ : s¯, τ
′
with τ 4 τ ′. By FlowI, Γ ⊢
Σ (flow F¯ in {x 7→ X1}M¯) →֒ (flow F¯ in {x 7→ X2}N¯) :
s, τ ′.
AllowI: HereM = (allowed F¯ then M¯t else M¯f ), andN = (allowed F¯ then N¯t else N¯f )
and W ; Γ, x : σ ⊢Σ M¯ →֒ M¯ : s¯, bool and also W ; Γ, x : σ ⊢Σ M¯t →֒ N¯t : s¯t, τ¯t
and W ; Γ, x : σ ⊢Σ M¯f →֒ N¯f : s¯f , τ¯f , with s = s¯t ⌣ F¯ uprise s¯f , τ¯t ≈ τ¯f and
τ = τ¯t uprise τ¯f . By induction hypothesis, Γ ⊢
Σ {x 7→ X1}M¯t →֒ {x 7→ X2}N¯t :
s¯t, τ¯ ′t and Γ ⊢
Σ {x 7→ X1}M¯f →֒ {x 7→ X2}N¯f : s¯f , τ¯ ′f with τ¯t 4 τ¯
′
t and τ¯f 4
τ¯ ′f . Still, we have that τ¯
′
t ≈ τ¯
′
f . We then have, by rule AllowI, that Γ ⊢
Σ
(allowed F¯ then {x 7→ X1}M¯t else {x 7→ X1}M¯f ) →֒ (allowed F¯ then {x 7→ X1}N¯t else {x 7→ X1}N¯f ) :
s, s¯′t ⌣ F¯ uprise s¯
′
f . We then take τ
′ = τ¯t uprise τ¯f .
The proofs for the cases LocI, BtI and BfI are analogous to the one for NilI, while the
proofs for SeqI, DerI and AssI are analogous to (or simpler than) the one for AppI.
Lemma B.17 (Replacement).
(1) If Γ ⊢Σ E1[M ] →֒ NE2 : s, τ is a valid judgment, then the proof gives M a typing
Γ ⊢Σ M →֒ N : s¯, τ¯ for some N , s¯ and τ¯ such that s 4 s¯ and for which there exists
E2 such that NE2 = E1[N ]. In this case, if Γ ⊢
Σ M ′ →֒ N ′ : s¯′, τ¯ ′ with s¯ uprise A 4 s¯′
for some A and τ¯ 4 τ¯ ′, then Γ ⊢Σ E1[M
′] →֒ E2[N
′] : s′, τ ′ for some s′, τ ′ such that
supriseA 4 s′ and τ 4 τ ′.
(2) If Γ ⊢Σ ME1 →֒ E2[N ] : s, τ is a valid judgment, then the proof gives N a typing
Γ ⊢Σ M →֒ N : s¯, τ¯ for some M , s¯ and τ¯ such that s 4 s¯ and for which there exists
E1 such that ME1 = E1[M ]. In this case, if Γ ⊢
Σ M ′ →֒ N ′ : s¯′, τ¯ ′ with s¯ uprise A 4 s¯′
for some A and τ¯ 4 τ¯ ′, then Γ ⊢Σ E1[M
′] →֒ E2[N
′] : s′, τ ′ for some s′, τ ′ such that
supriseA 4 s′ and τ 4 τ ′.
Proof.
(1) By induction on the structure of E1. The proof is symmetric to the second case.
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(2) By induction on the structure of E2.
E2[N ] = N : This case is direct.
E2[N ] = (if Eˆ2[N ] then Nˆt else Nˆf): By CondI,ME1 = (if MEˆ1 then Mˆt else Mˆf ),
and Γ ⊢Σ M
Eˆ1
→֒ Eˆ2[N ] : sˆ, bool, and also Γ ⊢
Σ Mˆt →֒ Nˆt : sˆt, τˆt and
Γ ⊢Σ Mˆf →֒ Nˆf : sˆf , τˆf with s = sˆ uprise sˆt uprise sˆf , τˆt ≈ τˆf and τ = τˆt uprise τˆf . By
induction hypothesis, the proof gives N a typing Γ ⊢Σ M →֒ N : s¯, τ¯ , for some
M , s¯, τ¯ such that sˆ 4 s¯, and for which there exists Eˆ1 such that MEˆ1 = Eˆ1[M ].
Also by induction hypothesis, Γ ⊢Σ Eˆ1[M
′] →֒ Eˆ2[N
′] : sˆ′, bool, for some sˆ′ such
that sˆupriseA 4 sˆ′. Again by ruleCondIwe have that Γ ⊢
Σ (if Eˆ1[M
′] then Mˆt else Mˆf )
→֒ (if Eˆ2[N ′] then Nˆt else Nˆf ) : s
′, τ ′ with s′ = sˆ′ uprise sˆt uprise sˆf and τ
′ = τˆt uprise τˆf .
Notice that supriseA = sˆuprise sˆt uprise sˆf upriseA 4 sˆ
′ uprise sˆt uprise sˆf = s
′.
E2[M ] = (flow Fˆ in Eˆ2[M ]): By FlowI, ME1 = (flow Fˆ in MEˆ1), and Γ ⊢
Σ
M
Eˆ1
→֒ Eˆ2[N ] : sˆ, τ and s = sˆuprise Fˆ . By induction hypothesis, the proof gives N
a typing Γ ⊢Σ M →֒ N : s¯, τ¯ , for some M , s¯, τ¯ such that sˆ 4 s¯, and for which
there exists Eˆ1 such that MEˆ1 = Eˆ1[M ].
Also by induction hypothesis, Γ ⊢Σ Eˆ1[M
′] →֒ Eˆ2[N
′] : sˆ′, τ , for some sˆ′ such
that sˆ uprise A 4 sˆ′. Then, again by FlowI, we have Γ ⊢
Σ (flow Fˆ in Eˆ1[M
′]) →֒
(flow F¯ in Eˆ2[N
′]) : s′, τ with s′ = sˆ′ uprise Fˆ . Notice that s uprise A = sˆ uprise Fˆ uprise A 4
sˆ′ uprise Fˆ = s′.
The proofs for the cases E2[M ] = ⌈(Eˆ2[M ] := N)⌉, E2[M ] = ⌈(V := Eˆ2[M ])⌉,
E2[M ] = ⌈(! Eˆ2[M ])⌉, E2[M ] = ⌈(Eˆ2[M ] N)⌉, E2[M ] = ⌈(V Eˆ2[M ])⌉, E2[M ] =
⌈(Eˆ2[M ];N)⌉ and E2[M ] = ⌈(ref l,θ Eˆ2[M ])⌉, are all analogous to the proof for the
case where E2[M ] = (if Eˆ2[M ] then Nt else Nf ).
The following proposition ensures that the annotation processing is preserved by the
annotated semantics. This is formulated by stating that after reduction, programs are
still well annotated. More precisely, the following result states that if a program is the
result of an annotation process, a certain declassification effect and type, then after one
computation step it is still the result of annotating a program, and is given a not more
permissive declassification effect and type.
Proposition B.18 (Subject Reduction, or Preservation of Annotations – Proposition 4.13).
Consider a thread Mm such that Γ ⊢Σ M →֒ N : s, τ and suppose that W ⊢Σ,Υ 〈{Nm}, T, S〉
d
−→
F
〈{N ′m} ∪ P, T ′, S′〉, for a memory S that is (W,Σ,Γ)-compatible. Then there exist M ′,
s′, τ ′ such that s upriseW (T (m)) 4 s′, and τ 4 τ ′, and Γ ⊢Σ M ′ →֒ N ′ : s′, τ ′, and S′ is also
(W,Σ,Γ)-compatible. Furthermore, if P = {N ′′n} for some expression N ′′ and thread name
n, then there exist M ′′, s′′ such that W (T ′(n)) 4 s′′ and Γ ⊢Σ M ′′ →֒ N ′′ : s′′, unit.
Proof. Suppose that N = E¯[N¯ ] andW ⊢Σ,Υ 〈{N¯m}, T, S〉
d
−→
F¯
〈{N¯ ′m} ∪ P ′, T¯ ′, S¯′〉. We start
by observing that this implies F = F¯ uprise ⌈E¯⌉, M ′ = E¯[M¯ ′], P = P ′, T¯ ′ = T ′ and S¯′ = S′.
We can assume, without loss of generality, that N¯ is the smallest in the sense that there is
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no Eˆ, Nˆ such that Eˆ 6= [] and Eˆ[Nˆ ] = N¯ for which we can write W ⊢Σ,Υ 〈{Nˆm}, T, S〉
d
−→
Fˆ
〈{Nˆ ′m} ∪ P, T ′, S′〉.
By Replacement (Lemma B.17), we have Γ ⊢Σ M¯ →֒ N¯ : s¯, τ¯ , for some M¯ , s¯’ τ¯ such
that s 4 s¯, in the proof of Γ ⊢Σ M →֒ N : s, τ . We proceed by case analysis on the
transition W ⊢Σ,Υ 〈{N¯m}, T, S〉
d
−→
F¯
〈{N¯ ′m} ∪ P, T ′, S′〉, and prove that:
• There exist M¯ ′, s¯′ and τ¯ ′ such that Γ ⊢Σ M¯ ′ →֒ N¯ ′ : s¯′, τ¯ ′, and s¯upriseW (T (m)) 4 s¯′ and
τ¯ 4 τ¯ ′. Furthermore, for every reference a ∈ dom(S′) implies Γ ⊢Σ
℧, V →֒ S
′(a) : Σ2(a)
for some value V .
• If P = {N ′′n} for some expression N ′′ and thread name n, then there exist M ′′ and
s¯′′ such that Γ ⊢Σ M ′′ →֒ N ′′ : s¯′′, unit, and W (T ′(n)) 4 s¯′. (Note that in this case
S = S′.)
By case analysis on the structure of N¯ :
N¯ = ((λx.Nˆ) V2): Here we have N¯
′ = {x 7→ V2}Nˆ , S = S
′ and P = ∅. By rule
AppI, there exist Mˆ , V1, sˆ1, sˆ2, sˆ3, τˆ , σˆ and τˆ
′′ such that Γ ⊢Σ (λx.Mˆ ) →֒ (λx.Nˆ) :
sˆ1, τˆ
sˆ3−→ σˆ and Γ ⊢Σ V1 →֒ V2 : sˆ2, τˆ
′′ with s¯ = sˆ1 uprise sˆ2 uprise sˆ3, τˆ 4 τˆ
′′ and τ¯ = σˆ.
By AbsI, then Γ, x : τˆ ⊢
Σ Mˆ →֒ Nˆ : sˆ3, σˆ. Therefore, by Lemma B.16, we get
Γ ⊢Σ {x 7→ V1}Mˆ →֒ {x 7→ V2}Nˆ : sˆ3
′, σˆ′ with sˆ3 4 sˆ3
′ and σˆ 4 τ¯ ′. We take s¯′ = sˆ3
and τ¯ ′ = σˆ′.
N¯ = (flow Fˆ in V2): Here we have N¯
′ = V2, S = S
′ and P = ∅. By rule FlowI and
by Remark B.13, there exist V1, sˆ, such that Γ ⊢
Σ V1 →֒ V2 : ℧, τ¯ . We take s¯
′ = ℧.
N¯ = (allowed Fˆ then Nt else Nf) and W (T (m)) 4 Fˆ : Here we have N¯
′ = Nt,
S = S′ and P = ∅. By AllowI, there exist Mt, Nt, sˆt, sˆf , τˆt and τˆf such that
Γ ⊢Σ Mt →֒ Nt : sˆt, τˆt, and Γ ⊢
Σ Mf →֒ Nf : sˆf , τˆf , where s¯ = sˆt ⌣ Fˆ uprise sˆf , τt ≈ τf
and τ¯ = τˆt uprise τˆf . We take s¯
′ = sˆt and τ¯
′ = τˆt. Notice that s¯ upriseW (T (m)) = sˆt ⌣
Fˆ uprise sˆf upriseW (T (m)) 4 sˆt and τ¯ 4 τ¯
′.
N¯ = (threads˙k Nˆ at d): Here we have N¯
′ = (), S = S′, P = {Nˆn} for some thread
name n, T ′(n) = d and W (d) 4 s˙. By MigI, we have that there exists Mˆ such that
Γ ⊢Σ Mˆ →֒ Nˆ : s˙, unit and τ¯ = unit, and by NilI we have that Γ ⊢
Σ () →֒ () : ℧, unit.
By Replacement (Lemma B.17), we can finally conclude that Γ ⊢Σ M ′E →֒ E¯[N¯
′] : s′, τ ′
for some M ′E , s
′, τ ′ such that supriseW (T (m)) 4 s′ and τ 4 τ ′.
Proposition B.19 (Safety (weakened) – Proposition 4.15). Consider a closed thread Mm
such that ∅ ⊢Σ M →֒ Mˆ : s, τ . Then, for any allowed-policy mapping W , memory S that is
(W,Σ, ∅)-compatible and position-tracker T , either the program Mˆ is a value, or:
(1) the program Mˆ is a value, or
(2) W ⊢ 〈{Mˆm}, T, S〉
T (m)
−−−→
F ′
〈{Mˆ ′m} ∪ P, T ′, S′〉, for some F ′, Mˆ ′, P , S′ and T ′, or
(3) M = E[(threadl N at d)], for some E, l, d and sˆ such that Mˆ = E[(thread
sˆ
l Nˆ at d)]
and ∅ ⊢Σ N →֒ Nˆ : sˆ, τ but W (d) 64 sˆ.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of Γ ⊢Σ M →֒ Mˆ : s, τ . If Mˆ ∈ V al′ then case 1
holds.
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FlowI: If M = (flow F in N) and Mˆ = (flow F in Nˆ), then Γ ⊢
Σ N →֒ Nˆ : s′, τ . By
induction hypothesis, then one of the following cases holds for Nˆ :
Case 1: Then case 2 holds for Mˆ , with Mˆ ′ = Nˆ , d = T (m) and F ′ = F .
Case 2: Suppose that there exists F ′, Nˆ ′, P , S′ and T ′ such thatW ⊢ 〈{Nˆm}, T, S〉
d
−→
F ′
〈{Nˆ ′m} ∪ P, T ′, S′〉. ThenW ⊢ 〈{Mˆm}, T, S〉
d
−−−→
F ′∪F
〈{(flow F in Nˆ ′)
m
} ∪ P, T ′, S′〉,
so case 2 holds for Mˆ .
Case 3: Suppose that there exists an evaluation context E¯, a security level l,
a domain name d and a security effect sˆ such that N = E[(threadl N
′ at d)],
Nˆ = E[(threadsˆl Nˆ
′ at d)] and Γ ⊢Σ N ′ →֒ Nˆ ′ : sˆ, τ butW (d) 64 sˆ. Then, case 3
also holds for Mˆ for the evaluation context E = (flow F in E¯[]).
Allow: If M = (allowed F then Nt else Nf ) and M = (allowed F then Nˆt else Nˆf ),
then we have that W ⊢ 〈{Mˆm}, T, S〉
T (m)
−−−→
∅
〈{Mˆ ′m}, T, S〉, with Mˆ ′ = Nˆt of
Mˆ ′ = Nˆf depending on whether W (T (m)) 4 F or W (T (m)) 4 F (respectively).
Therefore, case 2 holds for Mˆ .
Mig: IfM = (threadl N at d) and Mˆ = (thread
sˆ
l Nˆ at d), then Γ ⊢
Σ N →֒ Nˆ : sˆ, unit,
and either:
W (d) 4 sˆ: Then, W ⊢ 〈{Mm}, T, S〉
T (m)
−−−→
∅
〈{()m, Nn}, T, S〉. Therefore, case 2
holds for M .
W (d) 64 sˆ: Then, case 3 holds for M for the evaluation context E = E¯.
B.4.2. Preservation of the semantics.
Proposition B.20 (Proposition 4.18). If Γ ⊢Σ M →֒ N : s, τ , then for all allowed-policy
mappings W and thread names m ∈ Nam we have that {Mm}∼W,Σ,Γ{Nm}.
Proof. We prove that, for all allowed-policy mappings W , the set
B = {〈{Mm}, {Nm}〉 | m ∈ Nam and ∃s, τ . Γ ⊢Σ M →֒ N : s, τ}
is a (W,Σ,Γ)-simulation according to Definition 4.17.
Let us assume thatW ⊢Σ,Υ 〈{Nm}, T, Sˆ〉
d
−→
F
〈{N ′m} ∪ P ′2, T
′, Sˆ′〉. Consider E¯2, N¯ such
that N = E¯2[N¯ ] and W ⊢
Σ,Υ 〈{N¯m}, T, Sˆ〉
d
−→
F¯
〈{N¯ ′m} ∪ P¯ ′2, T¯
′,
¯ˆ
S′〉 and N ′ = E¯2[N¯
′]. We
start by observing that F = F¯ uprise ⌈E¯2⌉, N
′ = E¯2[N¯
′], P ′2 = P¯
′
2, T¯
′ = T ′ and
¯ˆ
S′ = Sˆ′. We
can assume, without loss of generality, that N¯ is the smallest in the sense that there is no
Eˆ2, Nˆ such that Eˆ2 6= [] and Eˆ2[Nˆ ] = N¯ for which we can write W ⊢
Σ,Υ 〈{Nˆm}, T, Sˆ〉
d
−→
Fˆ
〈{Nˆ ′m} ∪ P ′2, T
′, Sˆ′〉.
By Replacement (Lemma B.17), we have Γ ⊢Σ M¯ →֒ N¯ : s¯, τ¯ , for some M¯ , s¯, τ¯ such
that s 4 s¯, in the proof of Γ ⊢Σ M →֒ N : s, τ . Furthermore, there exists E¯1 such that
M = E¯1[M¯ ]. We proceed by case analysis on the transition W ⊢
Σ,Υ 〈{N¯m}, T, Sˆ〉
d
−→
F¯
〈{N¯ ′m} ∪ P ′2, T
′, Sˆ′〉, and prove that:
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• if annotΣ,Γ(S) = Sˆ, there exist M¯ ′, S′ s.t. W ⊢Σ,Υ 〈{M¯m}, T, S〉
d
−→
F¯
〈{M¯ ′m} ∪ P ′1, T
′, S′〉
and annotΣ,Γ(S′) = Sˆ′, and for which there exist s¯′ and τ¯ ′ such that Γ ⊢Σ M¯ ′ →֒
N¯ ′ : s¯′, τ¯ ′.
• If P ′2 = {N
′′n} for some expression N ′′ and thread name n, then there exist M ′′ and
s′′ such that P ′1 = {M
′′n} and Γ ⊢Σ M ′′ →֒ N ′′ : s′′, unit.
By case analysis on the structure of N¯ :
N¯ = (flow Fˆ in V2): Here we have N¯
′ = V2, S = S
′, T = T ′ and P ′2 = ∅. By rule
FlowI and Remark B.13, there exist V1, sˆ, such that M¯ = (flow Fˆ in V1) and
Γ ⊢Σ V1 →֒ V2 : sˆ, τ¯ . We then have W ⊢ 〈{M¯
m}, T, S〉
d
−→
F
〈{V1
m}, T, S〉, so we take
M¯ ′ = V1.
N¯ = (allowed Fˆ then Nt else Nf) and W (T (m)) 4 Fˆ : Here we have that N¯
′ =
Nt, S = S
′, T = T ′ and P ′2 = ∅. By AllowI, there exist Mt, Mf , sˆt, sˆf , τˆt and
τˆf such that M¯ = (allowed Fˆ then Mt else Mf ) and Γ ⊢
Σ Mt →֒ Nt : sˆt, τˆt, and
Γ ⊢Σ Mf →֒ Nf : sˆf , τˆf , where s¯ = sˆt ⌣ Fˆ uprise sˆf , τt ≈ τf and τ¯ = τˆt uprise τˆf . We take
s¯′ = sˆt and τ¯
′ = τˆt. We then have W ⊢ 〈{M¯
m}, T, S〉
d
−→
F
〈{Mt
m}, T, S〉, so we take
M¯ ′ =Mt.
N¯ = (threads˙k Nˆ at d): Here we have N¯
′ = (), S = S′, P = {Nˆn} for some thread
name n, T ′(n) = d and W (d) 4 s˙. By MigI, we have that there exists Mˆ such that
M¯ = (threadk Mˆ at d) and Γ ⊢
Σ Mˆ →֒ Nˆ : s˙, unit and τ¯ = unit, and by NilI we
have that Γ ⊢Σ () →֒ () : ℧, unit. Therefore, W ⊢ 〈{M¯m}, T, S〉
d
−→
F
〈{()m, Mˆn}, T, S〉,
so we take M¯ ′ = () and M ′′ = Mˆ .
We then have that W ⊢Σ,Υ 〈{Mm}, T, S〉
d
−→
F
〈{M ′m} ∪ P ′1, T
′, S′〉 with M ′ = E¯1[M¯
′].
By Replacement (Lemma B.17), we can conclude that Γ ⊢Σ E¯1[M¯
′] →֒ E¯2[N¯
′] : s′, τ ′
for some s′, τ ′. Therefore, {M ′m}B{N ′m}, and if P ′2 = {N
′′n}, then P ′1 = {M
′′n} and
{M ′m,M ′′n}B{N ′m, N ′′n}.
B.4.3. Soundness.
Theorem B.21 (Soundness of Enforcement Mechanism III – Theorem 4.14). Consider an
allowed-policy mapping W , reference labeling Σ, typing environment Γ, and a thread configu-
ration 〈P, T 〉 such that for all Mm ∈ P there exist Mˆ , s and τ such that Γ ⊢Σ M →֒ Mˆ : s, τ
and W (T (m)) 4 s. Then 〈Pˆ , T 〉, formed by annotating the threads in 〈P, T 〉, is (W,Σ,Γ)-
confined.
Proof. Consider the following set:
C = {〈P, T 〉 | ∀Mˆm ∈ P, ∃M,s, τ . Γ ⊢Σ M →֒ Mˆ : s, τ and W (T (m)) 4 s}
We show that C is a set of (W,Σ,Γ)-confined thread configurations. As in the proof
of Theorem B.10, if for a given (W,Σ,Γ)-compatible store S we have that there exist
P ′, T ′, S′ such that W ⊢ 〈P, T, S〉
d
−→
F
〈P ′, T ′, S′〉, then, there is a thread Mm such that
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P = {Mm} ∪ P¯ and W ⊢ 〈{Mm}, T, S〉
d
−→
F
〈{Mm} ∪ P¯ ′, T ′, S′〉, with P ′ = {Mm} ∪ P¯ ′ ∪ P¯
and T (m) = d. By induction on the inference of Γ ⊢Σ M →֒ Mˆ : s, τ , we prove thatW (d) 4
F and there exists M ′, s′ and τ ′ such that Γ ⊢Σ M ′ →֒ Mˆ ′ : s′, τ ′ with W (T ′(m)) 4 s′.
Furthermore, if P¯ = Nn for some expression N and thread name N , then there exists M ′,
s′, τ ′ such that Γ ⊢Σ M ′ →֒ Mˆ ′ : s′, τ ′ with W (T ′(m)) 4 s, and there exists N , s′′ such that
Γ ⊢Σ N →֒ Nˆ : s′′, unit with W (T ′(n)) 4 s′′.
Notice that since we necessarily have T ′(m) = T (m) = d, then typability of the threads
that result from the transition step is guaranteed by Subject Reduction (Proposition 4.13).
Also, by the same result, we have compliance of the new declassification effect s′ to the
domain’s allowed flow policy, for: If s upriseW (T (m)) 4 s′, and since W (d) = W (T (m)) 4 s,
then W (T (m)) 4 s′. Furthermore, if P¯ = Nn, then W (T ′(n)) 4 s′′.
It remains to prove the conditions regarding the compliance of the declared flow poli-
cies to the current domain’s allowed flow policy. Assuming that Γ ⊢Σ M →֒ N : s, τ and
W (T (m)) 4 s and by case analysis on the last rule in the corresponding typing proof:
FlowI: Here M = (flow F¯ in M¯), N = (flow F¯ in N¯), and Γ ⊢
Σ M¯ →֒ N¯ : s¯, τ , with
s = s¯uprise F¯ . Then, we have that W (d) 4 s¯. There are two cases to consider:
N¯ can compute: Then W ⊢Σ,Υ 〈{N¯m}, T, S〉
d
−→
F¯ ′
〈{N¯ ′m} ∪ P, T ′, S′〉, with F =
F¯ uprise F¯ ′. By induction hypothesis, then W (T (m)) 4 F¯ ′. Since W (T (m)) =
W (d) 4 F¯ , then W (T (m)) 4 F .
N¯ ∈ Val : Then we have F = ℧, so W (T (m)) 4 F holds vacuously.
AllowI: Here N = (allowed A¯ then N¯t else N¯f ), and we have F = ℧. Therefore
W (T (m)) 4 F holds vacuously.
MigI: In this case we have M = (threadl M¯ at d¯) and N = (thread
s¯
l N¯ at d¯), with
Γ ⊢Σ M¯ →֒ N¯ : s¯, unit. Then we have F = ℧, so W (T (m)) 4 F holds vacuously.
Since N can reduce, then W (d¯) =W (T ′(n)) 4 s¯.
The cases for RefI, DerI, AssI, SeqI, AppI and CondI are similar to FlowI, since
for the cases where the sub-expressions are not all values, these sub-expressions are typed
with a declassification effect s′ that is at least as restrictive as that s′ of the concluding
judgment, i.e. s 4 s′, and so since W (d) 4 s′ then the induction hypothesis can be applied.
Furthermore, for the cases where the sub-expression is ready to reduce, the flow policy that
decorates the transition is the same as F . When the sub-expressions are all values (more
precisely, those that are to be evaluated in the evaluation context provided by each of these
constructs), then F = ℧. The case for RecI is similar to AllowI, since the constructs are
not evaluation contexts, and therefore the transition is decorated with the top flow policy
F = ℧.
B.4.4. Comparison of Enforcement Mechanisms II and III.
Proposition B.22 (Proposition 4.16). If for an allowed policy A and type τ we have that
Γ ⊢ΣA M : τ , then there exist N , s and τ
′ such that Γ ⊢Σ M →֒ N : s, τ ′ with A 4 s and
τ 4 τ ′.
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Proof. By induction on the inference of Γ ⊢ΣA M : τ , and by case analysis on the last rule
used in this typing proof.
Nil: Here M = () and τ = unit. We conclude using NilI, N = (), s = ℧ and τ
′ = unit.
Var: Here M = x and τ = Γ(x). We conclude using VarI, N = x, s = ℧ and
τ ′ = Γ(x).
Abs: Here M = (λx.M¯) and Γ, x : θ¯ ⊢Σ
A¯
M¯ : σ¯ where τ = θ¯
A¯
−→ σ¯. By induction
hypothesis, there exist N¯ , s¯ and σ¯′ such that Γ, x : θ¯ ⊢Σ M¯ →֒ N¯ : s¯, σ¯′ and A¯ 4 s¯
with σ¯ 4 σ¯′. We conclude using AbsI, N = (λx.N¯ ), s = ℧, and τ
′ = θ¯
s¯
−→ σ¯′.
Rec: Here M = (̺x.X¯1), and Γ, x : τ ⊢
Σ
A X¯1 : τ . By induction hypothesis, there exist
X¯2, s¯ and τ¯
′ such that Γ, x : τ ⊢Σ X¯1 →֒ X¯2 : s¯, τ¯
′ and A 4 s¯ with τ 4 τ¯ ′. We
conclude using RecI, N = (̺x.X¯2), s = s¯, and τ
′ = τ¯ ′.
Cond: Here M = (if M¯ then M¯t else M¯f ) and we have Γ ⊢
Σ
A M¯ : bool, Γ ⊢
Σ
A M¯t : τ¯
and Γ ⊢ΣA M¯f : τ¯ where τ¯ = τ . By induction hypothesis, there exist N¯ , N¯t, N¯f , s¯,
s¯t, s¯f , τ¯t and τ¯f such that Γ ⊢
Σ M¯ →֒ N¯ : s¯, bool, Γ ⊢Σ M¯t →֒ N¯t : s¯t, τ¯t and Γ ⊢Σ
M¯f →֒ N¯f : s¯f , τ¯f and A 4 s¯, A 4 s¯t, A 4 s¯f with τ¯ 4 τ¯t and τ¯ 4 τ¯f . Therefore,
A 4 s¯ uprise s¯′t uprise s¯
′
f , and we conclude using rule CondI, N = (if N¯ then N¯t else N¯f ),
s = s¯uprise s¯′t uprise s¯
′
f and τ
′ = τ¯t uprise τ¯f .
Ref: Here M = (refθ M¯ ) and we have Γ ⊢
Σ
A M¯ : θ where τ = θ ref . By induction
hypothesis, there exist N¯ , s¯ and θ′ such that Γ ⊢Σ M¯ →֒ N¯ : s¯, θ′ and A 4 s¯ with
θ 4 θ′. We conclude using rule RefI, N = (ref N¯), s = s¯ and τ
′ = θ ref .
Der: Here M = (! M¯) and we have Γ ⊢ΣA M¯ : τ¯ with τ¯ = τ ref . By induction
hypothesis, there exist N¯ , s¯ and τ¯ ′ such that Γ ⊢Σ M¯ →֒ N¯ : s¯, τ¯ ′ and A 4 s¯ with
τ¯ 4 τ¯ ′. Notice that τ¯ ′ = τ ref . We conclude using rule DerI, N = (! N¯), s = s¯ and
τ ′ = τ .
Assign: Here M = (M¯1 := M¯2) and we have Γ ⊢
Σ
A M¯1 : θ¯ ref and Γ ⊢
Σ
A M¯2 : θ¯ where
τ = unit. By induction hypothesis, there exist N¯1, N¯2, s¯1, s¯2, τ¯
′, and θ¯′ such that
Γ ⊢Σ M¯1 →֒ N¯1 : s¯1, τ¯
′ and Γ ⊢Σ M¯2 →֒ N¯2 : s¯2, θ¯
′ and A 4 s¯1
′, A 4 s¯2
′ with
θ¯ ref 4 τ¯ ′ and θ¯ 4 θ¯′. Notice that τ¯ ′ = θ¯ ref . Therefore, A 4 s¯1
′ uprise s¯2
′, and we
conclude using rule AppI, N = (N¯1 N¯2), s = s¯1
′ uprise s¯2
′ and τ ′ = unit.
App: Here M = (M¯1 M¯2) and we have Γ ⊢
Σ
A M¯1 : θ¯
A
−→ σ¯ and Γ ⊢ΣA M¯2 : θ¯ where
τ = σ¯. By induction hypothesis, there exist N¯1, N¯2, s¯1, s¯2, τ¯
′, and θ¯′ such that
Γ ⊢Σ M¯1 →֒ N¯1 : s¯1, τ¯
′ and Γ ⊢Σ M¯2 →֒ N¯2 : s¯2, θ¯
′ and A 4 s¯1
′, A 4 s¯2
′ with
θ¯
A
−→ σ¯ 4 τ¯ ′ and θ¯ 4 θ¯′. Notice that τ¯ ′ = θ¯
A′′
−−→ σ¯′′, for some A′′ and σ¯′′ such that
A 4 A′′ and σ¯ 4 σ¯′′. Therefore, A 4 s¯1
′ uprise s¯2
′ uprise A′′, and we conclude using rule
AppI, N = (N¯1 N¯2), s = s¯1
′ uprise s¯2
′ upriseA′′ and τ ′ = σ¯′′.
Mig: Here M = (threadl M¯ at d) and we have that Γ ⊢
Σ
Ω M¯ : τ¯ , with τ = τ¯ = unit.
By induction hypothesis, there exist N¯ , s¯, τ¯ ′ such that Γ ⊢Σ M¯ →֒ N¯ : s¯, τ¯ ′ and
Ω 4 s¯ with τ¯ 4 τ¯ ′. We conclude using rule MigI, N = (thread
s¯
l N¯ at d), s = ℧ and
τ ′ = unit.
Flow: Here M = (flow F¯ in M¯) and Γ ⊢ΣA M¯ : τ¯ , with A 4 F¯ and τ = τ¯ . By
induction hypothesis, there exist N¯ , s¯, τ¯ ′ such that Γ ⊢Σ M¯ →֒ N¯ : s¯, τ¯ ′ and
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A 4 s¯ with τ¯ 4 τ¯ ′. Therefore A 4 s¯ uprise F¯ and we conclude using rule FlowI,
N = (flow F¯ in N¯), s = s¯uprise F¯ and τ ′ = τ¯ ′.
Allow: Here M = (allowed F¯ then M¯t else M¯f ) and we have Γ ⊢
Σ
AupriseF¯
M¯t : τ¯ and
Γ ⊢ΣA M¯f : τ¯ where τ¯ = τ . By induction hypothesis, there exist N¯t, N¯f , s¯t, s¯f and
τ¯ ′ such that Γ ⊢Σ M¯t →֒ N¯t : s¯t, τ¯
′ and Γ ⊢Σ M¯f →֒ N¯f : s¯f , τ¯
′ and A uprise F¯ 4 s¯′t,
A 4 s¯′f with τ¯ 4 τ¯
′. Therefore, A 4 s¯′t ⌣ F¯ uprise s¯
′
f , and we conclude using rule
AllowI, N = (allowed F¯ then N¯t else N¯f ), s = s¯
′
t ⌣ F¯ uprise s¯
′
f and τ
′ = τ¯ ′.
The proofs for the cases Loc, BT and BF are analogous to the one for Nil, while the proof
for Seq is analogous to the one for Cond.
